Merge remote-tracking branch 'arm64/for-next/ghostbusters' into kvm-arm64/hyp-pcpu

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>

arch/arm64/Kconfig

@@ -1165,32 +1165,6 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
-config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
-	default y
-	help
-	  Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
-	  being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by
-	  executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.  Such attacks
-	  can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch
-	  predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.
-
-	  This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the
-	  branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific
-	  instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system
-	  firmware.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y.
-
-config ARM64_SSBD
-	bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT
-	default y
-	help
-	  This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores
-	  by speculative loads.
-
-	  If unsure, say Y.
-
 config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
 	bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases"
 	default y

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h

@@ -31,13 +31,13 @@
 #define ARM64_HAS_DCPOP				21
 #define ARM64_SVE				22
 #define ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0		23
-#define ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR		24
+#define ARM64_SPECTRE_V2			24
 #define ARM64_HAS_RAS_EXTN			25
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419			26
 #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_IDC			27
 #define ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC			28
 #define ARM64_HW_DBM				29
-#define ARM64_SSBD				30
+#define ARM64_SPECTRE_V4			30
 #define ARM64_MISMATCHED_CACHE_TYPE		31
 #define ARM64_HAS_STAGE2_FWB			32
 #define ARM64_HAS_CRC32				33

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h

@@ -698,30 +698,6 @@ static inline bool system_supports_tlb_range(void)
 		cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_TLB_RANGE);
 }
 
-#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED	0
-#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED	1
-
-int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void);
-
-#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE	0
-#define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL		1
-#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
-#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
-
-static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-	extern int ssbd_state;
-	return ssbd_state;
-#else
-	return ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
-#endif
-}
-
-void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state);
-
 extern int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt);
 
 static inline u32 id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_phys_shift(int parange)

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h

@@ -10,9 +10,6 @@
 #include <asm/hyp_image.h>
 #include <asm/virt.h>
 
-#define	VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT	0
-#define	VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG		(_AC(1, UL) << VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT)
-
 #define ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT  31
 #define ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE(x)	  ((x) & ~(1U << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT))
 #define ARM_EXCEPTION_IS_TRAP(x)  (ARM_EXCEPTION_CODE((x)) == ARM_EXCEPTION_TRAP)
@@ -132,11 +129,9 @@ extern unsigned long kvm_arm_hyp_percpu_base[NR_CPUS];
 DECLARE_KVM_NVHE_SYM(__per_cpu_start);
 DECLARE_KVM_NVHE_SYM(__per_cpu_end);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
 extern atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot;
 DECLARE_KVM_HYP_SYM(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
 #define __bp_harden_hyp_vecs	CHOOSE_HYP_SYM(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)
-#endif
 
 extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm_s2_mmu *mmu, phys_addr_t ipa,

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h

@@ -383,20 +383,6 @@ static inline unsigned long kvm_vcpu_get_mpidr_aff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, MPIDR_EL1) & MPIDR_HWID_BITMASK;
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_arm_get_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	return vcpu->arch.workaround_flags & VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-}
-
-static inline void kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-						      bool flag)
-{
-	if (flag)
-		vcpu->arch.workaround_flags |= VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-	else
-		vcpu->arch.workaround_flags &= ~VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-}
-
 static inline void kvm_vcpu_set_be(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	if (vcpu_mode_is_32bit(vcpu)) {

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -631,46 +631,6 @@ static inline void kvm_set_pmu_events(u32 set, struct perf_event_attr *attr) {}
 static inline void kvm_clr_pmu_events(u32 clr) {}
 #endif
 
-#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED		0
-#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED	1
-
-static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
-{
-	switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
-	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
-		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED;
-	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
-		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED;
-	case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
-	default:
-		return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-}
-
-#define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
-#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE		0
-#define KVM_SSBD_KERNEL		1
-#define KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
-#define KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
-
-static inline int kvm_arm_have_ssbd(void)
-{
-	switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
-	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
-		return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
-		return KVM_SSBD_KERNEL;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-		return KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
-		return KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
-	default:
-		return KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-}
-
 void kvm_vcpu_load_sysregs_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_vcpu_put_sysregs_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 

arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/memory.h>
+#include <asm/mmu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 
 /*
@@ -430,19 +431,17 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
 /*
  * EL2 vectors can be mapped and rerouted in a number of ways,
  * depending on the kernel configuration and CPU present:
  *
- * - If the CPU has the ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the
- *   hardening sequence is placed in one of the vector slots, which is
- *   executed before jumping to the real vectors.
+ * - If the CPU is affected by Spectre-v2, the hardening sequence is
+ *   placed in one of the vector slots, which is executed before jumping
+ *   to the real vectors.
  *
- * - If the CPU has both the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap and the
- *   ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR cap, the slot containing the
- *   hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page, and executed
- *   before jumping to the real vectors.
+ * - If the CPU also has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, the slot
+ *   containing the hardening sequence is mapped next to the idmap page,
+ *   and executed before jumping to the real vectors.
  *
  * - If the CPU only has the ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS cap, then an
  *   empty slot is selected, mapped next to the idmap page, and
@@ -452,19 +451,16 @@ static inline int kvm_write_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa,
  * VHE, as we don't have hypervisor-specific mappings. If the system
  * is VHE and yet selects this capability, it will be ignored.
  */
-#include <asm/mmu.h>
-
 extern void *__kvm_bp_vect_base;
 extern int __kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot;
 
-/*  This is called on both VHE and !VHE systems */
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
 	struct bp_hardening_data *data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
 	void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
 	int slot = -1;
 
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) && data->fn) {
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2) && data->fn) {
 		vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
 		slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
 	}
@@ -481,68 +477,6 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 	return vect;
 }
 
-/*  This is only called on a !VHE system */
-static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
-{
-	/*
-	 * HBP  = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
-	 * HEL2 = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
-	 *
-	 * !HBP + !HEL2 -> use direct vectors
-	 *  HBP + !HEL2 -> use hardened vectors in place
-	 * !HBP +  HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping
-	 *  HBP +  HEL2 -> use hardened vertors and use exec mapping
-	 */
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
-		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
-		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base);
-	}
-
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) {
-		phys_addr_t vect_pa = __pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
-		unsigned long size = __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ;
-
-		/*
-		 * Always allocate a spare vector slot, as we don't
-		 * know yet which CPUs have a BP hardening slot that
-		 * we can reuse.
-		 */
-		__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot);
-		BUG_ON(__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS);
-		return create_hyp_exec_mappings(vect_pa, size,
-						&__kvm_bp_vect_base);
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#else
-static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
-{
-	return kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
-}
-
-static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
-DECLARE_KVM_NVHE_PER_CPU(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
-
-static inline void hyp_init_aux_data(void)
-{
-	u64 *ptr;
-
-	/* Copy arm64_ssbd_callback_required value from kernel to hyp. */
-	ptr = this_cpu_ptr_nvhe_sym(arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
-	*ptr = __this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
-}
-#else
-static inline void hyp_init_aux_data(void) {}
-#endif
-
 #define kvm_phys_to_vttbr(addr)		phys_to_ttbr(addr)
 
 /*

arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ struct bp_hardening_data {
 	bp_hardening_cb_t	fn;
 };
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
 
 static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
@@ -57,21 +56,13 @@ static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)
 {
 	struct bp_hardening_data *d;
 
-	if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+	if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2))
 		return;
 
 	d = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
 	if (d->fn)
 		d->fn();
 }
-#else
-static inline struct bp_hardening_data *arm64_get_bp_hardening_data(void)
-{
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-static inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)	{ }
-#endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
 extern void arm64_memblock_init(void);
 extern void paging_init(void);

arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable-hwdef.h>
 #include <asm/pointer_auth.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
 #include <asm/types.h>
 
 /*
@@ -197,40 +198,15 @@ static inline void start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc)
 		regs->pmr_save = GIC_PRIO_IRQON;
 }
 
-static inline void set_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
-}
-
-static inline void set_compat_ssbs_bit(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT;
-}
-
 static inline void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
 				unsigned long sp)
 {
 	start_thread_common(regs, pc);
 	regs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL0t;
-
-	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
-		set_ssbs_bit(regs);
-
+	spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(current);
 	regs->sp = sp;
 }
 
-static inline bool is_ttbr0_addr(unsigned long addr)
-{
-	/* entry assembly clears tags for TTBR0 addrs */
-	return addr < TASK_SIZE;
-}
-
-static inline bool is_ttbr1_addr(unsigned long addr)
-{
-	/* TTBR1 addresses may have a tag if KASAN_SW_TAGS is in use */
-	return arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr) >= PAGE_OFFSET;
-}
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
 				       unsigned long sp)
@@ -244,13 +220,23 @@ static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
 	regs->pstate |= PSR_AA32_E_BIT;
 #endif
 
-	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() != ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE)
-		set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs);
-
+	spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(current);
 	regs->compat_sp = sp;
 }
 #endif
 
+static inline bool is_ttbr0_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	/* entry assembly clears tags for TTBR0 addrs */
+	return addr < TASK_SIZE;
+}
+
+static inline bool is_ttbr1_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	/* TTBR1 addresses may have a tag if KASAN_SW_TAGS is in use */
+	return arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr) >= PAGE_OFFSET;
+}
+
 /* Forward declaration, a strange C thing */
 struct task_struct;
 

arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h

+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Interface for managing mitigations for Spectre vulnerabilities.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC
+ * Author: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+
+/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */
+enum mitigation_state {
+	SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
+	SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
+	SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+struct task_struct;
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(void);
+bool has_spectre_v2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope);
+void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(void);
+bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope);
+void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk);
+
+#endif	/* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */

arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h

@@ -242,6 +242,15 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_events {
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL		0
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_AVAIL		1
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_REQUIRED	2
+
+/*
+ * Only two states can be presented by the host kernel:
+ * - NOT_REQUIRED: the guest doesn't need to do anything
+ * - NOT_AVAIL: the guest isn't mitigated (it can still use SSBS if available)
+ *
+ * All the other values are deprecated. The host still accepts all
+ * values (they are ABI), but will narrow them to the above two.
+ */
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2	KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(2)
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL		0
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN		1

arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ obj-y			:= debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o		\
 			   return_address.o cpuinfo.o cpu_errata.o		\
 			   cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o		\
 			   smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o	\
-			   syscall.o
+			   syscall.o proton-pack.o
 
 targets			+= efi-entry.o
 
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP)		+= crash_dump.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE)		+= crash_core.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE)		+= sdei.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)		+= ssbd.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)		+= pointer_auth.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK)		+= scs.o
 

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr1[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_MPAMFRAC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_RASFRAC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_NI),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_BTI),
 				    FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR1_BT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr1[] = {
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr2[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_PFR2_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_PFR2_SSBS_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_PFR2_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
@@ -1583,48 +1583,6 @@ static void cpu_has_fwb(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 	WARN_ON(val & (7 << 27 | 7 << 21));
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-static int ssbs_emulation_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr)
-{
-	if (user_mode(regs))
-		return 1;
-
-	if (instr & BIT(PSTATE_Imm_shift))
-		regs->pstate |= PSR_SSBS_BIT;
-	else
-		regs->pstate &= ~PSR_SSBS_BIT;
-
-	arm64_skip_faulting_instruction(regs, 4);
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static struct undef_hook ssbs_emulation_hook = {
-	.instr_mask	= ~(1U << PSTATE_Imm_shift),
-	.instr_val	= 0xd500401f | PSTATE_SSBS,
-	.fn		= ssbs_emulation_handler,
-};
-
-static void cpu_enable_ssbs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
-{
-	static bool undef_hook_registered = false;
-	static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(hook_lock);
-
-	raw_spin_lock(&hook_lock);
-	if (!undef_hook_registered) {
-		register_undef_hook(&ssbs_emulation_hook);
-		undef_hook_registered = true;
-	}
-	raw_spin_unlock(&hook_lock);
-
-	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) {
-		sysreg_clear_set(sctlr_el1, 0, SCTLR_ELx_DSSBS);
-		arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false);
-	} else {
-		arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
-	}
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PAN
 static void cpu_enable_pan(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
@@ -1976,19 +1934,16 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64ISAR0_CRC32_SHIFT,
 		.min_field_value = 1,
 	},
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 	{
 		.desc = "Speculative Store Bypassing Safe (SSBS)",
 		.capability = ARM64_SSBS,
-		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_WEAK_LOCAL_CPU_FEATURE,
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_SYSTEM_FEATURE,
 		.matches = has_cpuid_feature,
 		.sys_reg = SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1,
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_SHIFT,
 		.sign = FTR_UNSIGNED,
 		.min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR1_SSBS_PSTATE_ONLY,
-		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_ssbs,
 	},
-#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_CNP
 	{
 		.desc = "Common not Private translations",

