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Commit 475ed4a6 authored by Matt Mackall's avatar Matt Mackall Committed by Linus Torvalds
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[PATCH] random: whitespace cleanups 

Whitespace cleanups
trailing whitespace removal
superfluous brace removal
Signed-off-by: default avatarMatt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
parent c078bd9e
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Showing with 334 additions and 341 deletions
drivers/char/random.c
View file @ 475ed4a6
......@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* random.c -- A strong random number generator
*
* Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
*
*
* Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
* rights reserved.
*
......@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior
* written permission.
*
*
* ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
* required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
* necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
* the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
*
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
......@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@
*/
/*
* (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
*
* (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
*
* This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
* and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
* Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
......@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
*
* Theory of operation
* ===================
*
*
* Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
* to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
* pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
......@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
* must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
* generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
* from inside the kernel.
*
*
* Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
* timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
* events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
......@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
* As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
* an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
* the random number generator's internal state.
*
*
* When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
* hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
* exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
......@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
* reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
* bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
* outputs random numbers.
*
*
* If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
* random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
* able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
......@@ -94,10 +94,10 @@
* not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
* Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
* of purposes.
*
*
* Exported interfaces ---- output
* ===============================
*
*
* There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to
* be used from within the kernel:
*
......@@ -105,14 +105,14 @@
*
* This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
* and place it in the requested buffer.
*
*
* The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
* /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
* quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
* one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
* bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
* contained in the entropy pool.
*
*
* The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
* as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
* requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
......@@ -121,17 +121,17 @@
*
* Exported interfaces ---- input
* ==============================
*
*
* The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
* from the devices are:
*
*
* void add_keyboard_randomness(unsigned char scancode);
* void add_mouse_randomness(__u32 mouse_data);
* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
*
*
* add_keyboard_randomness() uses the inter-keypress timing, as well as the
* scancode as random inputs into the "entropy pool".
*
*
* add_mouse_randomness() uses the mouse interrupt timing, as well as
* the reported position of the mouse from the hardware.
*
......@@ -142,14 +142,14 @@
* regular, and hence predictable to an attacker. Disk interrupts are
* a better measure, since the timing of the disk interrupts are more
* unpredictable.
*
*
* All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
* particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
* first and second order deltas of the event timings.
*
* Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
* ============================================
*
*
* When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
* of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
* if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
......@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
* counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
* entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
* following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
* sequence:
* sequence:
*
* echo "Initializing random number generator..."
* random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
......@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
* scripts, such code fragments would be found in
* /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
* location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
*
*
* Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
* to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
* start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
......@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
*
* mknod /dev/random c 1 8
* mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
*
*
* Acknowledgements:
* =================
*
......@@ -221,17 +221,17 @@
* number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
* pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
* useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
*
*
* Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
* not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
*
*
* The code for SHA transform was taken from Peter Gutmann's
* implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
* The code for MD5 transform was taken from Colin Plumb's
* implementation, which has been placed in the public domain.
* The MD5 cryptographic checksum was devised by Ronald Rivest, and is
* documented in RFC 1321, "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm".
*
*
* Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
* RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
* Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
......@@ -299,8 +299,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, trickle_count) = 0;
* get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
*/
static struct poolinfo {
int poolwords;
int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
int poolwords;
int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
} poolinfo_table[] = {
/* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */
{ 2048, 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 },
......@@ -353,12 +353,12 @@ static struct poolinfo {
* II. ACM Transactions on Mdeling and Computer Simulation 4:254-266)
*
* Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
*
*
* We have not analyzed the resultant polynomial to prove it primitive;
* in fact it almost certainly isn't. Nonetheless, the irreducible factors
* of a random large-degree polynomial over GF(2) are more than large enough
* that periodicity is not a concern.
