Commit 35c2e967 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
  Switch !O_CREAT case to use of do_last()
  Get rid of symlink body copying
  Finish pulling of -ESTALE handling to upper level in do_filp_open()
  Turn do_link spaghetty into a normal loop
  Unify exits in O_CREAT handling
  Kill is_link argument of do_last()
  Pull handling of LAST_BIND into do_last(), clean up ok: part in do_filp_open()
  Leave mangled flag only for setting nd.intent.open.flag
  Get rid of passing mangled flag to do_last()
  Don't pass mangled open_flag to finish_open()
  pull more into do_last()
  bail out with ELOOP earlier in do_link loop
  pull the common predecessors into do_last()
  postpone __putname() until after do_last()
  unroll do_last: loop in do_filp_open()
  Shift releasing nd->root from do_last() to its caller
  gut do_filp_open() a bit more (do_last separation)
  beginning to untangle do_filp_open()
parents 6c550ee4 1f36f774
......@@ -498,8 +498,6 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *, struct nameidata *);
static __always_inline int __vfs_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const char *link)
{
int res = 0;
char *name;
if (IS_ERR(link))
goto fail;
......@@ -510,22 +508,7 @@ static __always_inline int __vfs_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const char *l
path_get(&nd->root);
}
res = link_path_walk(link, nd);
if (nd->depth || res || nd->last_type!=LAST_NORM)
return res;
/*
* If it is an iterative symlinks resolution in open_namei() we
* have to copy the last component. And all that crap because of
* bloody create() on broken symlinks. Furrfu...
*/
name = __getname();
if (unlikely(!name)) {
path_put(&nd->path);
return -ENOMEM;
}
strcpy(name, nd->last.name);
nd->last.name = name;
return 0;
return link_path_walk(link, nd);
fail:
path_put(&nd->path);
return PTR_ERR(link);
......@@ -547,10 +530,10 @@ static inline void path_to_nameidata(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
nd->path.dentry = path->dentry;
}
static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
static __always_inline int
__do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
{
int error;
void *cookie;
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
touch_atime(path->mnt, dentry);
......@@ -562,9 +545,9 @@ static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata
}
mntget(path->mnt);
nd->last_type = LAST_BIND;
cookie = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
error = PTR_ERR(cookie);
if (!IS_ERR(cookie)) {
*p = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
error = PTR_ERR(*p);
if (!IS_ERR(*p)) {
char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
error = 0;
if (s)
......@@ -574,8 +557,6 @@ static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata
if (error)
path_put(&nd->path);
}
if (dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link)
dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link(dentry, nd, cookie);
}
return error;
}
......@@ -589,6 +570,7 @@ static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata
*/
static inline int do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
{
void *cookie;
int err = -ELOOP;
if (current->link_count >= MAX_NESTED_LINKS)
goto loop;
......@@ -602,7 +584,9 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
current->link_count++;
current->total_link_count++;
nd->depth++;
err = __do_follow_link(path, nd);
err = __do_follow_link(path, nd, &cookie);
if (!IS_ERR(cookie) && path->dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link)
path->dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link(path->dentry, nd, cookie);
path_put(path);
current->link_count--;
nd->depth--;
......@@ -1375,22 +1359,6 @@ static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
return inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
}
/*
* O_DIRECTORY translates into forcing a directory lookup.
*/
static inline int lookup_flags(unsigned int f)
{
unsigned long retval = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (f & O_NOFOLLOW)
retval &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (f & O_DIRECTORY)
retval |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
return retval;
}
/*
* p1 and p2 should be directories on the same fs.
*/
......@@ -1590,129 +1558,135 @@ static int open_will_truncate(int flag, struct inode *inode)
return (flag & O_TRUNC);
}
/*
* Note that the low bits of the passed in "open_flag"
* are not the same as in the local variable "flag". See
* open_to_namei_flags() for more details.