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S

@@ -132,9 +132,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	 * them if required.
 	 */
 	.macro	apply_ssbd, state, tmp1, tmp2
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-alternative_cb	arm64_enable_wa2_handling
-	b	.L__asm_ssbd_skip\@
+alternative_cb	spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_enable
+	b	.L__asm_ssbd_skip\@		// Patched to NOP
 alternative_cb_end
 	ldr_this_cpu	\tmp2, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, \tmp1
 	cbz	\tmp2,	.L__asm_ssbd_skip\@
@@ -142,11 +141,10 @@ alternative_cb_end
 	tbnz	\tmp2, #TIF_SSBD, .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@
 	mov	w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
 	mov	w1, #\state
-alternative_cb	arm64_update_smccc_conduit
+alternative_cb	spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit
 	nop					// Patched to SMC/HVC #0
 alternative_cb_end
 .L__asm_ssbd_skip\@:
-#endif
 	.endm
 
 	.macro	kernel_entry, el, regsize = 64
@@ -697,11 +695,9 @@ el0_irq_naked:
 	bl	trace_hardirqs_off
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	tbz	x22, #55, 1f
 	bl	do_el0_irq_bp_hardening
 1:
-#endif
 	irq_handler
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS

arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c

@@ -332,11 +332,7 @@ int swsusp_arch_suspend(void)
 		 * mitigation off behind our back, let's set the state
 		 * to what we expect it to be.
 		 */
-		switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
-		case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-		case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
-			arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(true);
-		}
+		spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(NULL);
 	}
 
 	local_daif_restore(flags);

arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h

@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ __efistub__ctype		= _ctype;
  */
 
 /* Alternative callbacks for init-time patching of nVHE hyp code. */
-KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(arm64_enable_wa2_handling);
 KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_patch_vector_branch);
 KVM_NVHE_ALIAS(kvm_update_va_mask);
 

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/unistd.h>
@@ -421,8 +422,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
 		    cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_UAO))
 			childregs->pstate |= PSR_UAO_BIT;
 
-		if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
-			set_ssbs_bit(childregs);
+		spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(p);
 
 		if (system_uses_irq_prio_masking())
 			childregs->pmr_save = GIC_PRIO_IRQON;
@@ -472,8 +472,6 @@ void uao_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)
  */
 static void ssbs_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)
 {
-	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(next);
-
 	/*
 	 * Nothing to do for kernel threads, but 'regs' may be junk
 	 * (e.g. idle task) so check the flags and bail early.
@@ -485,18 +483,10 @@ static void ssbs_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next)
 	 * If all CPUs implement the SSBS extension, then we just need to
 	 * context-switch the PSTATE field.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_have_feature(cpu_feature(SSBS)))
-		return;
-
-	/* If the mitigation is enabled, then we leave SSBS clear. */
-	if ((arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE) ||
-	    test_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_SSBD))
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
 		return;
 
-	if (compat_user_mode(regs))
-		set_compat_ssbs_bit(regs);
-	else if (user_mode(regs))
-		set_ssbs_bit(regs);
+	spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(next);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -620,6 +610,11 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
 	current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0;
 
 	ptrauth_thread_init_user(current);
+
+	if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(current)) {
+		arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(current, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS,
+					 PR_SPEC_ENABLE);
+	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI

arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c

-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Ltd, All Rights Reserved.
- */
-
-#include <linux/compat.h>
-#include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/prctl.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
-#include <linux/thread_info.h>
-
-#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
-
-static void ssbd_ssbs_enable(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	u64 val = is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)) ?
-		  PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT;
-
-	task_pt_regs(task)->pstate |= val;
-}
-
-static void ssbd_ssbs_disable(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	u64 val = is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(task)) ?
-		  PSR_AA32_SSBS_BIT : PSR_SSBS_BIT;
-
-	task_pt_regs(task)->pstate &= ~val;
-}
-
-/*
- * prctl interface for SSBD
- */
-static int ssbd_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
-{
-	int state = arm64_get_ssbd_state();
-
-	/* Unsupported */
-	if (state == ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	/* Treat the unaffected/mitigated state separately */
-	if (state == ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED) {
-		switch (ctrl) {
-		case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
-			return -EPERM;
-		case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
-		case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Things are a bit backward here: the arm64 internal API
-	 * *enables the mitigation* when the userspace API *disables
-	 * speculation*. So much fun.
-	 */
-	switch (ctrl) {
-	case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
-		/* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
-		if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE ||
-		    task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
-			return -EPERM;
-		task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
-		ssbd_ssbs_enable(task);
-		break;
-	case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
-		if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
-			return -EPERM;
-		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
-		ssbd_ssbs_disable(task);
-		break;
-	case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
-		if (state == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
-			return -EPERM;
-		task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
-		task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
-		set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD);
-		ssbd_ssbs_disable(task);
-		break;
-	default:
-		return -ERANGE;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
-			     unsigned long ctrl)
-{
-	switch (which) {
-	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
-		return ssbd_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
-	default:
-		return -ENODEV;
-	}
-}
-
-static int ssbd_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
-	case ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
-		return -ENODEV;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-		return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
-		if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
-			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
-		if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
-			return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
-		return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
-	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
-		return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
-	default:
-		return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
-	}
-}
-
-int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
-{
-	switch (which) {
-	case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
-		return ssbd_prctl_get(task);
-	default:
-		return -ENODEV;
-	}
-}

arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c

@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ void notrace __cpu_suspend_exit(void)
 	 * have turned the mitigation on. If the user has forcefully
 	 * disabled it, make sure their wishes are obeyed.
 	 */
-	if (arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE)
-		arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(false);
+	spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(NULL);
 }
 
 /*

arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig

@@ -57,9 +57,6 @@ config KVM_ARM_PMU
 	  Adds support for a virtual Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) in
 	  virtual machines.
 
-config KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
-	def_bool HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR || RANDOMIZE_BASE
-
 endif # KVM
 
 endif # VIRTUALIZATION

arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c

@@ -1269,6 +1269,40 @@ static unsigned long nvhe_percpu_order(void)
 	return size ? get_order(size) : 0;
 }
 
+static int kvm_map_vectors(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * SV2  = ARM64_SPECTRE_V2
+	 * HEL2 = ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
+	 *
+	 * !SV2 + !HEL2 -> use direct vectors
+	 *  SV2 + !HEL2 -> use hardened vectors in place
+	 * !SV2 +  HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping
+	 *  SV2 +  HEL2 -> use hardened vectors and use exec mapping
+	 */
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2)) {
+		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
+		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base);
+	}
+
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS)) {
+		phys_addr_t vect_pa = __pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
+		unsigned long size = __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ;
+
+		/*
+		 * Always allocate a spare vector slot, as we don't
+		 * know yet which CPUs have a BP hardening slot that
+		 * we can reuse.
+		 */
+		__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot = atomic_inc_return(&arm64_el2_vector_last_slot);
+		BUG_ON(__kvm_harden_el2_vector_slot >= BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS);
+		return create_hyp_exec_mappings(vect_pa, size,
+						&__kvm_bp_vect_base);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void)
 {
 	phys_addr_t pgd_ptr;
@@ -1305,12 +1339,9 @@ static void cpu_init_hyp_mode(void)
 	 * at EL2.
 	 */
 	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS) &&
-	    arm64_get_ssbd_state() == ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE) {
+	    arm64_get_spectre_v4_state() == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) {
 		kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__kvm_enable_ssbs);
 	}
-
-	/* Copy information whether SSBD callback is required to hyp. */
-	hyp_init_aux_data();
 }
 
 static void cpu_hyp_reset(void)

