Commit a6de82ca authored by Jan Kara's avatar Jan Kara Committed by Al Viro

xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities

Currently XFS calls file_remove_privs() without holding i_mutex. This is
wrong because that function can end up messing with file permissions and
file capabilities stored in xattrs for which we need i_mutex held.

Fix the problem by grabbing iolock exclusively when we will need to
change anything in permissions / xattrs.
Reviewed-by: default avatarDave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
parent 45f147a1
...@@ -563,6 +563,13 @@ xfs_file_aio_write_checks( ...@@ -563,6 +563,13 @@ xfs_file_aio_write_checks(
if (error) if (error)
return error; return error;
/* For changing security info in file_remove_privs() we need i_mutex */
if (*iolock == XFS_IOLOCK_SHARED && !IS_NOSEC(inode)) {
xfs_rw_iunlock(ip, *iolock);
*iolock = XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL;
xfs_rw_ilock(ip, *iolock);
goto restart;
}
/* /*
* If the offset is beyond the size of the file, we need to zero any * If the offset is beyond the size of the file, we need to zero any
* blocks that fall between the existing EOF and the start of this * blocks that fall between the existing EOF and the start of this
...@@ -623,7 +630,9 @@ xfs_file_aio_write_checks( ...@@ -623,7 +630,9 @@ xfs_file_aio_write_checks(
* setgid bits if the process is not being run by root. This keeps * setgid bits if the process is not being run by root. This keeps
* people from modifying setuid and setgid binaries. * people from modifying setuid and setgid binaries.
*/ */
if (!IS_NOSEC(inode))
return file_remove_privs(file); return file_remove_privs(file);
return 0;
} }
/* /*
......
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