*/
struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
int open_flag, int mode, int acc_mode)
static struct file *finish_open(struct nameidata *nd,
int open_flag, int acc_mode)
{
struct file *filp;
struct nameidata nd;
int error;
struct path path;
struct dentry *dir;
int count = 0;
int will_truncate;
int flag = open_to_namei_flags(open_flag);
int force_reval = 0;
int error;
will_truncate = open_will_truncate(open_flag, nd->path.dentry->d_inode);
if (will_truncate) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit;
}
error = may_open(&nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (error) {
if (will_truncate)
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
goto exit;
}
filp = nameidata_to_filp(nd);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
}
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
vfs_dq_init(nd->path.dentry->d_inode);
if (will_truncate) {
error = handle_truncate(&nd->path);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
}
}
/*
* O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
* check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
* always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
* for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
* It is now safe to drop the mnt write
* because the filp has had a write taken
* on its behalf.
*/
if (open_flag & __O_SYNC)
open_flag |= O_DSYNC;
if (!acc_mode)
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(open_flag);
if (will_truncate)
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
return filp;
/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
if (flag & O_TRUNC)
acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
exit:
if (!IS_ERR(nd->intent.open.file))
release_open_intent(nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
/* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
access from general write access. */
if (flag & O_APPEND)
acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
static struct file *do_last(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
int open_flag, int acc_mode,
int mode, const char *pathname,
int *want_dir)
{
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
struct file *filp;
int error = -EISDIR;
/*
* The simplest case - just a plain lookup.
*/
if (!(flag & O_CREAT)) {
filp = get_empty_filp();
if (filp == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENFILE);
nd.intent.open.file = filp;
filp->f_flags = open_flag;
nd.intent.open.flags = flag;
nd.intent.open.create_mode = 0;
error = do_path_lookup(dfd, pathname,
lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_OPEN, &nd);
if (IS_ERR(nd.intent.open.file)) {
if (error == 0) {
error = PTR_ERR(nd.intent.open.file);
path_put(&nd.path);
switch (nd->last_type) {
case LAST_DOTDOT:
follow_dotdot(nd);
dir = nd->path.dentry;
if (nd->path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_REVAL_DOT) {
if (!dir->d_op->d_revalidate(dir, nd)) {
error = -ESTALE;
goto exit;
}
} else if (error)
release_open_intent(&nd);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
/* fallthrough */
case LAST_DOT:
case LAST_ROOT:
if (open_flag & O_CREAT)
goto exit;
/* fallthrough */
case LAST_BIND:
audit_inode(pathname, dir);
goto ok;
}
/*
* Create - we need to know the parent.
*/
reval:
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, LOOKUP_PARENT, &nd);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
if (force_reval)
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
error = path_walk(pathname, &nd);
if (error) {
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
return ERR_PTR(error);
/* trailing slashes? */
if (nd->last.name[nd->last.len]) {
if (open_flag & O_CREAT)
goto exit;
*want_dir = 1;
}
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
audit_inode(pathname, nd.path.dentry);
/*
* We have the parent and last component. First of all, check
* that we are not asked to creat(2) an obvious directory - that
* will not do.
*/
error = -EISDIR;
if (nd.last_type != LAST_NORM || nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
goto exit_parent;
/* just plain open? */
if (!(open_flag & O_CREAT)) {
error = do_lookup(nd, &nd->last, path);
if (error)
goto exit;
error = -ENOENT;
if (!path->dentry->d_inode)
goto exit_dput;
if (path->dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link)
return NULL;
error = -ENOTDIR;
if (*want_dir & !path->dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
goto exit_dput;
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
audit_inode(pathname, nd->path.dentry);
goto ok;
}
error = -ENFILE;
filp = get_empty_filp();
if (filp == NULL)
goto exit_parent;
nd.intent.open.file = filp;
filp->f_flags = open_flag;
nd.intent.open.flags = flag;
nd.intent.open.create_mode = mode;
dir = nd.path.dentry;
nd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_CREATE | LOOKUP_OPEN;
if (flag & O_EXCL)
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
/* OK, it's O_CREAT */
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
path.dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
path.mnt = nd.path.mnt;
do_last:
error = PTR_ERR(path.dentry);
if (IS_ERR(path.dentry)) {
path->dentry = lookup_hash(nd);
path->mnt = nd->path.mnt;
error = PTR_ERR(path->dentry);
if (IS_ERR(path->dentry)) {
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
goto exit;
}
if (IS_ERR(nd.intent.open.file)) {
error = PTR_ERR(nd.intent.open.file);
if (IS_ERR(nd->intent.open.file)) {
error = PTR_ERR(nd->intent.open.file);
goto exit_mutex_unlock;
}
/* Negative dentry, just create the file */
if (!path.dentry->d_inode) {
if (!path->dentry->d_inode) {
/*
* This write is needed to ensure that a
* ro->rw transition does not occur between
......@@ -1720,18 +1694,16 @@ struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
* a permanent write count is taken through
* the 'struct file' in nameidata_to_filp().