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/Makefile

@@ -10,5 +10,4 @@ subdir-ccflags-y := -I$(incdir)				\
 		    -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING		\
 		    $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += vhe/ nvhe/
-obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS) += smccc_wa.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += vhe/ nvhe/ smccc_wa.o

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S

@@ -116,35 +116,6 @@ el1_hvc_guest:
 			  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2)
 	cbnz	w1, el1_trap
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-alternative_cb	arm64_enable_wa2_handling
-	b	wa2_end
-alternative_cb_end
-	get_vcpu_ptr	x2, x0
-	ldr	x0, [x2, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS]
-
-	// Sanitize the argument and update the guest flags
-	ldr	x1, [sp, #8]			// Guest's x1
-	clz	w1, w1				// Murphy's device:
-	lsr	w1, w1, #5			// w1 = !!w1 without using
-	eor	w1, w1, #1			// the flags...
-	bfi	x0, x1, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG_SHIFT, #1
-	str	x0, [x2, #VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS]
-
-	/* Check that we actually need to perform the call */
-	ldr_this_cpu x0, arm64_ssbd_callback_required, x2
-	cbz	x0, wa2_end
-
-	mov	w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
-	smc	#0
-
-	/* Don't leak data from the SMC call */
-	mov	x3, xzr
-wa2_end:
-	mov	x2, xzr
-	mov	x1, xzr
-#endif
-
 wa_epilogue:
 	mov	x0, xzr
 	add	sp, sp, #16
@@ -288,7 +259,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__kvm_hyp_vector)
 	valid_vect	el1_error		// Error 32-bit EL1
 SYM_CODE_END(__kvm_hyp_vector)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INDIRECT_VECTORS
 .macro hyp_ventry
 	.align 7
 1:	esb
@@ -338,4 +308,3 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)
 1:	.org __bp_harden_hyp_vecs + __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ
 	.org 1b
 SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs)
-#endif

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h

@@ -479,39 +479,6 @@ static inline bool fixup_guest_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *exit_code)
 	return false;
 }
 
-static inline bool __needs_ssbd_off(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBD))
-		return false;
-
-	return !(vcpu->arch.workaround_flags & VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG);
-}
-
-static inline void __set_guest_arch_workaround_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-	/*
-	 * The host runs with the workaround always present. If the
-	 * guest wants it disabled, so be it...
-	 */
-	if (__needs_ssbd_off(vcpu) &&
-	    __this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required))
-		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, 0, NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
-static inline void __set_host_arch_workaround_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
-	/*
-	 * If the guest has disabled the workaround, bring it back on.
-	 */
-	if (__needs_ssbd_off(vcpu) &&
-	    __this_cpu_read(arm64_ssbd_callback_required))
-		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, 1, NULL);
-#endif
-}
-
 static inline void __kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void)
 {
 	unsigned long addr, fixup;

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c

@@ -208,8 +208,6 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	__debug_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
 
-	__set_guest_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
-
 	do {
 		/* Jump in the fire! */
 		exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu, host_ctxt);
@@ -217,8 +215,6 @@ int __kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		/* And we're baaack! */
 	} while (fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, &exit_code));
 
-	__set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
-
 	__sysreg_save_state_nvhe(guest_ctxt);
 	__sysreg32_save_state(vcpu);
 	__timer_disable_traps(vcpu);

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c

@@ -134,8 +134,6 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	sysreg_restore_guest_state_vhe(guest_ctxt);
 	__debug_switch_to_guest(vcpu);
 
-	__set_guest_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
-
 	do {
 		/* Jump in the fire! */
 		exit_code = __guest_enter(vcpu, host_ctxt);
@@ -143,8 +141,6 @@ static int __kvm_vcpu_run_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		/* And we're baaack! */
 	} while (fixup_guest_exit(vcpu, &exit_code));
 
-	__set_host_arch_workaround_state(vcpu);
-
 	sysreg_save_guest_state_vhe(guest_ctxt);
 