*
*
* The input hash is much less sensitive than the output hash. All
* that we want of it is that it be a good non-cryptographic hash;
* i.e. it not produce collisions when fed "random" data of the sort
......@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static struct poolinfo {
* Linux 2.2 compatibility
*/
#ifndef DECLARE_WAITQUEUE
#define DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(WAIT, PTR) struct wait_queue WAIT = { PTR, NULL }
#define DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(WAIT, PTR) struct wait_queue WAIT = { PTR, NULL }
#endif
#ifndef DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD
#define DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(WAIT) struct wait_queue *WAIT
......@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state);
*
* Utility functions, with some ASM defined functions for speed
* purposes
*
*
*****************************************************************/
/*
......@@ -428,7 +428,6 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state);
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
{
return (word << i) | (word >> (32 - i));
}
#else
static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
......@@ -442,9 +441,9 @@ static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
/*
* More asm magic....
*
*
* For entropy estimation, we need to do an integral base 2
* logarithm.
* logarithm.
*
* Note the "12bits" suffix - this is used for numbers between
* 0 and 4095 only. This allows a few shortcuts.
......@@ -453,7 +452,7 @@ static inline __u32 rotate_left(int i, __u32 word)
static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
{
__u32 nbits = 0;
while (word >>= 1)
nbits++;
return nbits;
......@@ -487,20 +486,20 @@ static inline __u32 int_ln_12bits(__u32 word)
*
* OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
* storing entropy in an entropy pool.
*
*
**********************************************************************/
struct entropy_store {
/* mostly-read data: */
struct poolinfo poolinfo;
__u32 *pool;
const char *name;
__u32 *pool;
const char *name;
/* read-write data: */
spinlock_t lock ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
unsigned add_ptr;
int entropy_count;
int input_rotate;
unsigned add_ptr;
int entropy_count;
int input_rotate;
};
/*
......@@ -512,9 +511,9 @@ struct entropy_store {
static int create_entropy_store(int size, const char *name,
struct entropy_store **ret_bucket)
{
struct entropy_store *r;
struct poolinfo *p;
int poolwords;
struct entropy_store *r;
struct poolinfo *p;
int poolwords;
poolwords = (size + 3) / 4; /* Convert bytes->words */
/* The pool size must be a multiple of 16 32-bit words */
......@@ -554,6 +553,7 @@ static void clear_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
r->input_rotate = 0;
memset(r->pool, 0, r->poolinfo.POOLBYTES);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static void free_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
{
......@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static void free_entropy_store(struct entropy_store *r)
* This function adds a byte into the entropy "pool". It does not
* update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
* credit_entropy_store if this is appropriate.
*
*
* The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
* degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
* it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
......@@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static void __add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
int nwords, __u32 out[16])
{
static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
0, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
unsigned long i, add_ptr, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
int new_rotate, input_rotate;
......@@ -642,7 +642,6 @@ static inline void add_entropy_words(struct entropy_store *r, const __u32 *in,
__add_entropy_words(r, in, nwords, NULL);
}
/*
* Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy
*/
......@@ -682,10 +681,10 @@ struct sample {
};
static struct sample *batch_entropy_pool, *batch_entropy_copy;
static int batch_head, batch_tail;
static int batch_head, batch_tail;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(batch_lock);
static int batch_max;
static int batch_max;
static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_);
static DECLARE_WORK(batch_work, batch_entropy_process, NULL);
......@@ -726,19 +725,14 @@ static void batch_entropy_store(u32 a, u32 b, int num)
batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].data[1] = b;
batch_entropy_pool[batch_head].credit = num;
if (((batch_head - batch_tail) & (batch_max-1)) >= (batch_max / 2)) {
/*
* Schedule it for the next timer tick:
*/
if (((batch_head - batch_tail) & (batch_max - 1)) >= (batch_max / 2))
schedule_delayed_work(&batch_work, 1);
}
new = (batch_head+1) & (batch_max-1);
if (new == batch_tail) {
new = (batch_head + 1) & (batch_max - 1);
if (new == batch_tail)
DEBUG_ENT("batch entropy buffer full\n");
