UBUNTU: Ubuntu-4.4.0-127.153

Signed-off-by: Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>

debian.master/changelog

-linux (4.4.0-126.151) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
-
-  CHANGELOG: Do not edit directly. Autogenerated at release.
-  CHANGELOG: Use the printchanges target to see the curent changes.
-  CHANGELOG: Use the insertchanges target to create the final log.
-
- -- Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com>  Tue, 15 May 2018 14:21:24 +0200
+linux (4.4.0-127.153) xenial; urgency=medium
+
+  * CVE-2018-3639 (powerpc)
+    - powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
+    - powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
+    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
+    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
+    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
+    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
+    - powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
+    - powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
+    - powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
+    - powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
+    - powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
+    - powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
+    - powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
+    - powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
+    - powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
+    - powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
+    - powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
+    - powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
+    - powerpc: Move default security feature flags
+    - powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
+    - SAUCE: powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel
+      entry/exit
+
+  * CVE-2018-3639 (x86)
+    - SAUCE: Clean up IBPB and IBRS control functions and macros
+    - SAUCE: Fix up IBPB and IBRS kernel parameters documentation
+    - SAUCE: Remove #define X86_FEATURE_PTI
+    - x86/cpufeature: Move some of the scattered feature bits to x86_capability
+    - x86/cpufeature: Cleanup get_cpu_cap()
+    - x86/cpu: Probe CPUID leaf 6 even when cpuid_level == 6
+    - x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
+    - x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
+    - SAUCE: x86/kvm: Expose SPEC_CTRL from the leaf
+    - x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
+    - x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
+    - SAUCE: x86/msr: Rename MSR spec control feature bits
+    - x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
+    - x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
+    - x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
+    - x86/speculation: Add <asm/msr-index.h> dependency
+    - x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
+    - x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
+    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Move vendor specific IBRS/IBPB control code
+    - SAUCE: x86: Add alternative_msr_write
+    - SAUCE: x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write()
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function
+    - arch: Introduce post-init read-only memory
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
+    - SAUCE: x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable
+      mitigation
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if
+      requested
+    - SAUCE: x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest
+    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
+    - SAUCE: prctl: Add speculation control prctls
+    - x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra()
+    - SAUCE: x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
+    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
+    - SAUCE: nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task
+    - SAUCE: proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
+    - SAUCE: seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Honour SPEC_CTRL default
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init
+    - SAUCE: prctl: Add force disable speculation
+    - SAUCE: seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
+    - selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
+    - SAUCE: seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
+    - SAUCE: seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
+    - SAUCE: x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative
+      Store Bypass
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
+    - SAUCE: proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status'
+    - SAUCE: Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type
+    - SAUCE: x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static
+    - x86/entry: define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK flags explicitly
+    - Revert "x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2
+      microcodes"
+    - SAUCE: kvm/cpuid: Fix CPUID_7_0.EDX handling
+
+ -- Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>  Sat, 19 May 2018 11:58:02 +0200
 
 linux (4.4.0-125.150) xenial; urgency=medium