Commit 73c7733f authored by Jason A. Donenfeld's avatar Jason A. Donenfeld

random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load

When crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), we
currently will advance to crng_init==1 once we've acquired 64 bytes, and
then throw away the rest of the buffer. Usually, that is not a problem:
When add_hwgenerator_randomness() gets called via EFI or DT during
setup_arch(), there won't be any IRQ randomness. Therefore, the 64 bytes
passed by EFI exactly matches what is needed to advance to crng_init==1.
Usually, DT seems to pass 64 bytes as well -- with one notable exception
being kexec, which hands over 128 bytes of entropy to the kexec'd kernel.
In that case, we'll advance to crng_init==1 once 64 of those bytes are
consumed by crng_fast_load(), but won't continue onward feeding in bytes
to progress to crng_init==2. This commit fixes the issue by feeding
any leftover bytes into the next phase in add_hwgenerator_randomness().

[linux@dominikbrodowski.net: rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: default avatarDominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
parent 9c3ddde3
......@@ -919,12 +919,14 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
/*
* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
* bytes processed from cp.
*/
static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
{
unsigned long flags;
char *p;
size_t ret = 0;
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
return 0;
......@@ -935,7 +937,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--;
cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
......@@ -943,7 +945,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
crng_init = 1;
pr_notice("fast init done\n");
}
return 1;
return ret;
}
/*
......@@ -1294,7 +1296,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
fast_pool->count = 0;
fast_pool->last = now;
}
......@@ -2295,7 +2297,10 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
count -= ret;
buffer += ret;
if (!count || crng_init == 0)
return;
}
......
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