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Commit f60c55a9 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
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Merge tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt 

Pull fs-verity support from Eric Biggers:
 "fs-verity is a filesystem feature that provides Merkle tree based
  hashing (similar to dm-verity) for individual readonly files, mainly
  for the purpose of efficient authenticity verification.

  This pull request includes:

   (a) The fs/verity/ support layer and documentation.

   (b) fs-verity support for ext4 and f2fs.

  Compared to the original fs-verity patchset from last year, the UAPI
  to enable fs-verity on a file has been greatly simplified. Lots of
  other things were cleaned up too.

  fs-verity is planned to be used by two different projects on Android;
  most of the userspace code is in place already. Another userspace tool
  ("fsverity-utils"), and xfstests, are also available. e2fsprogs and
  f2fs-tools already have fs-verity support. Other people have shown
  interest in using fs-verity too.

  I've tested this on ext4 and f2fs with xfstests, both the existing
  tests and the new fs-verity tests. This has also been in linux-next
  since July 30 with no reported issues except a couple minor ones I
  found myself and folded in fixes for.

  Ted and I will be co-maintaining fs-verity"

* tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt:
  f2fs: add fs-verity support
  ext4: update on-disk format documentation for fs-verity
  ext4: add fs-verity read support
  ext4: add basic fs-verity support
  fs-verity: support builtin file signatures
  fs-verity: add SHA-512 support
  fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl
  fs-verity: implement FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl
  fs-verity: add data verification hooks for ->readpages()
  fs-verity: add the hook for file ->setattr()
  fs-verity: add the hook for file ->open()
  fs-verity: add inode and superblock fields
  fs-verity: add Kconfig and the helper functions for hashing
  fs: uapi: define verity bit for FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
  fs-verity: add UAPI header
  fs-verity: add MAINTAINERS file entry
  fs-verity: add a documentation file
parents 734d1ed8 95ae251f
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Showing with 3910 additions and 70 deletions
Documentation/filesystems/ext4/inodes.rst
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -277,6 +277,8 @@ The ``i_flags`` field is a combination of these values:
- This is a huge file (EXT4\_HUGE\_FILE\_FL).
* - 0x80000
- Inode uses extents (EXT4\_EXTENTS\_FL).
* - 0x100000
- Verity protected file (EXT4\_VERITY\_FL).
* - 0x200000
- Inode stores a large extended attribute value in its data blocks
(EXT4\_EA\_INODE\_FL).
......@@ -299,9 +301,9 @@ The ``i_flags`` field is a combination of these values:
- Reserved for ext4 library (EXT4\_RESERVED\_FL).
* -
- Aggregate flags:
* - 0x4BDFFF
* - 0x705BDFFF
- User-visible flags.
* - 0x4B80FF
* - 0x604BC0FF
- User-modifiable flags. Note that while EXT4\_JOURNAL\_DATA\_FL and
EXT4\_EXTENTS\_FL can be set with setattr, they are not in the kernel's
EXT4\_FL\_USER\_MODIFIABLE mask, since it needs to handle the setting of
......
Documentation/filesystems/ext4/overview.rst
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -24,3 +24,4 @@ order.
.. include:: bigalloc.rst
.. include:: inlinedata.rst
.. include:: eainode.rst
.. include:: verity.rst
Documentation/filesystems/ext4/super.rst
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -696,6 +696,8 @@ the following:
(RO\_COMPAT\_READONLY)
* - 0x2000
- Filesystem tracks project quotas. (RO\_COMPAT\_PROJECT)
* - 0x8000
- Verity inodes may be present on the filesystem. (RO\_COMPAT\_VERITY)
.. _super_def_hash:
......
Documentation/filesystems/ext4/verity.rst 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
Verity files
------------
ext4 supports fs-verity, which is a filesystem feature that provides
Merkle tree based hashing for individual readonly files. Most of
fs-verity is common to all filesystems that support it; see
:ref:`Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst <fsverity>` for the
fs-verity documentation. However, the on-disk layout of the verity
metadata is filesystem-specific. On ext4, the verity metadata is
stored after the end of the file data itself, in the following format:
- Zero-padding to the next 65536-byte boundary. This padding need not
actually be allocated on-disk, i.e. it may be a hole.
- The Merkle tree, as documented in
:ref:`Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
<fsverity_merkle_tree>`, with the tree levels stored in order from
root to leaf, and the tree blocks within each level stored in their
natural order.
- Zero-padding to the next filesystem block boundary.
- The verity descriptor, as documented in
:ref:`Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst <fsverity_descriptor>`,
with optionally appended signature blob.
- Zero-padding to the next offset that is 4 bytes before a filesystem
block boundary.
- The size of the verity descriptor in bytes, as a 4-byte little
endian integer.
Verity inodes have EXT4_VERITY_FL set, and they must use extents, i.e.
EXT4_EXTENTS_FL must be set and EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL must be clear.
They can have EXT4_ENCRYPT_FL set, in which case the verity metadata
is encrypted as well as the data itself.
Verity files cannot have blocks allocated past the end of the verity
metadata.
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
.. _fsverity:
=======================================================
fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