*/
error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
error = mnt_want_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit_mutex_unlock;
error = __open_namei_create(&nd, &path, open_flag, mode);
error = __open_namei_create(nd, path, open_flag, mode);
if (error) {
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
goto exit;
}
filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
filp = nameidata_to_filp(nd);
mnt_drop_write(nd->path.mnt);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
if (error) {
......@@ -1746,150 +1718,181 @@ struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
* It already exists.
*/
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
audit_inode(pathname, path.dentry);
audit_inode(pathname, path->dentry);
error = -EEXIST;
if (flag & O_EXCL)
if (open_flag & O_EXCL)
goto exit_dput;
if (__follow_mount(&path)) {
if (__follow_mount(path)) {
error = -ELOOP;
if (flag & O_NOFOLLOW)
if (open_flag & O_NOFOLLOW)
goto exit_dput;
}
error = -ENOENT;
if (!path.dentry->d_inode)
if (!path->dentry->d_inode)
goto exit_dput;
if (path.dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link)
goto do_link;
path_to_nameidata(&path, &nd);
if (path->dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link)
return NULL;
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
error = -EISDIR;
if (S_ISDIR(path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
if (S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto exit;
ok:
filp = finish_open(nd, open_flag, acc_mode);
return filp;
exit_mutex_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
exit_dput:
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
exit:
if (!IS_ERR(nd->intent.open.file))
release_open_intent(nd);
path_put(&nd->path);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
/*
* Note that the low bits of the passed in "open_flag"
* are not the same as in the local variable "flag". See
* open_to_namei_flags() for more details.
*/
struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd, const char *pathname,
int open_flag, int mode, int acc_mode)
{
struct file *filp;
struct nameidata nd;
int error;
struct path path;
int count = 0;
int flag = open_to_namei_flags(open_flag);
int force_reval = 0;
int want_dir = open_flag & O_DIRECTORY;
if (!(open_flag & O_CREAT))
mode = 0;
/*
* Consider:
* 1. may_open() truncates a file
* 2. a rw->ro mount transition occurs
* 3. nameidata_to_filp() fails due to
* the ro mount.
* That would be inconsistent, and should
* be avoided. Taking this mnt write here
* ensures that (2) can not occur.
* O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
* check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
* always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
* for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
*/
will_truncate = open_will_truncate(flag, nd.path.dentry->d_inode);
if (will_truncate) {
error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (error)
goto exit;
}
error = may_open(&nd.path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (open_flag & __O_SYNC)
open_flag |= O_DSYNC;
if (!acc_mode)
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(open_flag);
/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
if (open_flag & O_TRUNC)
acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
/* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
access from general write access. */
if (open_flag & O_APPEND)
acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
/* find the parent */
reval:
error = path_init(dfd, pathname, LOOKUP_PARENT, &nd);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
if (force_reval)
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
current->total_link_count = 0;
error = link_path_walk(pathname, &nd);
if (error) {
if (will_truncate)
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
goto exit;
}
filp = nameidata_to_filp(&nd);
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
error = ima_file_check(filp, acc_mode);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
goto out;
}
if (!IS_ERR(filp)) {
if (acc_mode & MAY_WRITE)
vfs_dq_init(nd.path.dentry->d_inode);
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()) && (open_flag & O_CREAT))
audit_inode(pathname, nd.path.dentry);
if (will_truncate) {
error = handle_truncate(&nd.path);
if (error) {
fput(filp);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
}
}
}
/*
* It is now safe to drop the mnt write
* because the filp has had a write taken
* on its behalf.
