Merge tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes:

  Cleanup:

   - Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip

  Bug fixes:

   - Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data

   - Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules
     (-ESTALE)

   - IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths

   - CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed"

* tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm
  ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
  integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path
  ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash()
  ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
  ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule
  ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list
  efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk
  KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data

Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst

@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
 
 Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
 
-    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
+    $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p)
+    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u
     794890253
 
     $ keyctl print 794890253

security/integrity/digsig.c

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 {
 	struct key_restriction *restriction;
 	key_perm_t perm;
+	int ret;
 
 	perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW
 		| KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
@@ -154,7 +155,10 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
 		perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
 
 out:
-	return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
+	ret = __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
+	if (ret)
+		kfree(restriction);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,

security/integrity/ima/Kconfig

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ choice
 
 	config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3
 		bool "SM3"
-		depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y
+		depends on CRYPTO_SM3_GENERIC=y
 endchoice
 
 config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH

security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c

@@ -544,8 +544,13 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
 
 		rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
 					     ima_hash_algo, NULL);
-		if (rc < 0)
+		if (rc < 0) {
+			/* ima_hash could be allocated in case of failure. */
+			if (rc != -ENOMEM)
+				kfree(tmp_iint.ima_hash);
+
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		}
 
 		iint = &tmp_iint;
 		mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);

security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

@@ -398,12 +398,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
 		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
-		/*
-		 * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
-		 * memory will not be freed during a later call to
-		 * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
-		 */
-		entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
 
 		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
 				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
@@ -417,6 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
+	int i;
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 
 	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
@@ -431,7 +426,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	 * references and the entry itself. All other memory references will now
 	 * be owned by nentry.
 	 */
-	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
 	kfree(entry);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -549,6 +545,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			    const char *func_data)
 {
 	int i;
+	bool result = false;
+	struct ima_rule_entry *lsm_rule = rule;
+	bool rule_reinitialized = false;
 
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
 	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
@@ -612,35 +611,55 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
 
-		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
-			if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
+		if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+			if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p)
 				continue;
 			else
 				return false;
 		}
+
+retry:
 		switch (i) {
 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
 			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
-						   rule->lsm[i].rule);
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
-						   rule->lsm[i].rule);
+						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
-		if (!rc)
-			return false;
+
+		if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
+			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
+			if (lsm_rule) {
+				rule_reinitialized = true;
+				goto retry;
 			}
-	return true;
+		}
+		if (!rc) {
+			result = false;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	result = true;
+
+out:
+	if (rule_reinitialized) {
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+			ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
+		kfree(lsm_rule);
+	}
+	return result;
 }
 
 /*

security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c

@@ -245,11 +245,11 @@ int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt,
 	}
 
 	if (fields && num_fields) {
-		*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL);
+		*fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(**fields), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (*fields == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields));
+		memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(**fields));
 		*num_fields = i;
 	}
 
@@ -340,8 +340,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore_template_fmt(char *template_name)
 
 	template_desc->name = "";
 	template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!template_desc->fmt)
+	if (!template_desc->fmt) {
+		kfree(template_desc);
+		template_desc = NULL;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(&template_list);
 	list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates);

security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = {
 	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") },
 	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") },
 	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") },
+	{ UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMacPro1,1") },
 	{ }
 };
 

security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c

@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
 			pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n");
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
-		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen * 2) {
 			pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
@@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 		ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
 	} else if (decrypted_data) {
 		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
-		memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
+		ret = hex2bin(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
 			      epayload->decrypted_datalen);
 	} else {
 		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);