=======================================================
Introduction
============
fs-verity (``fs/verity/``) is a support layer that filesystems can
hook into to support transparent integrity and authenticity protection
of read-only files. Currently, it is supported by the ext4 and f2fs
filesystems. Like fscrypt, not too much filesystem-specific code is
needed to support fs-verity.
fs-verity is similar to `dm-verity
<https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/device-mapper/verity.txt>`_
but works on files rather than block devices. On regular files on
filesystems supporting fs-verity, userspace can execute an ioctl that
causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for the file and persist
it to a filesystem-specific location associated with the file.
After this, the file is made readonly, and all reads from the file are
automatically verified against the file's Merkle tree. Reads of any
corrupted data, including mmap reads, will fail.
Userspace can use another ioctl to retrieve the root hash (actually
the "file measurement", which is a hash that includes the root hash)
that fs-verity is enforcing for the file. This ioctl executes in
constant time, regardless of the file size.
fs-verity is essentially a way to hash a file in constant time,
subject to the caveat that reads which would violate the hash will
fail at runtime.
Use cases
=========
By itself, the base fs-verity feature only provides integrity
protection, i.e. detection of accidental (non-malicious) corruption.
However, because fs-verity makes retrieving the file hash extremely
efficient, it's primarily meant to be used as a tool to support
authentication (detection of malicious modifications) or auditing
(logging file hashes before use).
Trusted userspace code (e.g. operating system code running on a
read-only partition that is itself authenticated by dm-verity) can
authenticate the contents of an fs-verity file by using the
`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_ ioctl to retrieve its hash, then verifying a
digital signature of it.
A standard file hash could be used instead of fs-verity. However,
this is inefficient if the file is large and only a small portion may
be accessed. This is often the case for Android application package
(APK) files, for example. These typically contain many translations,
classes, and other resources that are infrequently or even never
accessed on a particular device. It would be slow and wasteful to
read and hash the entire file before starting the application.
Unlike an ahead-of-time hash, fs-verity also re-verifies data each
time it's paged in. This ensures that malicious disk firmware can't
undetectably change the contents of the file at runtime.
fs-verity does not replace or obsolete dm-verity. dm-verity should
still be used on read-only filesystems. fs-verity is for files that
must live on a read-write filesystem because they are independently
updated and potentially user-installed, so dm-verity cannot be used.
The base fs-verity feature is a hashing mechanism only; actually
authenticating the files is up to userspace. However, to meet some
users' needs, fs-verity optionally supports a simple signature
verification mechanism where users can configure the kernel to require
that all fs-verity files be signed by a key loaded into a keyring; see
`Built-in signature verification`_. Support for fs-verity file hashes
in IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) policies is also planned.
User API
========
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY
--------------------
The FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY ioctl enables fs-verity on a file. It takes
in a pointer to a :c:type:`struct fsverity_enable_arg`, defined as
follows::
struct fsverity_enable_arg {
__u32 version;
__u32 hash_algorithm;
__u32 block_size;
__u32 salt_size;
__u64 salt_ptr;
__u32 sig_size;
__u32 __reserved1;
__u64 sig_ptr;
__u64 __reserved2[11];
};
This structure contains the parameters of the Merkle tree to build for
the file, and optionally contains a signature. It must be initialized
as follows:
- ``version`` must be 1.
- ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to
use for the Merkle tree, such as FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256. See
``include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h`` for the list of possible values.
- ``block_size`` must be the Merkle tree block size. Currently, this
must be equal to the system page size, which is usually 4096 bytes.
Other sizes may be supported in the future. This value is not
necessarily the same as the filesystem block size.
- ``salt_size`` is the size of the salt in bytes, or 0 if no salt is
provided. The salt is a value that is prepended to every hashed
block; it can be used to personalize the hashing for a particular
file or device. Currently the maximum salt size is 32 bytes.
- ``salt_ptr`` is the pointer to the salt, or NULL if no salt is
provided.
- ``sig_size`` is the size of the signature in bytes, or 0 if no
signature is provided. Currently the signature is (somewhat
arbitrarily) limited to 16128 bytes. See `Built-in signature
verification`_ for more information.
- ``sig_ptr`` is the pointer to the signature, or NULL if no
signature is provided.
- All reserved fields must be zeroed.
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY causes the filesystem to build a Merkle tree for
the file and persist it to a filesystem-specific location associated
with the file, then mark the file as a verity file. This ioctl may
take a long time to execute on large files, and it is interruptible by
fatal signals.
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY checks for write access to the inode. However,