* We have the parent and last component.
*/
if (will_truncate)
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
error = -ENFILE;
filp = get_empty_filp();
if (filp == NULL)
goto exit_parent;
nd.intent.open.file = filp;
filp->f_flags = open_flag;
nd.intent.open.flags = flag;
nd.intent.open.create_mode = mode;
nd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_OPEN;
if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_CREATE;
if (open_flag & O_EXCL)
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
}
filp = do_last(&nd, &path, open_flag, acc_mode, mode, pathname, &want_dir);
while (unlikely(!filp)) { /* trailing symlink */
struct path holder;
struct inode *inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
void *cookie;
error = -ELOOP;
/* S_ISDIR part is a temporary automount kludge */
if ((open_flag & O_NOFOLLOW) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
goto exit_dput;
if (count++ == 32)
goto exit_dput;
/*
* This is subtle. Instead of calling do_follow_link() we do
* the thing by hands. The reason is that this way we have zero
* link_count and path_walk() (called from ->follow_link)
* honoring LOOKUP_PARENT. After that we have the parent and
* last component, i.e. we are in the same situation as after
* the first path_walk(). Well, almost - if the last component
* is normal we get its copy stored in nd->last.name and we will
* have to putname() it when we are done. Procfs-like symlinks
* just set LAST_BIND.
*/
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
error = security_inode_follow_link(path.dentry, &nd);
if (error)
goto exit_dput;
error = __do_follow_link(&path, &nd, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error)) {
/* nd.path had been dropped */
if (!IS_ERR(cookie) && inode->i_op->put_link)
inode->i_op->put_link(path.dentry, &nd, cookie);
path_put(&path);
release_open_intent(&nd);
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
goto out;
}
holder = path;
nd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
filp = do_last(&nd, &path, open_flag, acc_mode, mode, pathname, &want_dir);
if (inode->i_op->put_link)
inode->i_op->put_link(holder.dentry, &nd, cookie);
path_put(&holder);
}
out:
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
if (filp == ERR_PTR(-ESTALE) && !force_reval) {
force_reval = 1;
goto reval;
}
return filp;
exit_mutex_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
exit_dput:
path_put_conditional(&path, &nd);
exit:
if (!IS_ERR(nd.intent.open.file))
release_open_intent(&nd);
exit_parent:
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
path_put(&nd.path);
return ERR_PTR(error);
do_link:
error = -ELOOP;
if (flag & O_NOFOLLOW)
goto exit_dput;
/*
* This is subtle. Instead of calling do_follow_link() we do the
* thing by hands. The reason is that this way we have zero link_count
* and path_walk() (called from ->follow_link) honoring LOOKUP_PARENT.
* After that we have the parent and last component, i.e.
* we are in the same situation as after the first path_walk().
* Well, almost - if the last component is normal we get its copy
* stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we
* are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND.
*/
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
error = security_inode_follow_link(path.dentry, &nd);
if (error)
goto exit_dput;
error = __do_follow_link(&path, &nd);
path_put(&path);
if (error) {
/* Does someone understand code flow here? Or it is only
* me so stupid? Anathema to whoever designed this non-sense
* with "intent.open".
*/
release_open_intent(&nd);
if (nd.root.mnt)
path_put(&nd.root);
if (error == -ESTALE && !force_reval) {
force_reval = 1;
goto reval;
}
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
nd.flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
if (nd.last_type == LAST_BIND)
goto ok;
error = -EISDIR;
if (nd.last_type != LAST_NORM)
goto exit;
if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len]) {
__putname(nd.last.name);
goto exit;
}
error = -ELOOP;
if (count++==32) {
__putname(nd.last.name);
goto exit;
}
dir = nd.path.dentry;
mutex_lock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
path.dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
path.mnt = nd.path.mnt;
__putname(nd.last.name);
goto do_last;
filp = ERR_PTR(error);
goto out;
}
/**
......
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