Commit 38831a0a authored by Andy Lutomirski's avatar Andy Lutomirski Committed by Ben Hutchings

auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

commit a3c54931 upstream.

Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.

This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.

eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded
audit rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: audit_filter_inode_name() is not a separate
 function but part of audit_filter_inodes()]
Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
parent 191fe265
...@@ -688,6 +688,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) ...@@ -688,6 +688,22 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
} }
static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
{
int word, bit;
if (val > 0xffffffff)
return false;
word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
return false;
bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
return rule->mask[word] & bit;
}
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
...@@ -705,11 +721,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, ...@@ -705,11 +721,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
rcu_read_lock(); rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) { if (!list_empty(list)) {
int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) { &state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock(); rcu_read_unlock();
...@@ -738,8 +751,6 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) ...@@ -738,8 +751,6 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
rcu_read_lock(); rcu_read_lock();
for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
...@@ -748,7 +759,7 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) ...@@ -748,7 +759,7 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
continue; continue;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n,
&state, false)) { &state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock(); rcu_read_unlock();
......
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