} else {
else
batch_head = new;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch_lock, flags);
}
......@@ -762,7 +756,7 @@ static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_)
spin_lock_irq(&batch_lock);
memcpy(batch_entropy_copy, batch_entropy_pool,
batch_max*sizeof(struct sample));
batch_max * sizeof(struct sample));
head = batch_head;
tail = batch_tail;
......@@ -773,13 +767,13 @@ static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_)
p = r;
while (head != tail) {
if (r->entropy_count >= max_entropy) {
r = (r == sec_random_state) ? random_state :
sec_random_state;
r = (r == sec_random_state) ? random_state :
sec_random_state;
max_entropy = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
}
add_entropy_words(r, batch_entropy_copy[tail].data, 2);
credit_entropy_store(r, batch_entropy_copy[tail].credit);
tail = (tail+1) & (batch_max-1);
tail = (tail + 1) & (batch_max - 1);
}
if (p->entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
wake_up_interruptible(&random_read_wait);
......@@ -793,9 +787,9 @@ static void batch_entropy_process(void *private_)
/* There is one of these per entropy source */
struct timer_rand_state {
cycles_t last_time;
long last_delta,last_delta2;
unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
cycles_t last_time;
long last_delta,last_delta2;
unsigned dont_count_entropy:1;
};
static struct timer_rand_state keyboard_timer_state;
......@@ -815,14 +809,14 @@ static struct timer_rand_state *irq_timer_state[NR_IRQS];
*/
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
{
cycles_t time;
long delta, delta2, delta3;
int entropy = 0;
cycles_t time;
long delta, delta2, delta3;
int entropy = 0;
preempt_disable();
/* if over the trickle threshold, use only 1 in 4096 samples */
if ( random_state->entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
(__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
if (random_state->entropy_count > trickle_thresh &&
(__get_cpu_var(trickle_count)++ & 0xfff))
goto out;
/*
......@@ -898,7 +892,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq] == 0)
return;
add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100+irq);
add_timer_randomness(irq_timer_state[irq], 0x100 + irq);
}
void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
......@@ -906,7 +900,8 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
if (!disk || !disk->random)
return;
/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100+MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
add_timer_randomness(disk->random,
0x100 + MKDEV(disk->major, disk->first_minor));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
......@@ -921,7 +916,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
* This chunk of code defines a function
* void HASH_TRANSFORM(__u32 digest[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE],
* __u32 const data[16])
*
*
* The function hashes the input data to produce a digest in the first
* HASH_BUFFER_SIZE words of the digest[] array, and uses HASH_EXTRA_SIZE
* more words for internal purposes. (This buffer is exported so the
......@@ -936,7 +931,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
* 3) 0x98badcfe
* 4) 0x10325476
* 5) 0xc3d2e1f0 (SHA only)
*
*
* For /dev/random purposes, the length of the data being hashed is
* fixed in length, so appending a bit count in the usual way is not
* cryptographically necessary.
......@@ -958,9 +953,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
/* The SHA f()-functions. */
#define f1(x,y,z) ( z ^ (x & (y^z)) ) /* Rounds 0-19: x ? y : z */
#define f1(x,y,z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z))) /* Rounds 0-19: x ? y : z */
#define f2(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) /* Rounds 20-39: XOR */
#define f3(x,y,z) ( (x & y) + (z & (x ^ y)) ) /* Rounds 40-59: majority */
#define f3(x,y,z) ((x & y) + (z & (x ^ y))) /* Rounds 40-59: majority */
#define f4(x,y,z) (x ^ y ^ z) /* Rounds 60-79: XOR */
/* The SHA Mysterious Constants */
......@@ -970,199 +965,198 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_disk_randomness);
#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCL /* Rounds 40-59: sqrt(5) * 2^30 */
#define K4 0xCA62C1D6L /* Rounds 60-79: sqrt(10) * 2^30 */
#define ROTL(n,X) ( ( ( X ) << n ) | ( ( X ) >> ( 32 - n ) ) )
#define ROTL(n,X) (((X) << n ) | ((X) >> (32 - n)))
#define subRound(a, b, c, d, e, f, k, data) \
( e += ROTL( 5, a ) + f( b, c, d ) + k + data, b = ROTL( 30, b ) )
(e += ROTL(5, a) + f(b, c, d) + k + data, b = ROTL(30, b))
static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
{
__u32 A, B, C, D, E; /* Local vars */
__u32 TEMP;
int i;
__u32 A, B, C, D, E; /* Local vars */
__u32 TEMP;
int i;
#define W (digest + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE) /* Expanded data array */
/*
* Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words. Doing it
* out-of-line line this is faster than doing it in-line on
* register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
* slower on real processors.
*/
memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
}
/* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
A = digest[ 0 ];
B = digest[ 1 ];
C = digest[ 2 ];
D = digest[ 3 ];
E = digest[ 4 ];
/* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
/*
* Do the preliminary expansion of 16 to 80 words. Doing it
* out-of-line line this is faster than doing it in-line on
* register-starved machines like the x86, and not really any
* slower on real processors.
*/
memcpy(W, data, 16*sizeof(__u32));
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
TEMP = W[i] ^ W[i+2] ^ W[i+8] ^ W[i+13];
W[i+16] = ROTL(1, TEMP);
}
/* Set up first buffer and local data buffer */
A = digest[ 0 ];
B = digest[ 1 ];
C = digest[ 2 ];
D = digest[ 3 ];
E = digest[ 4 ];
/* Heavy mangling, in 4 sub-rounds of 20 iterations each. */
#if SHA_CODE_SIZE == 0
/*
* Approximately 50% of the speed of the largest version, but
* takes up 1/16 the space. Saves about 6k on an i386 kernel.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
if (i < 40) {
if (i < 20)
TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
else
TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
} else {
if (i < 60)
TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
else
TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
/*
* Approximately 50% of the speed of the largest version, but
* takes up 1/16 the space. Saves about 6k on an i386 kernel.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 80; i++) {
if (i < 40) {
if (i < 20)
TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1;
else
TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2;
} else {
if (i < 60)
TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3;
else
TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4;
}
TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
TEMP += ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 1
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (; i < 40; i++) {
TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (; i < 60; i++) {
TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (; i < 80; i++) {
TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
TEMP = f1(B, C, D) + K1 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (; i < 40; i++) {
TEMP = f2(B, C, D) + K2 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (; i < 60; i++) {
TEMP = f3(B, C, D) + K3 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
for (; i < 80; i++) {
TEMP = f4(B, C, D) + K4 + ROTL(5, A) + E + W[i];
E = D; D = C; C = ROTL(30, B); B = A; A = TEMP;
}
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 2
for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ i ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ i+1 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ i+2 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ i+3 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ i+4 ] );
}
for (; i < 40; i += 5) {
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ i ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ i+1 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ i+2 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ i+3 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ i+4 ] );
}
for (; i < 60; i += 5) {
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ i ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ i+1 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ i+2 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ i+3 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ i+4 ] );
}
for (; i < 80; i += 5) {
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ i ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ i+1 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ i+2 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ i+3 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ i+4 ] );
}
for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[i ]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[i+1]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[i+2]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[i+3]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[i+4]);
}
for (; i < 40; i += 5) {
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[i ]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[i+1]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[i+2]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[i+3]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[i+4]);
}
for (; i < 60; i += 5) {
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[i ]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[i+1]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[i+2]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[i+3]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[i+4]);
}
for (; i < 80; i += 5) {
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[i ]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[i+1]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[i+2]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[i+3]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[i+4]);
}
#elif SHA_CODE_SIZE == 3 /* Really large version */
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 0 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 1 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 2 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 3 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 4 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 5 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 6 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 7 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 8 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 9 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 10 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 11 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 12 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 13 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 14 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 15 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 16 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 17 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 18 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 19 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 20 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 21 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 22 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 23 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 24 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 25 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 26 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 27 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 28 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 29 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 30 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 31 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 32 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 33 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 34 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[ 35 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[ 36 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[ 37 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[ 38 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[ 39 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 40 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 41 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 42 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 43 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 44 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 45 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 46 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 47 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 48 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 49 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 50 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 51 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 52 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 53 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 54 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[ 55 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[ 56 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[ 57 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[ 58 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[ 59 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 60 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 61 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 62 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 63 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 64 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 65 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 66 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 67 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 68 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 69 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 70 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 71 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 72 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 73 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 74 ] );
subRound( A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[ 75 ] );
subRound( E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[ 76 ] );
subRound( D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[ 77 ] );
subRound( C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[ 78 ] );
subRound( B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[ 79 ] );
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 0]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 1]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 2]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 3]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 4]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[ 5]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[ 6]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[ 7]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[ 8]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[ 9]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[10]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[11]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[12]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[13]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[14]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f1, K1, W[15]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f1, K1, W[16]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f1, K1, W[17]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f1, K1, W[18]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f1, K1, W[19]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[20]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[21]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[22]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[23]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[24]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[25]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[26]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[27]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[28]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[29]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[30]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[31]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[32]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[33]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[34]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f2, K2, W[35]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f2, K2, W[36]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f2, K2, W[37]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f2, K2, W[38]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f2, K2, W[39]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[40]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[41]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[42]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[43]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[44]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[45]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[46]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[47]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[48]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[49]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[50]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[51]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[52]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[53]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[54]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f3, K3, W[55]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f3, K3, W[56]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f3, K3, W[57]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f3, K3, W[58]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f3, K3, W[59]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[60]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[61]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[62]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[63]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[64]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[65]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[66]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[67]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[68]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[69]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[70]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[71]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[72]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[73]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[74]);
subRound(A, B, C, D, E, f4, K4, W[75]);
subRound(E, A, B, C, D, f4, K4, W[76]);
subRound(D, E, A, B, C, f4, K4, W[77]);
subRound(C, D, E, A, B, f4, K4, W[78]);
subRound(B, C, D, E, A, f4, K4, W[79]);
#else
#error Illegal SHA_CODE_SIZE
#endif
/* Build message digest */
digest[ 0 ] += A;
digest[ 1 ] += B;
digest[ 2 ] += C;
digest[ 3 ] += D;
digest[ 4 ] += E;
/* Build message digest */
digest[0] += A;
digest[1] += B;
digest[2] += C;
digest[3] += D;
digest[4] += E;
/* W is wiped by the caller */
#undef W
......@@ -1173,18 +1167,18 @@ static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
#undef f2
#undef f3
#undef f4
#undef K1
#undef K1
#undef K2
#undef K3
#undef K4
#undef K3
#undef K4
#undef subRound
#else /* !USE_SHA - Use MD5 */
#define HASH_BUFFER_SIZE 4
#define HASH_EXTRA_SIZE 0
#define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5Transform
/*
* MD5 transform algorithm, taken from code written by Colin Plumb,
* and put into the public domain
......@@ -1200,7 +1194,7 @@ static void SHATransform(__u32 digest[85], __u32 const data[16])
/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<<s | w>>(32-s), w += x )
(w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w << s | w >> (32 - s), w += x )
/*
* The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
......@@ -1360,7 +1354,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
__u32 x;
unsigned long cpuflags;
/* Redundant, but just in case... */
if (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo.POOLBITS)
r->entropy_count = r->poolinfo.POOLBITS;
......@@ -1456,7 +1449,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
x ^= (x >> 16); /* Fold it in half */
((__u16 *)tmp)[HASH_BUFFER_SIZE-1] = (__u16)x;
#endif
/* Copy data to destination buffer */
i = min(nbytes, HASH_BUFFER_SIZE*sizeof(__u32)/2);
if (flags & EXTRACT_ENTROPY_USER) {
......@@ -1467,6 +1460,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
}
} else
memcpy(buf, (__u8 const *)tmp, i);
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
ret += i;
......@@ -1474,7 +1468,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void * buf,
/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
return ret;
}
......@@ -1517,10 +1511,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
*/
static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
{
struct timeval tv;
__u32 words[2];
char *p;
int i;
struct timeval tv;
__u32 words[2];
char *p;
int i;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
words[0] = tv.tv_sec;
......@@ -1577,7 +1571,7 @@ module_init(rand_initialize);
void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
if (irq >= NR_IRQS || irq_timer_state[irq])
return;
......@@ -1591,11 +1585,11 @@ void rand_initialize_irq(int irq)
irq_timer_state[irq] = state;
}
}
void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
/*
* If kmalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
* source.
......@@ -1611,8 +1605,8 @@ static ssize_t
random_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
if (nbytes == 0)
return 0;
......@@ -1683,7 +1677,7 @@ random_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
*/
if (count)
file_accessed(file);
return (count ? count : retval);
}
......@@ -1721,11 +1715,11 @@ static ssize_t
random_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t bytes;
__u32 buf[16];
const char __user *p = buffer;
size_t c = count;
int ret = 0;
size_t bytes;
__u32 buf[16];
const char __user *p = buffer;
size_t c = count;
while (c > 0) {
bytes = min(c, sizeof(buf));
......@@ -1757,7 +1751,7 @@ random_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
int size, ent_count;
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
int retval;
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
ent_count = random_state->entropy_count;
......@@ -1816,22 +1810,22 @@ random_ioctl(struct inode * inode, struct file * file,
}
struct file_operations random_fops = {
.read = random_read,
.write = random_write,
.poll = random_poll,
.ioctl = random_ioctl,
.read = random_read,
.write = random_write,
.poll = random_poll,
.ioctl = random_ioctl,
};
struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
.read = urandom_read,
.write = random_write,
.ioctl = random_ioctl,
.read = urandom_read,
.write = random_write,
.ioctl = random_ioctl,
};
/***************************************************************
* Random UUID interface
*
* Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
*
* Used here for a Boot ID, but can be useful for other kernel
* drivers.
***************************************************************/
......@@ -1865,14 +1859,14 @@ static int min_write_thresh, max_write_thresh;
static char sysctl_bootid[16];
/*
* This function handles a request from the user to change the pool size
* This function handles a request from the user to change the pool size
* of the primary entropy store.
*/
static int change_poolsize(int poolsize)
{
struct entropy_store *new_store, *old_store;
int ret;
struct entropy_store *new_store, *old_store;
int ret;
if ((ret = create_entropy_store(poolsize, random_state->name,
&new_store)))
return ret;
......@@ -1891,7 +1885,7 @@ static int change_poolsize(int poolsize)
static int proc_do_poolsize(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
int ret;
int ret;
sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;
......@@ -1907,8 +1901,8 @@ static int poolsize_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
void __user *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
int len;
int len;
sysctl_poolsize = random_state->poolinfo.POOLBYTES;
/*
......@@ -1934,16 +1928,16 @@ static int poolsize_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
* These functions is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
* UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
* then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
*
*
* If the user accesses this via the proc interface, it will be returned
* as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
* as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format. If accesses via the
* sysctl system call, it is returned as 16 bytes of binary data.
*/
static int proc_do_uuid(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
ctl_table fake_table;
unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
ctl_table fake_table;
unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
uuid = table->data;
if (!uuid) {
......@@ -1969,8 +1963,8 @@ static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
void __user *oldval, size_t __user *oldlenp,
void __user *newval, size_t newlen, void **context)
{
unsigned char tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
unsigned int len;
unsigned char tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
unsigned int len;
if (!oldval || !oldlenp)
return 1;
......@@ -1997,7 +1991,7 @@ static int uuid_strategy(ctl_table *table, int __user *name, int nlen,
ctl_table random_table[] = {
{
.ctl_name = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
.ctl_name = RANDOM_POOLSIZE,
.procname = "poolsize",
.data = &sysctl_poolsize,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
......@@ -2095,7 +2089,7 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state)
* Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
*/
#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32-s)))
(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
#define K1 0
#define K2 013240474631UL
#define K3 015666365641UL
......@@ -2105,7 +2099,7 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct entropy_store *random_state)
*/
static __u32 halfMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[8])
{
__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
/* Round 1 */
ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[0] + K1, 3);
......@@ -2145,7 +2139,7 @@ static __u32 halfMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[8])
static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
{
__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
/* Round 1 */
ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
......@@ -2189,7 +2183,7 @@ static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
}
#endif
......@@ -2203,7 +2197,7 @@ static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
#undef K3
/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
/*
* Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
* bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
......@@ -2221,16 +2215,16 @@ static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
*
* SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
* Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
*
*
*/
#define COUNT_BITS 8
#define COUNT_MASK ( (1<<COUNT_BITS)-1)
#define HASH_BITS 24
#define HASH_MASK ( (1<<HASH_BITS)-1 )
#define COUNT_BITS 8
#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
#define HASH_BITS 24
#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
static struct keydata {
__u32 count; // already shifted to the final position
__u32 secret[12];
__u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
__u32 secret[12];
} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
static unsigned int ip_cnt;
......@@ -2253,10 +2247,10 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator, NULL);
*/
static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_)
{
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1^(ip_cnt&1)];
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
keyptr->count = (ip_cnt&COUNT_MASK)<<HASH_BITS;
keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
smp_wmb();
ip_cnt++;
schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
......@@ -2264,7 +2258,7 @@ static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_)
static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
{
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt&1];
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
smp_rmb();
......@@ -2282,25 +2276,24 @@ late_initcall(seqgen_init);
__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
struct timeval tv;
__u32 seq;
__u32 hash[12];
struct timeval tv;
__u32 seq;
__u32 hash[12];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
* Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
*/
memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32)*7);
memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32) * 7);
seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
seq += keyptr->count;
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
return seq;
}
......@@ -2310,15 +2303,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
__u16 sport, __u16 dport)
{
struct timeval tv;
__u32 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct timeval tv;
__u32 seq;
__u32 hash[4];
struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
/*
* Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
* (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
* Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
* Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
* then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
*/
hash[0]=saddr;
......@@ -2337,7 +2330,7 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
* (Networks are faster now - should this be increased?)
*/
do_gettimeofday(&tv);
seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec*1000000;
seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
#if 0
printk("init_seq(%lx, %lx, %d, %d) = %d\n",
saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq);
......@@ -2400,14 +2393,14 @@ u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
#define COOKIEBITS 24 /* Upper bits store count */
#define COOKIEMASK (((__u32)1 << COOKIEBITS) - 1)
static int syncookie_init;
static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];
static int syncookie_init;
static __u32 syncookie_secret[2][16-3+HASH_BUFFER_SIZE];
__u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 data)
{
__u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
__u32 seq;
__u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
__u32 seq;
/*
* Pick two random secrets the first time we need a cookie.
......@@ -2428,19 +2421,19 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
* MSS into the second hash value.
*/
memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
seq = tmp[17] + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS);
memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[1], sizeof(syncookie_secret[1]));
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
tmp[3] = count; /* minute counter */
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp + 16, tmp);
/* Add in the second hash and the data */
return seq + ((tmp[17] + data) & COOKIEMASK);
......@@ -2458,22 +2451,22 @@ __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
__u16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{
__u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
__u32 diff;
__u32 tmp[16 + HASH_BUFFER_SIZE + HASH_EXTRA_SIZE];
__u32 diff;
if (syncookie_init == 0)
return (__u32)-1; /* Well, duh! */
return (__u32)-1; /* Well, duh! */
/* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
memcpy(tmp+3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
memcpy(tmp + 3, syncookie_secret[0], sizeof(syncookie_secret[0]));
tmp[0]=saddr;
tmp[1]=daddr;
tmp[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp + 16, tmp);
cookie -= tmp[17] + sseq;
/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32)-1 >> COOKIEBITS);
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
if (diff >= maxdiff)
return (__u32)-1;
......@@ -2482,7 +2475,7 @@ __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport,
tmp[1] = daddr;
tmp[2] = (sport << 16) + dport;
tmp[3] = count - diff; /* minute counter */
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp+16, tmp);
HASH_TRANSFORM(tmp + 16, tmp);
return (cookie - tmp[17]) & COOKIEMASK; /* Leaving the data behind */
}
......
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