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Kirill Smelkov
linux
Commits
9c973589
Commit
9c973589
authored
Sep 18, 2002
by
Manfred Spraul
Committed by
David S. Miller
Sep 18, 2002
Browse files
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[RANDOM]: Fix bugs in ipv{4,6} ID/SEQ generation, mostly SMP issues. Reviewed by Ted Tso
parent
5f761bd3
Changes
1
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97 additions
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70 deletions
+97
-70
drivers/char/random.c
drivers/char/random.c
+97
-70
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drivers/char/random.c
View file @
9c973589
...
...
@@ -2033,57 +2033,103 @@ static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
#define REKEY_INTERVAL 300
/*
* Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
* bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
* bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
*
* The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
* in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
* - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
* - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
* to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
* clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
*
* Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
* 4.55 hours.
*
* SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
* Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
*
*/
#define COUNT_BITS 8
#define COUNT_MASK ( (1<<COUNT_BITS)-1)
#define HASH_BITS 24
#define HASH_MASK ( (1<<HASH_BITS)-1 )
static
struct
keydata
{
time_t
rekey_time
;
__u32
count
;
// already shifted to the final position
__u32
secret
[
12
];
}
____cacheline_aligned
ip_keydata
[
2
];
static
spinlock_t
ip_lock
=
SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED
;
static
unsigned
int
ip_cnt
;
static
struct
keydata
*
__check_and_rekey
(
time_t
time
)
{
struct
keydata
*
keyptr
;
spin_lock
(
&
ip_lock
);
keyptr
=
&
ip_keydata
[
ip_cnt
&
1
];
if
(
!
keyptr
->
rekey_time
||
(
time
-
keyptr
->
rekey_time
)
>
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
{
keyptr
=
&
ip_keydata
[
1
^
(
ip_cnt
&
1
)];
keyptr
->
rekey_time
=
time
;
get_random_bytes
(
keyptr
->
secret
,
sizeof
(
keyptr
->
secret
));
keyptr
->
count
=
(
ip_cnt
&
COUNT_MASK
)
<<
HASH_BITS
;
mb
();
ip_cnt
++
;
}
spin_unlock
(
&
ip_lock
);
return
keyptr
;
}
static
inline
struct
keydata
*
check_and_rekey
(
time_t
time
)
{
struct
keydata
*
keyptr
=
&
ip_keydata
[
ip_cnt
&
1
];
rmb
();
if
(
!
keyptr
->
rekey_time
||
(
time
-
keyptr
->
rekey_time
)
>
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
{
keyptr
=
__check_and_rekey
(
time
);
}
return
keyptr
;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
__u32
secure_tcpv6_sequence_number
(
__u32
*
saddr
,
__u32
*
daddr
,
__u16
sport
,
__u16
dport
)
{
static
__u32
rekey_time
;
static
__u32
count
;
static
__u32
secret
[
12
];
struct
timeval
tv
;
__u32
seq
;
__u32
hash
[
12
];
struct
keydata
*
keyptr
;
/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer. */
/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
* Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
*/
do_gettimeofday
(
&
tv
);
/* We need the usecs below... */
keyptr
=
check_and_rekey
(
tv
.
tv_sec
);
if
(
!
rekey_time
||
(
tv
.
tv_sec
-
rekey_time
)
>
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
{
rekey_time
=
tv
.
tv_sec
;
/* First five words are overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes
(
&
secret
[
5
],
sizeof
(
secret
)
-
5
*
4
);
count
=
(
tv
.
tv_sec
/
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
<<
HASH_BITS
;
}
memcpy
(
secret
,
saddr
,
16
);
secret
[
4
]
=
(
sport
<<
16
)
+
dport
;
seq
=
(
twothirdsMD4Transform
(
daddr
,
secret
)
&
((
1
<<
HASH_BITS
)
-
1
))
+
count
;
memcpy
(
hash
,
saddr
,
16
);
hash
[
4
]
=
(
sport
<<
16
)
+
dport
;
memcpy
(
&
hash
[
5
],
keyptr
->
secret
,
sizeof
(
__u32
)
*
7
);
seq
=
twothirdsMD4Transform
(
daddr
,
hash
)
&
HASH_MASK
;
seq
+=
keyptr
->
count
;
seq
+=
tv
.
