Merge tag 'landlock-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux

Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
 "This brings ioctl control to Landlock, contributed by Günther Noack.
  This also adds him as a Landlock reviewer, and fixes an issue in the
  sample"

* tag 'landlock-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
  MAINTAINERS: Add Günther Noack as Landlock reviewer
  fs/ioctl: Add a comment to keep the logic in sync with LSM policies
  MAINTAINERS: Notify Landlock maintainers about changes to fs/ioctl.c
  landlock: Document IOCTL support
  samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
  selftests/landlock: Exhaustive test for the IOCTL allow-list
  selftests/landlock: Check IOCTL restrictions for named UNIX domain sockets
  selftests/landlock: Test IOCTLs on named pipes
  selftests/landlock: Test ioctl(2) and ftruncate(2) with open(O_PATH)
  selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL with memfds
  selftests/landlock: Test IOCTL support
  landlock: Add IOCTL access right for character and block devices
  samples/landlock: Fix incorrect free in populate_ruleset_net

Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
 =====================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2023
+:Date: April 2024
 
 The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
 filesystem or network access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK |
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
-            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE |
+            LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
         .handled_access_net =
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
@@ -85,10 +86,10 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
 Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
 executed, it is safer to follow a best-effort security approach.  Indeed, we
 should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
-using.  To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
-none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
-of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses.  Let's check if we should
-remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the ABI.
+using.
+
+To be compatible with older Linux versions, we detect the available Landlock ABI
+version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
 
 .. code-block:: c
 
@@ -114,6 +115,10 @@ remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the ABI.
         ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
             ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
               LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
+        __attribute__((fallthrough));
+    case 4:
+        /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */
+        ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
     }
 
 This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -225,6 +230,7 @@ access rights per directory enables to change the location of such directory
 without relying on the destination directory access rights (except those that
 are required for this operation, see ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER``
 documentation).
+
 Having self-sufficient hierarchies also helps to tighten the required access
 rights to the minimal set of data.  This also helps avoid sinkhole directories,
 i.e.  directories where data can be linked to but not linked from.  However,
@@ -318,18 +324,26 @@ It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the
 system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags
 ``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``.
 
-When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
-right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be used for
-subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`.  The behavior is
-similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked
-during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and
+The truncate right is associated with the opened file (see below).
+
+Rights associated with file descriptors
+---------------------------------------
+
+When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` and
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` rights is associated with the newly created
+file descriptor and will be used for subsequent truncation and ioctl attempts
+using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` and :manpage:`ioctl(2)`.  The behavior is similar
+to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked during
+:manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and
 :manpage:`write(2)` calls.
 
-As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors for the
-same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other does
-not.  It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes,
-keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have an
-enforced Landlock ruleset.
+As a consequence, it is possible that a process has multiple open file
+descriptors referring to the same file, but Landlock enforces different things
+when operating with these file descriptors.  This can happen when a Landlock
+ruleset gets enforced and the process keeps file descriptors which were opened
+both before and after the enforcement.  It is also possible to pass such file
+descriptors between processes, keeping their Landlock properties, even when some
+of the involved processes do not have an enforced Landlock ruleset.
 
 Compatibility
 =============
@@ -458,6 +472,28 @@ Memory usage
 Kernel memory allocated to create rulesets is accounted and can be restricted
 by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst.
 
+IOCTL support
+-------------
+
+The ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right restricts the use of
+:manpage:`ioctl(2)`, but it only applies to *newly opened* device files.  This
+means specifically that pre-existing file descriptors like stdin, stdout and
+stderr are unaffected.
+
+Users should be aware that TTY devices have traditionally permitted to control
+other processes on the same TTY through the ``TIOCSTI`` and ``TIOCLINUX`` IOCTL
+commands.  Both of these require ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` on modern Linux systems, but
+the behavior is configurable for ``TIOCSTI``.
+
+On older systems, it is therefore recommended to close inherited TTY file
+descriptors, or to reopen them from ``/proc/self/fd/*`` without the
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right, if possible.
+
+Landlock's IOCTL support is coarse-grained at the moment, but may become more
+fine-grained in the future.  Until then, users are advised to establish the
+guarantees that they need through the file hierarchy, by only allowing the
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right on files where it is really required.
+
 Previous limitations
 ====================
 
@@ -495,6 +531,16 @@ bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed ports thanks to the new
 ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` and ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP``
 access rights.
 
