ptp: kvm: Use decrypted memory in confidential guest on x86
KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING currently fails inside SEV-SNP guests because the guest passes an address to static data to the host. In confidential computing the host can't access arbitrary guest memory so handling the hypercall runs into an "rmpfault". To make the hypercall work, the guest needs to explicitly mark the memory as decrypted. Do that in kvm_arch_ptp_init(), but retain the previous behavior for non-confidential guests to save us from having to allocate memory. Add a new arch-specific function (kvm_arch_ptp_exit()) to free the allocation and mark the memory as encrypted again. Signed-off-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308150531.477741-1-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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