Commit b47acbf4 authored by Gregory P. Smith's avatar Gregory P. Smith

Fixes Issue #6972: The zipfile module no longer overwrites files outside of

its destination path when extracting malicious zip files.
parent 04d86c7c
......@@ -214,6 +214,16 @@ ZipFile Objects
to extract to. *member* can be a filename or a :class:`ZipInfo` object.
*pwd* is the password used for encrypted files.
.. note::
If a member filename is an absolute path, a drive/UNC sharepoint and
leading (back)slashes will be stripped, e.g.: ``///foo/bar`` becomes
``foo/bar`` on Unix, and ``С:\foo\bar`` becomes ``foo\bar`` on Windows.
And all ``".."`` components in a member filename will be removed, e.g.:
``../../foo../../ba..r`` becomes ``foo../ba..r``. On Windows illegal
characters (``:``, ``<``, ``>``, ``|``, ``"``, ``?``, and ``*``)
replaced by underscore (``_``).
.. method:: ZipFile.extractall(path=None, members=None, pwd=None)
......@@ -222,12 +232,9 @@ ZipFile Objects
be a subset of the list returned by :meth:`namelist`. *pwd* is the password
used for encrypted files.
.. warning::
.. note::
Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members
that have absolute filenames starting with ``"/"`` or filenames with two
dots ``".."``.
See :meth:`extract` note.
.. method:: ZipFile.printdir()
......
......@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ DATAFILES_DIR = 'zipfile_datafiles'
SMALL_TEST_DATA = [('_ziptest1', '1q2w3e4r5t'),
('ziptest2dir/_ziptest2', 'qawsedrftg'),
('/ziptest2dir/ziptest3dir/_ziptest3', 'azsxdcfvgb'),
('ziptest2dir/ziptest3dir/_ziptest3', 'azsxdcfvgb'),
('ziptest2dir/ziptest3dir/ziptest4dir/_ziptest3', '6y7u8i9o0p')]
......@@ -409,9 +409,6 @@ class TestsWithSourceFile(unittest.TestCase):
writtenfile = zipfp.extract(fpath)
# make sure it was written to the right place
if os.path.isabs(fpath):
correctfile = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), fpath[1:])
else:
correctfile = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), fpath)
correctfile = os.path.normpath(correctfile)
......@@ -434,9 +431,6 @@ class TestsWithSourceFile(unittest.TestCase):
with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, "r") as zipfp:
zipfp.extractall()
for fpath, fdata in SMALL_TEST_DATA:
if os.path.isabs(fpath):
outfile = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), fpath[1:])
else:
outfile = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), fpath)
with open(outfile, "rb") as f:
......@@ -447,6 +441,80 @@ class TestsWithSourceFile(unittest.TestCase):
# remove the test file subdirectories
shutil.rmtree(os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'ziptest2dir'))
def check_file(self, filename, content):
self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(filename))
with open(filename, 'rb') as f:
self.assertEqual(f.read(), content)
def test_extract_hackers_arcnames(self):
hacknames = [
('../foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
('foo/../bar', 'foo/bar'),
('foo/../../bar', 'foo/bar'),
('foo/bar/..', 'foo/bar'),
('./../foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
('/foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
('/foo/../bar', 'foo/bar'),
('/foo/../../bar', 'foo/bar'),
('//foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
('../../foo../../ba..r', 'foo../ba..r'),
]
if os.path.sep == '\\': # Windows.
hacknames.extend([
(r'..\foo\bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'..\/foo\/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'foo/\..\/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'foo\/../\bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'C:foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'C:/foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'C://foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'C:\foo\bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'//conky/mountpoint/foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'\\conky\mountpoint\foo\bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'///conky/mountpoint/foo/bar', 'conky/mountpoint/foo/bar'),
(r'\\\conky\mountpoint\foo\bar', 'conky/mountpoint/foo/bar'),
(r'//conky//mountpoint/foo/bar', 'conky/mountpoint/foo/bar'),
(r'\\conky\\mountpoint\foo\bar', 'conky/mountpoint/foo/bar'),
(r'//?/C:/foo/bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'\\?\C:\foo\bar', 'foo/bar'),
(r'C:/../C:/foo/bar', 'C_/foo/bar'),
(r'a:b\c<d>e|f"g?h*i', 'b/c_d_e_f_g_h_i'),
])
for arcname, fixedname in hacknames:
content = b'foobar' + arcname.encode()
with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_STORED) as zipfp:
zipfp.writestr(arcname, content)
targetpath = os.path.join('target', 'subdir', 'subsub')
correctfile = os.path.join(targetpath, *fixedname.split('/'))
with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, 'r') as zipfp:
writtenfile = zipfp.extract(arcname, targetpath)
self.assertEqual(writtenfile, correctfile)
self.check_file(correctfile, content)
shutil.rmtree('target')
with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, 'r') as zipfp:
zipfp.extractall(targetpath)
self.check_file(correctfile, content)
shutil.rmtree('target')
correctfile = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), *fixedname.split('/'))
with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, 'r') as zipfp:
writtenfile = zipfp.extract(arcname)
self.assertEqual(writtenfile, correctfile)
self.check_file(correctfile, content)
shutil.rmtree(fixedname.split('/')[0])
with zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, 'r') as zipfp:
zipfp.extractall()
self.check_file(correctfile, content)
shutil.rmtree(fixedname.split('/')[0])
os.remove(TESTFN2)
def test_writestr_compression(self):
zipfp = zipfile.ZipFile(TESTFN2, "w")
zipfp.writestr("a.txt", "hello world", compress_type=zipfile.ZIP_STORED)
......
......@@ -1062,17 +1062,22 @@ class ZipFile:
"""
# build the destination pathname, replacing
# forward slashes to platform specific separators.
# Strip trailing path separator, unless it represents the root.
if (targetpath[-1:] in (os.path.sep, os.path.altsep)
and len(os.path.splitdrive(targetpath)[1]) > 1):
targetpath = targetpath[:-1]
# don't include leading "/" from file name if present
if member.filename[0] == '/':
targetpath = os.path.join(targetpath, member.filename[1:])
else:
targetpath = os.path.join(targetpath, member.filename)
arcname = member.filename.replace('/', os.path.sep)
if os.path.altsep:
arcname = arcname.replace(os.path.altsep, os.path.sep)
# interpret absolute pathname as relative, remove drive letter or
# UNC path, redundant separators, "." and ".." components.
arcname = os.path.splitdrive(arcname)[1]
arcname = os.path.sep.join(x for x in arcname.split(os.path.sep)
if x not in ('', os.path.curdir, os.path.pardir))
# filter illegal characters on Windows
if os.path.sep == '\\':
illegal = ':<>|"?*'
table = str.maketrans(illegal, '_' * len(illegal))
arcname = arcname.translate(table)
targetpath = os.path.join(targetpath, arcname)
targetpath = os.path.normpath(targetpath)
# Create all upper directories if necessary.
......
......@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ Core and Builtins
Library
-------
- Issue #6972: The zipfile module no longer overwrites files outside of
its destination path when extracting malicious zip files.
- Issue #4844: ZipFile now raises BadZipFile when opens a ZIP file with an
incomplete "End of Central Directory" record. Original patch by Guilherme
Polo and Alan McIntyre.
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment