Fixing odd formatting of info caused by unnecessary indentations.

ccan/isaac/_info

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  * ISAAC (Indirect, Shift, Accumulate, Add, and Count) is the most advanced of
  * a series of pseudo-random number generators designed by Robert J. Jenkins
  * Jr. in 1996: http://www.burtleburtle.net/bob/rand/isaac.html
+ *
  * To quote:
  *   No efficient method is known for deducing their internal states.
  *   ISAAC requires an amortized 18.75 instructions to produce a 32-bit value.
@@ -16,7 +17,9 @@
  *   It generates a 64-bit result every 19 instructions.
  *   All cycles are at least 2**72 values, and the average cycle length is
  *    2**16583.
+ *
  * An additional, important comment from Bob Jenkins in 2006:
+ *
  *   Seeding a random number generator is essentially the same problem as
  *   encrypting the seed with a block cipher.
  *   ISAAC should be initialized with the encryption of the seed by some
@@ -26,20 +29,10 @@
  *   I have in ISAAC.
  *
  * A number of attacks on ISAAC have been published.
+ *
  * [Pudo01] can recover the entire internal state and has expected running time
  * less than the square root of the number of states, or 2**4121 (4.67E+1240).
- * [Auma06] reveals a large set of weak states, consisting of those for which
- *  the first value is repeated one or more times elsewhere in the state
- *  vector.
- * These induce a bias in the output relative to the repeated value.
- * The seed values used as input below are scrambled before being used, so any
- *  duplicates in them do not imply duplicates in the resulting internal state,
- *  however the chances of some duplicate existing elsewhere in a random state
- *  are just over 255/2**32, or merely 1 in 16 million.
- * Such states are, of course, much rarer in ISAAC-64.
- * It is not clear if an attacker can tell from just the output if ISAAC is in
- *  a weak state, or deduce the full internal state in any case except that
- *  where all or almost all of the entries in the state vector are identical.
+ *
  *   @MISC{Pudo01,
  *     author="Marina Pudovkina",
  *     title="A Known Plaintext Attack on the {ISAAC} Keystream Generator",
@@ -47,6 +40,11 @@
  *     year=2001,
  *     note="\url{http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/049}",
  *   }
+ *
+ * [Auma06] reveals a large set of weak states, consisting of those for which
+ * the first value is repeated one or more times elsewhere in the state
+ * vector.
+ *
  *   @MISC{Auma06,
  *     author="Jean-Philippe Aumasson",
  *     title="On the Pseudo-Random Generator {ISAAC}",
@@ -55,13 +53,28 @@
  *     note="\url{http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/438}",
  *   }
  *
+ * These induce a bias in the output relative to the repeated value.
+ *
+ * The seed values used as input below are scrambled before being used, so any
+ * duplicates in them do not imply duplicates in the resulting internal state,
+ * however the chances of some duplicate existing elsewhere in a random state
+ * are just over 255/2**32, or merely 1 in 16 million.
+ *
+ * Such states are, of course, much rarer in ISAAC-64.
+ *
+ * It is not clear if an attacker can tell from just the output if ISAAC is in
+ * a weak state, or deduce the full internal state in any case except that
+ * where all or almost all of the entries in the state vector are identical.
+ *
  * Even if one does not trust the security of this PRNG (and, without a good
  * source of entropy to seed it, one should not), ISAAC is an excellent source
  * of high-quality random numbers for Monte Carlo simulations, etc.
+ *
  * It is the fastest 32-bit generator among all of those that pass the
  * statistical tests in the recent survey
  * http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~simardr/testu01/tu01.html, with the exception
  * of Marsa-LFIB4, and it is quite competitive on 64-bit archtectures.
+ *
  * Unlike Marsa-LFIB4 (and all other LFib generators), there are no linear
  * dependencies between successive values, and unlike many generators found in
  * libc implementations, there are no small periods in the least significant