 	__deactivate_traps(vcpu);

arch/arm64/kvm/hypercalls.c

@@ -24,27 +24,36 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu);
 		switch (feature) {
 		case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
-			switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) {
-			case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
+			switch (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state()) {
+			case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
 				break;
-			case KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
+			case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
 				val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
 				break;
-			case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
+			case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
 				val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
 				break;
 			}
 			break;
 		case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
-			switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) {
-			case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
-			case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
+			switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) {
+			case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
 				break;
-			case KVM_SSBD_KERNEL:
-				val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
+			case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+				/*
+				 * SSBS everywhere: Indicate no firmware
+				 * support, as the SSBS support will be
+				 * indicated to the guest and the default is
+				 * safe.
+				 *
+				 * Otherwise, expose a permanent mitigation
+				 * to the guest, and hide SSBS so that the
+				 * guest stays protected.
+				 */
+				if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
 					break;
-			case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-			case KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+				fallthrough;
+			case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
 				val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
 				break;
 			}

arch/arm64/kvm/psci.c

@@ -425,27 +425,30 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid)
 {
 	switch (regid) {
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
-		switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) {
-		case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
+		switch (arm64_get_spectre_v2_state()) {
+		case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
 			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL;
-		case KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
+		case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
 			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_AVAIL;
-		case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
+		case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
 			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_REQUIRED;
 		}
 		return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1_NOT_AVAIL;
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
-		switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) {
-		case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		switch (arm64_get_spectre_v4_state()) {
+		case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+			/*
+			 * As for the hypercall discovery, we pretend we
+			 * don't have any FW mitigation if SSBS is there at
+			 * all times.
+			 */
+			if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
 				return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
-		case KVM_SSBD_KERNEL:
-			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL;
-		case KVM_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
-		case KVM_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+			fallthrough;
+		case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
 			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED;
-		case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
-		default:
-			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN;
+		case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -462,14 +465,8 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
 		val = kvm_psci_version(vcpu, vcpu->kvm);
 		break;
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
-		val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
-		break;
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
 		val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
-
-		if (val == KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL &&
-		    kvm_arm_get_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(vcpu))
-			val |= KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED;
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -ENOENT;
@@ -527,34 +524,35 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
 			    KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		wa_level = val & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
-
-		if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < wa_level)
-			return -EINVAL;
-
 		/* The enabled bit must not be set unless the level is AVAIL. */
-		if (wa_level != KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL &&
-		    wa_level != val)
+		if ((val & KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED) &&
+		    (val & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK) != KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
-		/* Are we finished or do we need to check the enable bit ? */
-		if (kvm_arm_have_ssbd() != KVM_SSBD_KERNEL)
-			return 0;
-
 		/*
-		 * If this kernel supports the workaround to be switched on
-		 * or off, make sure it matches the requested setting.
+		 * Map all the possible incoming states to the only two we
+		 * really want to deal with.
 		 */
-		switch (wa_level) {
-		case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL:
-			kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(vcpu,
-			    val & KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED);
+		switch (val & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK) {
+		case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL:
+		case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN:
+			wa_level = KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_AVAIL;
 			break;
+		case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_AVAIL:
 		case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED:
-			kvm_arm_set_vcpu_workaround_2_flag(vcpu, true);
+			wa_level = KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED;
 			break;
+		default:
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
+		/*
+		 * We can deal with NOT_AVAIL on NOT_REQUIRED, but not the
+		 * other way around.
+		 */
+		if (get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) < wa_level)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		return 0;
 	default:
 		return -ENOENT;

arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c

@@ -319,10 +319,6 @@ int kvm_reset_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.reset_state.reset = false;
 	}
 
-	/* Default workaround setup is enabled (if supported) */
-	if (kvm_arm_have_ssbd() == KVM_SSBD_KERNEL)
-		vcpu->arch.workaround_flags |= VCPU_WORKAROUND_2_FLAG;
-
 	/* Reset timer */
 	ret = kvm_timer_vcpu_reset(vcpu);
 out:

arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c

@@ -1131,6 +1131,9 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu))
 			val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_SVE_SHIFT);
 		val &= ~(0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_AMU_SHIFT);
+		if (!(val & (0xfUL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT)) &&
+		    arm64_get_spectre_v2_state() == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
+			val |= (1UL << ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT);
 	} else if (id == SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1 && !vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
 		val &= ~((0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT) |
 			 (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |