netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early

commit bdf533de upstream.

We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>

net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c

@@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
+static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -513,10 +511,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
 	target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
 					t->u.user.revision);
@@ -561,6 +555,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -575,6 +570,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1232,7 +1231,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 

net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c

@@ -560,14 +560,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -657,10 +655,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -724,6 +718,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -738,6 +733,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1498,7 +1497,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 

net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c

@@ -570,14 +570,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -668,10 +666,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -735,6 +729,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -749,6 +744,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1510,7 +1509,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;