Commit e5fb5d2c authored by James Bottomley's avatar James Bottomley Committed by Jarkko Sakkinen

security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable

The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a
key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using
party needs to know to strip this extra byte.  However, all other
consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the
key.  Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to
migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only
sealed quantity.  This is secure because the key properties are bound
to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't
load.

Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're
loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from
the last byte of old format keys.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
parent f2219745
...@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ struct tpm_buf { ...@@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ struct tpm_buf {
}; };
enum tpm2_object_attributes { enum tpm2_object_attributes {
TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM = BIT(1),
TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT = BIT(4),
TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6),
}; };
......
...@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, ...@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
int blob_len = 0; int blob_len = 0;
struct tpm_buf buf; struct tpm_buf buf;
u32 hash; u32 hash;
u32 flags;
int i; int i;
int rc; int rc;
...@@ -265,31 +266,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, ...@@ -265,31 +266,32 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */ /* sensitive */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len + 1); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
if (options->blobauth_len) if (options->blobauth_len)
tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len + 1); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, payload->migratable);
/* public */ /* public */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
flags |= payload->migratable ? (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT) : 0;
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags);
/* policy */ /* policy */
if (options->policydigest_len) {
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
if (options->policydigest_len)
tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest, tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
options->policydigest_len); options->policydigest_len);
} else {
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
}
/* public parameters */ /* public parameters */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL); tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
...@@ -364,8 +366,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, ...@@ -364,8 +366,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
unsigned int private_len; unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len; unsigned int public_len;
unsigned int blob_len; unsigned int blob_len;
u8 *blob; u8 *blob, *pub;
int rc; int rc;
u32 attrs;
rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
if (rc) { if (rc) {
...@@ -392,6 +395,16 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, ...@@ -392,6 +395,16 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG; return -E2BIG;
pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
/* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
attrs = get_unaligned_be32(pub + 4);
if ((attrs & (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT)) ==
(TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT))
payload->migratable = 0;
else
payload->migratable = 1;
blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
return -E2BIG; return -E2BIG;
...@@ -472,7 +485,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, ...@@ -472,7 +485,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (!rc) { if (!rc) {
data_len = be16_to_cpup( data_len = be16_to_cpup(
(__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]);
if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1) { if (data_len < MIN_KEY_SIZE || data_len > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
rc = -EFAULT; rc = -EFAULT;
goto out; goto out;
} }
...@@ -483,9 +496,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, ...@@ -483,9 +496,19 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
} }
data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6]; data = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6];
if (payload->old_format) {
/* migratable flag is at the end of the key */
memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1); memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len - 1);
payload->key_len = data_len - 1; payload->key_len = data_len - 1;
payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1]; payload->migratable = data[data_len - 1];
} else {
/*
* migratable flag already collected from key
* attributes
*/
memcpy(payload->key, data, data_len);
payload->key_len = data_len;
}
} }
out: out:
......
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