x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations

commit d90a7a0e upstream

Introduce the 'l1tf=' kernel command line option to allow for boot-time
switching of mitigation that is used on processors affected by L1TF.

The possible values are:

  full
	Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability. Disables
	SMT and enables all mitigations in the hypervisors. SMT control via
	/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible after boot.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in
	a potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  full,force
	Same as 'full', but disables SMT control. Implies the 'nosmt=force'
	command line option. sysfs control of SMT and the hypervisor flush
	control is disabled.

  flush
	Leaves SMT enabled and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation.
	Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in a
	potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
	disabled.

  flush,nosmt
	Disables SMT and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation. SMT
	control via /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible
	after boot. If SMT is reenabled or flushing disabled at runtime
	hypervisors will issue a warning.

  flush,nowarn
	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when
	a VM is started in a potentially insecure configuration.

  off
	Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings.

Default is 'flush'.

Let KVM adhere to these semantics, which means:

  - 'lt1f=full,force'	: Performe L1D flushes. No runtime control
    			  possible.

  - 'l1tf=full'
  - 'l1tf-flush'
  - 'l1tf=flush,nosmt'	: Perform L1D flushes and warn on VM start if
			  SMT has been runtime enabled or L1D flushing
			  has been run-time enabled

  - 'l1tf=flush,nowarn'	: Perform L1D flushes and no warnings are emitted.

  - 'l1tf=off'		: L1D flushes are not performed and no warnings
			  are emitted.

KVM can always override the L1D flushing behavior using its 'vmentry_l1d_flush'
module parameter except when lt1f=full,force is set.

This makes KVM's private 'nosmt' option redundant, and as it is a bit
non-systematic anyway (this is something to control globally, not on
hypervisor level), remove that option.

Add the missing Documentation entry for the l1tf vulnerability sysfs file
while at it.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.202758176@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -368,6 +369,9 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
+		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
+		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1989,12 +1989,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			for all guests.
 			Default is 1 (enabled) if in 64-bit or 32-bit PAE mode.
 
-	kvm-intel.nosmt=[KVM,Intel] If the L1TF CPU bug is present (CVE-2018-3620)
-			and the system has SMT (aka Hyper-Threading) enabled then
-			don't allow guests to be created.
-
-			Default is 0 (allow guests to be created).
-
 	kvm-intel.ept=	[KVM,Intel] Disable extended page tables
 			(virtualized MMU) support on capable Intel chips.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
@@ -2032,6 +2026,68 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
+	l1tf=           [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on
+			      affected CPUs
+
+			The kernel PTE inversion protection is unconditionally
+			enabled and cannot be disabled.
+
+			full
+				Provides all available mitigations for the
+				L1TF vulnerability. Disables SMT and
+				enables all mitigations in the
+				hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			full,force
+				Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D
+				flush runtime control. Implies the
+				'nosmt=force' command line option.
+				(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+			flush
+				Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation, i.e. conditional
+				L1D flush.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nosmt
+
+				Disables SMT and enables the default
+				hypervisor mitigation.
+
+				SMT control and L1D flush control via the
+				sysfs interface is still possible after
+				boot.  Hypervisors will issue a warning
+				when the first VM is started in a
+				potentially insecure configuration,
+				i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush disabled.
+
+			flush,nowarn
+				Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not
+				warn when a VM is started in a potentially
+				insecure configuration.
+
+			off
+				Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
+				emit any warnings.
+
+			Default is 'flush'.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
 	l3cr=		[PPC]

arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

@@ -860,4 +860,16 @@ bool xen_set_default_idle(void);
 
 void stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
 void df_debug(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code);
+
+enum l1tf_mitigations {
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE
+};
+
+extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -643,7 +643,11 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
+
 enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
 #endif
@@ -655,6 +659,20 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		break;
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+		break;
+	case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+		cpu_smt_disable(true);
+		break;
+	}
+
 #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
 	pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
 	return;
@@ -673,6 +691,32 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
 }
+
+static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c

@@ -69,9 +69,6 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
 
-static bool __read_mostly nosmt;
-module_param(nosmt, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
 static bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
 module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
 
@@ -216,15 +213,31 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
 {
 	struct page *page;
 
-	/* If set to 'auto' select 'cond' */
-	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
-		l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
-
 	if (!enable_ept) {
 		l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
+	if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+			break;
+		}
+	} else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
+		l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
+	}
+
 	if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
 		page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
@@ -9500,16 +9513,33 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-#define L1TF_MSG "SMT enabled with L1TF CPU bug present. Refer to CVE-2018-3620 for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
 static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED) {
-		if (nosmt) {
-			pr_err(L1TF_MSG);
-			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
+		switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+			/* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+			/*
+			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
+			 * insecure environment.
+			 */
+			if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
+			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
+				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
+			break;
+		case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+			/* Flush is enforced */
+			break;
 		}
-		pr_warn(L1TF_MSG);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }