Commit cd56e646 authored by Wenwen Wang's avatar Wenwen Wang Committed by Kelsey Skunberg

ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1868627

commit fe2e082f upstream.

In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: default avatarWenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKhalid Elmously <khalid.elmously@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarKelsey Skunberg <kelsey.skunberg@canonical.com>
parent f0fc6e25
...@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat, ...@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,
printk(KERN_ERR "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n", printk(KERN_ERR "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n",
ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE); ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE);
rc = -EINVAL; rc = -EINVAL;
goto out; goto out_free;
} }
/* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or /* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or
* at end of function upon failure */ * at end of function upon failure */
......
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