Commit ea156d19 authored by Paolo Bonzini's avatar Paolo Bonzini Committed by Thomas Gleixner

x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability

Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
parent 58331136
......@@ -762,9 +762,15 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: SMT %s, L1D %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled",
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
(l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
#else
static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
......
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