it must be executed on an O_RDONLY file descriptor and no processes
can have the file open for writing. Attempts to open the file for
writing while this ioctl is executing will fail with ETXTBSY. (This
is necessary to guarantee that no writable file descriptors will exist
after verity is enabled, and to guarantee that the file's contents are
stable while the Merkle tree is being built over it.)
On success, FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY returns 0, and the file becomes a
verity file. On failure (including the case of interruption by a
fatal signal), no changes are made to the file.
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EACCES``: the process does not have write access to the file
- ``EBADMSG``: the signature is malformed
- ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file
- ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled
- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
- ``EINTR``: the operation was interrupted by a fatal signal
- ``EINVAL``: unsupported version, hash algorithm, or block size; or
reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a
regular file nor a directory.
- ``EISDIR``: the file descriptor refers to a directory
- ``EKEYREJECTED``: the signature doesn't match the file
- ``EMSGSIZE``: the salt or signature is too long
- ``ENOKEY``: the fs-verity keyring doesn't contain the certificate
needed to verify the signature
- ``ENOPKG``: fs-verity recognizes the hash algorithm, but it's not
available in the kernel's crypto API as currently configured (e.g.
for SHA-512, missing CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512).
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
support; or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity'
feature enabled on it; or the filesystem does not support fs-verity
on this file. (See `Filesystem support`_.)
- ``EPERM``: the file is append-only; or, a signature is required and
one was not provided.
- ``EROFS``: the filesystem is read-only
- ``ETXTBSY``: someone has the file open for writing. This can be the
caller's file descriptor, another open file descriptor, or the file
reference held by a writable memory map.
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
---------------------
The FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY ioctl retrieves the measurement of a verity
file. The file measurement is a digest that cryptographically
identifies the file contents that are being enforced on reads.
This ioctl takes in a pointer to a variable-length structure::
struct fsverity_digest {
__u16 digest_algorithm;
__u16 digest_size; /* input/output */
__u8 digest[];
};
``digest_size`` is an input/output field. On input, it must be
initialized to the number of bytes allocated for the variable-length
``digest`` field.
On success, 0 is returned and the kernel fills in the structure as
follows:
- ``digest_algorithm`` will be the hash algorithm used for the file
measurement. It will match ``fsverity_enable_arg::hash_algorithm``.
- ``digest_size`` will be the size of the digest in bytes, e.g. 32
for SHA-256. (This can be redundant with ``digest_algorithm``.)
- ``digest`` will be the actual bytes of the digest.
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY is guaranteed to execute in constant time,
regardless of the size of the file.
FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file
- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity
- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity'
feature enabled on it. (See `Filesystem support`_.)
- ``EOVERFLOW``: the digest is longer than the specified
``digest_size`` bytes. Try providing a larger buffer.
FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
---------------
The existing ioctl FS_IOC_GETFLAGS (which isn't specific to fs-verity)
can also be used to check whether a file has fs-verity enabled or not.
To do so, check for FS_VERITY_FL (0x00100000) in the returned flags.
The verity flag is not settable via FS_IOC_SETFLAGS. You must use
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY instead, since parameters must be provided.
Accessing verity files
======================
Applications can transparently access a verity file just like a
non-verity one, with the following exceptions:
- Verity files are readonly. They cannot be opened for writing or
truncate()d, even if the file mode bits allow it. Attempts to do
one of these things will fail with EPERM. However, changes to
metadata such as owner, mode, timestamps, and xattrs are still
allowed, since these are not measured by fs-verity. Verity files
can also still be renamed, deleted, and linked to.
- Direct I/O is not supported on verity files. Attempts to use direct
I/O on such files will fall back to buffered I/O.
- DAX (Direct Access) is not supported on verity files, because this
would circumvent the data verification.
- Reads of data that doesn't match the verity Merkle tree will fail
with EIO (for read()) or SIGBUS (for mmap() reads).
- If the sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is set to 1 and the
file's verity measurement is not signed by a key in the fs-verity
keyring, then opening the file will fail. See `Built-in signature
verification`_.
Direct access to the Merkle tree is not supported. Therefore, if a
verity file is copied, or is backed up and restored, then it will lose
its "verity"-ness. fs-verity is primarily meant for files like
executables that are managed by a package manager.
File measurement computation
============================
This section describes how fs-verity hashes the file contents using a
Merkle tree to produce the "file measurement" which cryptographically
identifies the file contents. This algorithm is the same for all