tv_usec
+
tv
.
tv_sec
*
1000000
;
return
seq
;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL
(
secure_tcpv6_sequence_number
);
__u32
secure_ipv6_id
(
__u32
*
daddr
)
{
static
time_t
rekey_time
;
static
__u32
secret
[
12
];
time_t
t
;
struct
keydata
*
keyptr
;
/*
* Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
*/
t
=
CURRENT_TIME
;
if
(
!
rekey_time
||
(
t
-
rekey_time
)
>
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
{
rekey_time
=
t
;
/* First word is overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes
(
secret
,
sizeof
(
secret
));
}
keyptr
=
check_and_rekey
(
CURRENT_TIME
);
return
twothirdsMD4Transform
(
daddr
,
secret
);
return
halfMD4Transform
(
daddr
,
keyptr
->
secret
);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL
(
secure_ipv6_id
);
...
...
@@ -2093,40 +2139,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_ipv6_id);
__u32
secure_tcp_sequence_number
(
__u32
saddr
,
__u32
daddr
,
__u16
sport
,
__u16
dport
)
{
static
__u32
rekey_time
;
static
__u32
count
;
static
__u32
secret
[
12
];
struct
timeval
tv
;
__u32
seq
;
__u32
hash
[
4
];
struct
keydata
*
keyptr
;
/*
* Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
*/
do_gettimeofday
(
&
tv
);
/* We need the usecs below... */
if
(
!
rekey_time
||
(
tv
.
tv_sec
-
rekey_time
)
>
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
{
rekey_time
=
tv
.
tv_sec
;
/* First three words are overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes
(
&
secret
[
3
],
sizeof
(
secret
)
-
12
);
count
=
(
tv
.
tv_sec
/
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
<<
HASH_BITS
;
}
keyptr
=
check_and_rekey
(
tv
.
tv_sec
);
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
* (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
* Note that the words are placed into the first words to be
* mixed in with the halfMD4. This is because the starting
* vector is also a random secret (at secret+8), and further
* hashing fixed data into it isn't going to improve anything,
* so we should get started with the variable data.
* Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
* then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
*/
secret
[
0
]
=
saddr
;
secret
[
1
]
=
daddr
;
secret
[
2
]
=
(
sport
<<
16
)
+
dport
;
seq
=
(
halfMD4Transform
(
secret
+
8
,
secret
)
&
((
1
<<
HASH_BITS
)
-
1
))
+
count
;
hash
[
0
]
=
saddr
;
hash
[
1
]
=
daddr
;
hash
[
2
]
=
(
sport
<<
16
)
+
dport
;
hash
[
3
]
=
keyptr
->
secret
[
11
];
seq
=
halfMD4Transform
(
hash
,
keyptr
->
secret
)
&
HASH_MASK
;
seq
+=
keyptr
->
count
;
/*
* As close as possible to RFC 793, which
* suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
...
...
@@ -2148,31 +2184,22 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
*/
__u32
secure_ip_id
(
__u32
daddr
)
{
static
time_t
rekey_time
;
static
__u32
secret
[
12
];
time_t
t
;
struct
keydata
*
keyptr
;
__u32
hash
[
4
];
/*
* Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
*/
t
=
CURRENT_TIME
;
if
(
!
rekey_time
||
(
t
-
rekey_time
)
>
REKEY_INTERVAL
)
{
rekey_time
=
t
;
/* First word is overwritten below. */
get_random_bytes
(
secret
+
1
,
sizeof
(
secret
)
-
4
);
}
keyptr
=
check_and_rekey
(
CURRENT_TIME
);
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
* Note that the words are placed into the first words to be
* mixed in with the halfMD4. This is because the starting
* vector is also a random secret (at secret+8), and further
* hashing fixed data into it isn't going to improve anything,
* so we should get started with the variable data.
* The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
* which is then hashed with random data.
*/
secret
[
0
]
=
daddr
;
hash
[
0
]
=
daddr
;
hash
[
1
]
=
keyptr
->
secret
[
9
];
hash
[
2
]
=
keyptr
->
secret
[
10
];
hash
[
3
]
=
keyptr
->
secret
[
11
];
return
halfMD4Transform
(
secret
+
8
,
secret
);
return
halfMD4Transform
(
hash
,
keyptr
->
secret
);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
...
...
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