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Commit 43761473 authored by Paul Moore's avatar Paul Moore
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audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg() 

There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1].  Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.

This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s).  In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).

As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:

 * https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25

[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.

[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data.  I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation).  The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: default avatarPengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
parent 0b7a0fdb
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Showing with 164 additions and 168 deletions
kernel/auditsc.c
View file @ 43761473
......@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
#include "audit.h"
......@@ -82,7 +83,8 @@
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
* see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
......@@ -992,184 +994,178 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
return rc;
}
/*
* to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
* really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
* within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
*
* why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
* logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
* space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
* about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
* if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
*/
static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab,
int arg_num,
size_t *len_sent,
const char __user *p,
char *buf)
static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab)
{
char arg_num_len_buf[12];
const char __user *tmp_p = p;
/* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
size_t len, len_left, to_send;
size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
int ret;
/* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
/*
* We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
* we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
* for strings that are too long, we should not have created
* any.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
long len_max;
long len_rem;
long len_full;
long len_buf;
long len_abuf;
long len_tmp;
bool require_data;
bool encode;
unsigned int iter;
unsigned int arg;
char *buf_head;
char *buf;
const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
/* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
* data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
* code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
char abuf[96];
/* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
* current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
* is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
* room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
/* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf_head) {
audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
return;
}
buf = buf_head;
/* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
len_rem = len_max;
len_buf = 0;
len_full = 0;
require_data = true;
encode = false;
iter = 0;
arg = 0;
do {
if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
else
to_send = len_left;
ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
/*
* There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
* copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
* space yet.
*/
if (ret) {
WARN_ON(1);
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
buf[to_send] = '\0';
has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
if (has_cntl) {
/*
* hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
* send half as much in each message
*/
max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
break;
}
len_left -= to_send;
tmp_p += to_send;
} while (len_left > 0);
len_left = len;
if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
too_long = 1;
/* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
int room_left;
if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
else
to_send = len_left;
/* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
if (has_cntl)
room_left -= (to_send * 2);
else
room_left -= to_send;
if (room_left < 0) {
*len_sent = 0;
audit_log_end(*ab);
*ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
if (!*ab)
return 0;
}
/* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
* serious, but the audit record format insists we
* provide an argument length for really long arguments,
* e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
* to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
* recording in the log, although we don't use it
* anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
if (len_full == 0)
len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
/* read more data from userspace */
if (require_data) {
/* can we make more room in the buffer? */
if (buf != buf_head) {
memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
buf = buf_head;
}
/* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
len_max - len_buf);
if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
/* unable to copy from userspace */
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
goto out;
} else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
/* buffer is not large enough */
require_data = true;
/* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
* buffers force the encoding so we stand
* a chance at a sane len_full value and
* consistent record encoding */
encode = true;
len_full = len_full * 2;
p += len_tmp;
} else {
require_data = false;
if (!encode)
encode = audit_string_contains_control(
buf, len_tmp);
/* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
if (len_full < len_max)
len_full = (encode ?
len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
p += len_tmp + 1;
}
len_buf += len_tmp;
buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
/*
* first record needs to say how long the original string was
* so we can be sure nothing was lost.
*/
if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
/*
* normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
* filled buf above when we checked for control characters
* so don't bother with another copy_from_user
*/
if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
else
ret = 0;
if (ret) {
WARN_ON(1);
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
/* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
}
buf[to_send] = '\0';
/* actually log it */
audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
if (too_long)
audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
if (has_cntl)
audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
else
audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
p += to_send;
len_left -= to_send;
*len_sent += arg_num_len;
if (has_cntl)
*len_sent += to_send * 2;
else
*len_sent += to_send;
}
/* include the null we didn't log */
return len + 1;
}
static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
struct audit_buffer **ab)
{
int i, len;
size_t len_sent = 0;
const char __user *p;
char *buf;
/* write as much as we can to the audit log */
if (len_buf > 0) {
/* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
* can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
* existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
* a new buffer */
if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
len_rem = len_max;
audit_log_end(*ab);
*ab = audit_log_start(context,
GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
if (!*ab)
goto out;
}
p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
/* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
len_tmp = 0;
if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
if (iter == 0) {
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
" a%d_len=%lu",
arg, len_full);
}
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
" a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
} else
len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
" a%d=", arg);
WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
/* log the arg in the audit record */
audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
len_rem -= len_tmp;
len_tmp = len_buf;
if (encode) {
if (len_abuf > len_rem)
len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
} else {
if (len_abuf > len_rem)
len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
/* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
* to add quotes to the remaining string */
len_abuf -= len_tmp;
}
len_buf -= len_tmp;
buf += len_tmp;
}
audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
/* ready to move to the next argument? */
if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
arg++;
iter = 0;
len_full = 0;
require_data = true;
encode = false;
}
} while (arg < context->execve.argc);
/*
* we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
* allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
* for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
* should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
*/
buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
return;
}
/* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
&len_sent, p, buf);
if (len <= 0)
break;
p += len;
}
kfree(buf);
out:
kfree(buf_head);
}
static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
......
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