Commit 9c973589 authored by Manfred Spraul's avatar Manfred Spraul Committed by David S. Miller

[RANDOM]: Fix bugs in ipv{4,6} ID/SEQ generation, mostly SMP issues. Reviewed by Ted Tso

parent 5f761bd3
...@@ -2033,57 +2033,103 @@ static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12]) ...@@ -2033,57 +2033,103 @@ static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */ /* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
#define REKEY_INTERVAL 300 #define REKEY_INTERVAL 300
/*
* Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
* bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
* bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
*
* The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
* in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
* - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
* - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
* to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
* clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
*
* Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
* 4.55 hours.
*
* SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
* Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
*
*/
#define COUNT_BITS 8
#define COUNT_MASK ( (1<<COUNT_BITS)-1)
#define HASH_BITS 24 #define HASH_BITS 24
#define HASH_MASK ( (1<<HASH_BITS)-1 )
static struct keydata {
time_t rekey_time;
__u32 count; // already shifted to the final position
__u32 secret[12];
} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
static spinlock_t ip_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
static unsigned int ip_cnt;
static struct keydata *__check_and_rekey(time_t time)
{
struct keydata *keyptr;
spin_lock(&ip_lock);
keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];
if (!keyptr->rekey_time || (time - keyptr->rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
keyptr = &ip_keydata[1^(ip_cnt&1)];
keyptr->rekey_time = time;
get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
keyptr->count = (ip_cnt&COUNT_MASK)<<HASH_BITS;
mb();
ip_cnt++;
}
spin_unlock(&ip_lock);
return keyptr;
}
static inline struct keydata *check_and_rekey(time_t time)
{
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];
rmb();
if (!keyptr->rekey_time || (time - keyptr->rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
keyptr = __check_and_rekey(time);
}
return keyptr;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr, __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport) __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{ {
static __u32 rekey_time;
static __u32 count;
static __u32 secret[12];
struct timeval tv; struct timeval tv;
__u32 seq; __u32 seq;
__u32 hash[12];
struct keydata *keyptr;
/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer. */ /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
* Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
*/
do_gettimeofday(&tv); /* We need the usecs below... */ do_gettimeofday(&tv); /* We need the usecs below... */
keyptr = check_and_rekey(tv.tv_sec);
if (!rekey_time || (tv.tv_sec - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) { memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
rekey_time = tv.tv_sec; hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
/* First five words are overwritten below. */ memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32)*7);
get_random_bytes(&secret[5], sizeof(secret)-5*4);
count = (tv.tv_sec/REKEY_INTERVAL) << HASH_BITS;
}
memcpy(secret, saddr, 16);
secret[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
seq = (twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, secret) &
((1<<HASH_BITS)-1)) + count;
seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
seq += keyptr->count;
seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000; seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
return seq; return seq;
} }
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number); EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
__u32 secure_ipv6_id(__u32 *daddr) __u32 secure_ipv6_id(__u32 *daddr)
{ {
static time_t rekey_time; struct keydata *keyptr;
static __u32 secret[12];
time_t t;
/* keyptr = check_and_rekey(CURRENT_TIME);
* Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
*/
t = CURRENT_TIME;
if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
rekey_time = t;
/* First word is overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret));
}
return twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, secret); return halfMD4Transform(daddr, keyptr->secret);
} }
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_id); EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_id);
...@@ -2093,40 +2139,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_id); ...@@ -2093,40 +2139,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_id);
__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport) __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{ {
static __u32 rekey_time;
static __u32 count;
static __u32 secret[12];
struct timeval tv; struct timeval tv;
__u32 seq; __u32 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr;
/* /*
* Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds. * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
*/ */
do_gettimeofday(&tv); /* We need the usecs below... */ do_gettimeofday(&tv); /* We need the usecs below... */
keyptr = check_and_rekey(tv.tv_sec);
if (!rekey_time || (tv.tv_sec - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
rekey_time = tv.tv_sec;
/* First three words are overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes(&secret[3], sizeof(secret)-12);
count = (tv.tv_sec/REKEY_INTERVAL) << HASH_BITS;
}
/* /*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
* (saddr, daddr, sport, dport). * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
* Note that the words are placed into the first words to be * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
* mixed in with the halfMD4. This is because the starting * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
* vector is also a random secret (at secret+8), and further
* hashing fixed data into it isn't going to improve anything,
* so we should get started with the variable data.
*/ */
secret[0]=saddr; hash[0]=saddr;
secret[1]=daddr; hash[1]=daddr;
secret[2]=(sport << 16) + dport; hash[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
hash[3]=keyptr->secret[11];
seq = (halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret) &
((1<<HASH_BITS)-1)) + count;
seq = halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
seq += keyptr->count;
/* /*
* As close as possible to RFC 793, which * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
* suggests using a 250 kHz clock. * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
...@@ -2148,31 +2184,22 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, ...@@ -2148,31 +2184,22 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
*/ */
__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr) __u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
{ {
static time_t rekey_time; struct keydata *keyptr;
static __u32 secret[12]; __u32 hash[4];
time_t t;
/* keyptr = check_and_rekey(CURRENT_TIME);
* Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
*/
t = CURRENT_TIME;
if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
rekey_time = t;
/* First word is overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes(secret+1, sizeof(secret)-4);
}
/* /*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination. * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
* Note that the words are placed into the first words to be * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
* mixed in with the halfMD4. This is because the starting * which is then hashed with random data.
* vector is also a random secret (at secret+8), and further
* hashing fixed data into it isn't going to improve anything,
* so we should get started with the variable data.
*/ */
secret[0]=daddr; hash[0] = daddr;
hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
return halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
} }
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
......
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