+IOCTL (ABI < 5)
+---------------
+
+IOCTL operations could not be denied before the fifth Landlock ABI, so
+:manpage:`ioctl(2)` is always allowed when using a kernel that only supports an
+earlier ABI.
+
+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the use of
+:manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV`` right.
+
 .. _kernel_support:
 
 Kernel support

MAINTAINERS

@@ -12374,12 +12374,14 @@ F:	net/l3mdev
 
 LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE
 M:	Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
+R:	Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
 L:	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Supported
 W:	https://landlock.io
 T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git
 F:	Documentation/security/landlock.rst
 F:	Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+F:	fs/ioctl.c
 F:	include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
 F:	samples/landlock/
 F:	security/landlock/

fs/ioctl.c

@@ -796,6 +796,9 @@ static int ioctl_get_fs_sysfs_path(struct file *file, void __user *argp)
  *
  * When you add any new common ioctls to the switches above and below,
  * please ensure they have compatible arguments in compat mode.
+ *
+ * The LSM mailing list should also be notified of any command additions or
+ * changes, as specific LSMs may be affected.
  */
 static int do_vfs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int fd,
 			unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)

include/uapi/linux/landlock.h

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  * files and directories.  Files or directories opened before the sandboxing
  * are not subject to these restrictions.
  *
- * A file can only receive these access rights:
+ * The following access rights apply only to files:
  *
  * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file.
  * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
@@ -138,12 +138,13 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access.
  * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`,
  *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with
- *   ``O_TRUNC``. Whether an opened file can be truncated with
- *   :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the
- *   same way as read and write permissions are checked during
- *   :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and
- *   %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the
- *   third version of the Landlock ABI.
+ *   ``O_TRUNC``.  This access right is available since the third version of the
+ *   Landlock ABI.
+ *
+ * Whether an opened file can be truncated with :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` or used
+ * with `ioctl(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the same way as
+ * read and write permissions are checked during :manpage:`open(2)` using
+ * %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE.
  *
  * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories.  The
  * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -198,13 +199,33 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  *   If multiple requirements are not met, the ``EACCES`` error code takes
  *   precedence over ``EXDEV``.
  *
+ * The following access right applies both to files and directories:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV: Invoke :manpage:`ioctl(2)` commands on an opened
+ *   character or block device.
+ *
+ *   This access right applies to all `ioctl(2)` commands implemented by device
+ *   drivers.  However, the following common IOCTL commands continue to be
+ *   invokable independent of the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right:
+ *
+ *   * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptors (``FIOCLEX``, ``FIONCLEX``),
+ *   * IOCTL commands targeting file descriptions (``FIONBIO``, ``FIOASYNC``),
+ *   * IOCTL commands targeting file systems (``FIFREEZE``, ``FITHAW``,
+ *     ``FIGETBSZ``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSUUID``, ``FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH``)
+ *   * Some IOCTL commands which do not make sense when used with devices, but
+ *     whose implementations are safe and return the right error codes
+ *     (``FS_IOC_FIEMAP``, ``FICLONE``, ``FICLONERANGE``, ``FIDEDUPERANGE``)
+ *
+ *   This access right is available since the fifth version of the Landlock
+ *   ABI.
+ *
  * .. warning::
  *
  *   It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions
  *   accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`,
  *   :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`,
  *   :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`,
- *   :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`.
+ *   :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`.
  *   Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
@@ -223,6 +244,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM			(1ULL << 12)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER			(1ULL << 13)
 #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE			(1ULL << 14)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV			(1ULL << 15)
 /* clang-format on */
 
 /**

samples/landlock/sandboxer.c

@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
 
 /* clang-format on */
 
@@ -153,7 +154,7 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
 				const __u64 allowed_access)
 {
 	int ret = 1;
-	char *env_port_name, *strport;
+	char *env_port_name, *env_port_name_next, *strport;
 	struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port = {
 		.allowed_access = allowed_access,
 		.port = 0,
@@ -165,7 +166,8 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
 	env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name);
 	unsetenv(env_var);
 
-	while ((strport = strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
+	env_port_name_next = env_port_name;
+	while ((strport = strsep(&env_port_name_next, ENV_DELIMITER))) {
 		net_port.port = atoi(strport);
 		if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
 				      &net_port, 0)) {
@@ -201,11 +203,12 @@ static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
 
 /* clang-format on */
 
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 4
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 5
 
 int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 {
@@ -319,6 +322,11 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
 		ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
 			~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
 			  LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
+		__attribute__((fallthrough));
+	case 4:
+		/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV for ABI < 5 */
+		ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+
 		fprintf(stderr,
 			"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
 			"to leverage Landlock features "

security/landlock/fs.c

@@ -5,8 +5,11 @@
  * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
  * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
  * Copyright © 2021-2022 Microsoft Corporation
+ * Copyright © 2022 Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
+ * Copyright © 2023-2024 Google LLC
  */
 
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
 #include <kunit/test.h>
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
@@ -14,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler_types.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/falloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -29,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/wait_bit.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/fiemap.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
@@ -84,6 +89,160 @@ static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
 	.release = release_inode
 };
 
+/* IOCTL helpers */
+
+/**
+ * is_masked_device_ioctl - Determine whether an IOCTL command is always
+ * permitted with Landlock for device files.  These commands can not be
+ * restricted on device files by enforcing a Landlock policy.
+ *
+ * @cmd: The IOCTL command that is supposed to be run.
+ *
+ * By default, any IOCTL on a device file requires the
+ * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right.  However, we blanket-permit some
+ * commands, if:
+ *
+ * 1. The command is implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl(),
+ *    not in f_ops->unlocked_ioctl() or f_ops->compat_ioctl().
+ *
+ * 2. The command is harmless when invoked on devices.
+ *
+ * We also permit commands that do not make sense for devices, but where the
+ * do_vfs_ioctl() implementation returns a more conventional error code.
+ *
+ * Any new IOCTL commands that are implemented in fs/ioctl.c's do_vfs_ioctl()
+ * should be considered for inclusion here.
+ *
+ * Returns: true if the IOCTL @cmd can not be restricted with Landlock for
+ * device files.
+ */
+static __attribute_const__ bool is_masked_device_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	/*
+	 * FIOCLEX, FIONCLEX, FIONBIO and FIOASYNC manipulate the FD's
+	 * close-on-exec and the file's buffered-IO and async flags.  These
+	 * operations are also available through fcntl(2), and are
+	 * unconditionally permitted in Landlock.
+	 */
+	case FIOCLEX:
+	case FIONCLEX:
+	case FIONBIO:
+	case FIOASYNC:
+	/*
+	 * FIOQSIZE queries the size of a regular file, directory, or link.
+	 *
+	 * We still permit it, because it always returns -ENOTTY for
+	 * other file types.
+	 */
+	case FIOQSIZE:
+	/*
+	 * FIFREEZE and FITHAW freeze and thaw the file system which the
+	 * given file belongs to.  Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
+	 *
+	 * These commands operate on the file system's superblock rather
+	 * than on the file itself.  The same operations can also be
+	 * done through any other file or directory on the same file
+	 * system, so it is safe to permit these.
+	 */
+	case FIFREEZE:
+	case FITHAW:
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC_FIEMAP queries information about the allocation of
+	 * blocks within a file.
+	 *
+	 * This IOCTL command only makes sense for regular files and is
+	 * not implemented by devices. It is harmless to permit.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC_FIEMAP:
+	/*
+	 * FIGETBSZ queries the file system's block size for a file or
+	 * directory.
+	 *
+	 * This command operates on the file system's superblock rather
+	 * than on the file itself.  The same operation can also be done
+	 * through any other file or directory on the same file system,
+	 * so it is safe to permit it.
+	 */
+	case FIGETBSZ:
+	/*
+	 * FICLONE, FICLONERANGE and FIDEDUPERANGE make files share
+	 * their underlying storage ("reflink") between source and
+	 * destination FDs, on file systems which support that.
+	 *
+	 * These IOCTL commands only apply to regular files
+	 * and are harmless to permit for device files.
+	 */
+	case FICLONE:
+	case FICLONERANGE:
+	case FIDEDUPERANGE:
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC_GETFSUUID and FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH both operate on
+	 * the file system superblock, not on the specific file, so
+	 * these operations are available through any other file on the
+	 * same file system as well.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC_GETFSUUID:
+	case FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH:
+		return true;
+
+	/*
+	 * FIONREAD, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and
+	 * FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR are forwarded to device implementations.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * file_ioctl() commands (FIBMAP, FS_IOC_RESVSP, FS_IOC_RESVSP64,
+	 * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 and FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE) are
+	 * forwarded to device implementations, so not permitted.
+	 */
+
+	/* Other commands are guarded by the access right. */
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * is_masked_device_ioctl_compat - same as the helper above, but checking the
+ * "compat" IOCTL commands.
+ *
+ * The IOCTL commands with special handling in compat-mode should behave the
+ * same as their non-compat counterparts.
+ */
+static __attribute_const__ bool
+is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(const unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	switch (cmd) {
+	/* FICLONE is permitted, same as in the non-compat variant. */
+	case FICLONE:
+		return true;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC_RESVSP_32, FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32,
+	 * FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32: not blanket-permitted,
+	 * for consistency with their non-compat variants.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC_RESVSP_32:
+	case FS_IOC_RESVSP64_32:
+	case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP_32:
+	case FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64_32:
+	case FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE_32:
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS, FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS are forwarded to their device
+	 * implementations.
+	 */
+	case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
+	case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
+		return false;
+	default:
+		return is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd);
+	}
+}
+
 /* Ruleset management */
 
 static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
@@ -148,7 +307,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
 /* clang-format on */
 
 /*
@@ -1332,11 +1492,18 @@ static int hook_file_alloc_security(struct file *const file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool is_device(const struct file *const file)
+{
+	const struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	return S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode);
+}
+
 static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 {
 	layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
-	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
-	const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access,
+		optional_access;
 	const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 		get_fs_domain(landlock_cred(file->f_cred)->domain);
 
@@ -1354,6 +1521,10 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 	 * We look up more access than what we immediately need for open(), so
 	 * that we can later authorize operations on opened files.
 	 */
+	optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+	if (is_device(file))
+		optional_access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV;
+
 	full_access_request = open_access_request | optional_access;
 
 	if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
@@ -1410,6 +1581,52 @@ static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file)
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
+static int hook_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			   unsigned long arg)
+{
+	access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
+
+	/*
+	 * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which
+	 * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later.
+	 *
+	 * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open().
+	 */
+	if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!is_device(file))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_masked_device_ioctl(cmd))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+				  unsigned long arg)
+{
+	access_mask_t allowed_access = landlock_file(file)->allowed_access;
+
+	/*
+	 * It is the access rights at the time of opening the file which
+	 * determine whether IOCTL can be used on the opened file later.
+	 *
+	 * The access right is attached to the opened file in hook_file_open().
+	 */
+	if (allowed_access & LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!is_device(file))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_masked_device_ioctl_compat(cmd))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
 
@@ -1432,6 +1649,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, hook_file_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, hook_file_truncate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, hook_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, hook_file_ioctl_compat),
 };
 
 __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)

security/landlock/limits.h

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS		16
 #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES		U32_MAX
 
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS		LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS		((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
 #define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS	0

security/landlock/syscalls.c

@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
 	.write = fop_dummy_write,
 };
 
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 5
 
 /**
  * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
 	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
 		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
 	};
-	ASSERT_EQ(4, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+	ASSERT_EQ(5, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
 					     LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c

@@ -8,22 +8,34 @@
  */
 
 #define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <asm/termbits.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <libgen.h>
+#include <linux/fiemap.h>
 #include <linux/landlock.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <sched.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <sys/mount.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <sys/sendfile.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
 #include <sys/vfs.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
+/*
+ * Intentionally included last to work around header conflict.
+ * See https://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/Synchronizing_Headers.
+ */
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
 #include "common.h"
 
 #ifndef renameat2
@@ -536,9 +548,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
 	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
-	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
+	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
 
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV
 
 #define ACCESS_ALL ( \
 	ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -743,6 +756,9 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; rules[i].path; i++) {
+		if (!rules[i].access)
+			continue;
+
 		add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access,
 				 rules[i].path);
 	}
@@ -3451,7 +3467,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled)
 			      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
 	int ruleset_fd;
 
-	/* Enable Landlock. */
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
 	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
 
 	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
@@ -3534,7 +3550,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate)
 			      LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
 	int ruleset_fd;
 
-	/* Enable Landlock. */
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
 	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, handled, rules);
 
 	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
@@ -3760,7 +3776,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate)
 	};
 	int fd, ruleset_fd;
 
-	/* Enable Landlock. */
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
 	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
 	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
@@ -3837,22 +3853,471 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate_in_different_processes)
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1]));
 }
 
-TEST(memfd_ftruncate)
+/* Invokes the FS_IOC_GETFLAGS IOCTL and returns its errno or 0. */
+static int test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl(int fd)
 {
-	int fd;
+	uint32_t flags;
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, &flags) < 0)
+		return errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+TEST(memfd_ftruncate_and_ioctl)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd, fd, i;
+
+	/*
+	 * We exercise the same test both with and without Landlock enabled, to
+	 * ensure that it behaves the same in both cases.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		/* Creates a new memfd. */
+		fd = memfd_create("name", MFD_CLOEXEC);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+		/*
+		 * Checks that operations associated with the opened file
+		 * (ftruncate, ioctl) are permitted on file descriptors that are
+		 * created in ways other than open(2).
+		 */
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl(fd));
+
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+		/* Enables Landlock. */
+		ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+		enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+		ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+	}
+}
+
+static int test_fionread_ioctl(int fd)
+{
+	size_t sz = 0;
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, FIONREAD, &sz) < 0 && errno == EACCES)
+		return errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, o_path_ftruncate_and_ioctl)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL,
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd, fd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that for files opened with O_PATH, both ioctl(2) and
+	 * ftruncate(2) yield EBADF, as it is documented in open(2) for the
+	 * O_PATH flag.
+	 */
+	fd = open(dir_s1d1, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(EBADF, test_ftruncate(fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EBADF, test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl(fd));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that after enabling Landlock,
+	 * - the file can still be opened with O_PATH
+	 * - both ioctl and truncate still yield EBADF (not EACCES).
+	 */
+	fd = open(dir_s1d1, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(EBADF, test_ftruncate(fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EBADF, test_fs_ioc_getflags_ioctl(fd));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ioctl_error - generically call the given ioctl with a pointer to a
+ * sufficiently large zeroed-out memory region.
+ *
+ * Returns the IOCTLs error, or 0.
+ */
+static int ioctl_error(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, int fd,
+		       unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	char buf[128]; /* sufficiently large */
+	int res, stdinbak_fd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Depending on the IOCTL command, parts of the zeroed-out buffer might
+	 * be interpreted as file descriptor numbers.  We do not want to
+	 * accidentally operate on file descriptor 0 (stdin), so we temporarily
+	 * move stdin to a different FD and close FD 0 for the IOCTL call.
+	 */
+	stdinbak_fd = dup(0);
+	ASSERT_LT(0, stdinbak_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(0));
+
+	/* Invokes the IOCTL with a zeroed-out buffer. */
+	bzero(&buf, sizeof(buf));
+	res = ioctl(fd, cmd, &buf);
+
+	/* Restores the old FD 0 and closes the backup FD. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, dup2(stdinbak_fd, 0));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(stdinbak_fd));
+
+	if (res < 0)
+		return errno;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Define some linux/falloc.h IOCTL commands which are not available in uapi headers. */
+struct space_resv {
+	__s16 l_type;
+	__s16 l_whence;
+	__s64 l_start;
+	__s64 l_len; /* len == 0 means until end of file */
+	__s32 l_sysid;
+	__u32 l_pid;
+	__s32 l_pad[4]; /* reserved area */
+};
+
+#define FS_IOC_RESVSP _IOW('X', 40, struct space_resv)
+#define FS_IOC_UNRESVSP _IOW('X', 41, struct space_resv)
+#define FS_IOC_RESVSP64 _IOW('X', 42, struct space_resv)
+#define FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64 _IOW('X', 43, struct space_resv)
+#define FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE _IOW('X', 57, struct space_resv)
+
+/*
+ * Tests a series of blanket-permitted and denied IOCTLs.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, blanket_permitted_ioctls)
+{
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+	};
+	int ruleset_fd, fd;
 
-	fd = memfd_create("name", MFD_CLOEXEC);
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
 	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
 
 	/*
-	 * Checks that ftruncate is permitted on file descriptors that are
-	 * created in ways other than open(2).
+	 * Checks permitted commands.
+	 * These ones may return errors, but should not be blocked by Landlock.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIOCLEX));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIONCLEX));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIONBIO));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIOASYNC));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIOQSIZE));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIFREEZE));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FITHAW));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIGETBSZ));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FICLONE));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FICLONERANGE));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIDEDUPERANGE));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_GETFSUUID));
+	EXPECT_NE(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_GETFSSYSFSPATH));
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks blocked commands.
+	 * A call to a blocked IOCTL command always returns EACCES.
 	 */
-	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(fd));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIONREAD));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FIBMAP));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_RESVSP));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_RESVSP64));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_UNRESVSP64));
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, FS_IOC_ZERO_RANGE));
+
+	/* Default case is also blocked. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, ioctl_error(_metadata, fd, 0xc00ffeee));
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
 }
 
+/*
+ * Named pipes are not governed by the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV right,
+ * because they are not character or block devices.
+ */
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_pipe_ioctl)
+{
+	pid_t child_pid;
+	int fd, ruleset_fd;
+	const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+	};
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, mkfifo(path, 0600));
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	/* The child process opens the pipe for writing. */
+	child_pid = fork();
+	ASSERT_NE(-1, child_pid);
+	if (child_pid == 0) {
+		fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+		close(fd);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+
+	/* FIONREAD is implemented by pipefifo_fops. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fionread_ioctl(fd));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0));
+}
+
+/* For named UNIX domain sockets, no IOCTL restrictions apply. */
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, named_unix_domain_socket_ioctl)
+{
+	const char *const path = file1_s1d1;
+	int srv_fd, cli_fd, ruleset_fd;
+	socklen_t size;
+	struct sockaddr_un srv_un, cli_un;
+	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr attr = {
+		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+	};
+
+	/* Sets up a server */
+	srv_un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strncpy(srv_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(srv_un.sun_path));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(path));
+	srv_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, srv_fd);
+
+	size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(srv_un.sun_path);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&srv_un, size));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, listen(srv_fd, 10 /* qlen */));
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&attr, sizeof(attr), 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	/* Sets up a client connection to it */
+	cli_un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	cli_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, cli_fd);
+
+	size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(cli_un.sun_path);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, size));
+
+	bzero(&cli_un, sizeof(cli_un));
+	cli_un.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strncpy(cli_un.sun_path, path, sizeof(cli_un.sun_path));
+	size = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(cli_un.sun_path);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(cli_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&cli_un, size));
+
+	/* FIONREAD and other IOCTLs should not be forbidden. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fionread_ioctl(cli_fd));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(cli_fd));
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE(ioctl) {};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(ioctl) {};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(ioctl) {};
+/* clang-format on */
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(ioctl)
+{
+	const __u64 handled;
+	const __u64 allowed;
+	const mode_t open_mode;
+	/*
+	 * FIONREAD is used as a characteristic device-specific IOCTL command.
+	 * It is implemented in fs/ioctl.c for regular files,
+	 * but we do not blanket-permit it for devices.
+	 */
+	const int expected_fionread_result;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ioctl, handled_i_allowed_none) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+	.allowed = 0,
+	.open_mode = O_RDWR,
+	.expected_fionread_result = EACCES,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ioctl, handled_i_allowed_i) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV,
+	.open_mode = O_RDWR,
+	.expected_fionread_result = 0,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ioctl, unhandled) {
+	/* clang-format on */
+	.handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+	.allowed = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE,
+	.open_mode = O_RDWR,
+	.expected_fionread_result = 0,
+};
+
+TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_file)
+{
+	const int flag = 0;
+	const struct rule rules[] = {
+		{
+			.path = "/dev",
+			.access = variant->allowed,
+		},
+		{},
+	};
+	int file_fd, ruleset_fd;
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	file_fd = open("/dev/zero", variant->open_mode);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd);
+
+	/* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_fionread_result,
+		  test_fionread_ioctl(file_fd));
+
+	/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOCLEX));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONCLEX));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_dir_access_dir)
+{
+	const int flag = 0;
+	const struct rule rules[] = {
+		{
+			.path = "/dev",
+			.access = variant->allowed,
+		},
+		{},
+	};
+	int dir_fd, ruleset_fd;
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	/*
+	 * Ignore variant->open_mode for this test, as we intend to open a
+	 * directory.  If the directory can not be opened, the variant is
+	 * infeasible to test with an opened directory.
+	 */
+	dir_fd = open("/dev", O_RDONLY);
+	if (dir_fd < 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors.
+	 * We do not use the expected values from the fixture here.
+	 *
+	 * When using IOCTL on a directory, no Landlock restrictions apply.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, test_fionread_ioctl(dir_fd));
+
+	/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(dir_fd, FIOCLEX));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(dir_fd, FIONCLEX));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(dir_fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(dir_fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(dir_fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(ioctl, handle_file_access_file)
+{
+	const int flag = 0;
+	const struct rule rules[] = {
+		{
+			.path = "/dev/zero",
+			.access = variant->allowed,
+		},
+		{},
+	};
+	int file_fd, ruleset_fd;
+
+	/* Enables Landlock. */
+	ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, variant->handled, rules);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+	enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+	file_fd = open("/dev/zero", variant->open_mode);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, file_fd)
+	{
+		TH_LOG("Failed to open /dev/zero: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* Checks that IOCTL commands return the expected errors. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(variant->expected_fionread_result,
+		  test_fionread_ioctl(file_fd));
+
+	/* Checks that unrestrictable commands are unrestricted. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOCLEX));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONCLEX));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIONBIO, &flag));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIOASYNC, &flag));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, ioctl(file_fd, FIGETBSZ, &flag));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, close(file_fd));
+}
+
 /* clang-format off */
 FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
 /* clang-format on */