filesystems that support fs-verity.
Userspace only needs to be aware of this algorithm if it needs to
compute the file measurement itself, e.g. in order to sign the file.
.. _fsverity_merkle_tree:
Merkle tree
-----------
The file contents is divided into blocks, where the block size is
configurable but is usually 4096 bytes. The end of the last block is
zero-padded if needed. Each block is then hashed, producing the first
level of hashes. Then, the hashes in this first level are grouped
into 'blocksize'-byte blocks (zero-padding the ends as needed) and
these blocks are hashed, producing the second level of hashes. This
proceeds up the tree until only a single block remains. The hash of
this block is the "Merkle tree root hash".
If the file fits in one block and is nonempty, then the "Merkle tree
root hash" is simply the hash of the single data block. If the file
is empty, then the "Merkle tree root hash" is all zeroes.
The "blocks" here are not necessarily the same as "filesystem blocks".
If a salt was specified, then it's zero-padded to the closest multiple
of the input size of the hash algorithm's compression function, e.g.
64 bytes for SHA-256 or 128 bytes for SHA-512. The padded salt is
prepended to every data or Merkle tree block that is hashed.
The purpose of the block padding is to cause every hash to be taken
over the same amount of data, which simplifies the implementation and
keeps open more possibilities for hardware acceleration. The purpose
of the salt padding is to make the salting "free" when the salted hash
state is precomputed, then imported for each hash.
Example: in the recommended configuration of SHA-256 and 4K blocks,
128 hash values fit in each block. Thus, each level of the Merkle
tree is approximately 128 times smaller than the previous, and for
large files the Merkle tree's size converges to approximately 1/127 of
the original file size. However, for small files, the padding is
significant, making the space overhead proportionally more.
.. _fsverity_descriptor:
fs-verity descriptor
--------------------
By itself, the Merkle tree root hash is ambiguous. For example, it
can't a distinguish a large file from a small second file whose data
is exactly the top-level hash block of the first file. Ambiguities
also arise from the convention of padding to the next block boundary.
To solve this problem, the verity file measurement is actually
computed as a hash of the following structure, which contains the
Merkle tree root hash as well as other fields such as the file size::
struct fsverity_descriptor {
__u8 version; /* must be 1 */
__u8 hash_algorithm; /* Merkle tree hash algorithm */
__u8 log_blocksize; /* log2 of size of data and tree blocks */
__u8 salt_size; /* size of salt in bytes; 0 if none */
__le32 sig_size; /* must be 0 */
__le64 data_size; /* size of file the Merkle tree is built over */
__u8 root_hash[64]; /* Merkle tree root hash */
__u8 salt[32]; /* salt prepended to each hashed block */
__u8 __reserved[144]; /* must be 0's */
};
Note that the ``sig_size`` field must be set to 0 for the purpose of
computing the file measurement, even if a signature was provided (or
will be provided) to `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_.
Built-in signature verification
===============================
With CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES=y, fs-verity supports putting
a portion of an authentication policy (see `Use cases`_) in the
kernel. Specifically, it adds support for:
1. At fs-verity module initialization time, a keyring ".fs-verity" is
created. The root user can add trusted X.509 certificates to this
keyring using the add_key() system call, then (when done)
optionally use keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent additional
certificates from being added.
2. `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_ accepts a pointer to a PKCS#7 formatted
detached signature in DER format of the file measurement. On
success, this signature is persisted alongside the Merkle tree.
Then, any time the file is opened, the kernel will verify the
file's actual measurement against this signature, using the
certificates in the ".fs-verity" keyring.
3. A new sysctl "fs.verity.require_signatures" is made available.
When set to 1, the kernel requires that all verity files have a
correctly signed file measurement as described in (2).
File measurements must be signed in the following format, which is
similar to the structure used by `FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_::
struct fsverity_signed_digest {
char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */
__le16 digest_algorithm;
__le16 digest_size;
__u8 digest[];
};
fs-verity's built-in signature verification support is meant as a
relatively simple mechanism that can be used to provide some level of
authenticity protection for verity files, as an alternative to doing
the signature verification in userspace or using IMA-appraisal.
However, with this mechanism, userspace programs still need to check
that the verity bit is set, and there is no protection against verity
files being swapped around.
Filesystem support
==================
fs-verity is currently supported by the ext4 and f2fs filesystems.
The CONFIG_FS_VERITY kconfig option must be enabled to use fs-verity
on either filesystem.
``include/linux/fsverity.h`` declares the interface between the
``fs/verity/`` support layer and filesystems. Briefly, filesystems
must provide an ``fsverity_operations`` structure that provides
methods to read and write the verity metadata to a filesystem-specific
location, including the Merkle tree blocks and
``fsverity_descriptor``. Filesystems must also call functions in
``fs/verity/`` at certain times, such as when a file is opened or when
pages have been read into the pagecache. (See `Verifying data`_.)
ext4
----
ext4 supports fs-verity since Linux TODO and e2fsprogs v1.45.2.
To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have
been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on
it. "verity" is an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, so once set, old
kernels will only be able to mount the filesystem readonly, and old
versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem. Moreover,
currently ext4 only supports mounting a filesystem with the "verity"
feature when its block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
ext4 sets the EXT4_VERITY_FL on-disk inode flag on verity files. It
can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared.
ext4 also supports encryption, which can be used simultaneously with
fs-verity. In this case, the plaintext data is verified rather than
the ciphertext. This is necessary in order to make the file
measurement meaningful, since every file is encrypted differently.
ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor)
past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond
i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are readonly,
and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can
be read/written internally by ext4 with only some relatively small
changes to ext4. This approach avoids having to depend on the
EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing ext4's xattr support to
support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support
encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted
when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
Currently, ext4 verity only supports the case where the Merkle tree
block size, filesystem block size, and page size are all the same. It
also only supports extent-based files.
f2fs
----
f2fs supports fs-verity since Linux TODO and f2fs-tools v1.11.0.
To create verity files on an f2fs filesystem, the filesystem must have
been formatted with ``-O verity``.
f2fs sets the FADVISE_VERITY_BIT on-disk inode flag on verity files.
It can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be
cleared.
Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first
64K boundary beyond i_size. See explanation for ext4 above.
Moreover, f2fs supports at most 4096 bytes of xattr entries per inode
which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block.
Currently, f2fs verity only supports a Merkle tree block size of 4096.
Also, f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently
have atomic or volatile writes pending.
Implementation details
======================
Verifying data
--------------
fs-verity ensures that all reads of a verity file's data are verified,
regardless of which syscall is used to do the read (e.g. mmap(),
read(), pread()) and regardless of whether it's the first read or a
later read (unless the later read can return cached data that was
already verified). Below, we describe how filesystems implement this.
Pagecache
~~~~~~~~~
For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->readpage()`` and
``->readpages()`` methods must be modified to verify pages before they
are marked Uptodate. Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be
insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps.
Therefore, fs/verity/ provides a function fsverity_verify_page() which
verifies a page that has been read into the pagecache of a verity
inode, but is still locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable
by userspace. As needed to do the verification,
fsverity_verify_page() will call back into the filesystem to read
Merkle tree pages via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page().
fsverity_verify_page() returns false if verification failed; in this
case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate. Following this,
as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to
read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with
EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS.
fsverity_verify_page() currently only supports the case where the
Merkle tree block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
In principle, fsverity_verify_page() verifies the entire path in the
Merkle tree from the data page to the root hash. However, for
efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore,
fsverity_verify_page() only ascends the tree reading hash pages until
an already-verified hash page is seen, as indicated by the PageChecked
bit being set. It then verifies the path to that page.
This optimization, which is also used by dm-verity, results in
excellent sequential read performance. This is because usually (e.g.
127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash page from the
bottom level of the tree will already be cached and checked from
reading a previous data page. However, random reads perform worse.
Block device based filesystems
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Block device based filesystems (e.g. ext4 and f2fs) in Linux also use
the pagecache, so the above subsection applies too. However, they
also usually read many pages from a file at once, grouped into a
structure called a "bio". To make it easier for these types of
filesystems to support fs-verity, fs/verity/ also provides a function
fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all pages in a bio.
ext4 and f2fs also support encryption. If a verity file is also
encrypted, the pages must be decrypted before being verified. To
support this, these filesystems allocate a "post-read context" for
each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``::
struct bio_post_read_ctx {
struct bio *bio;
struct work_struct work;
unsigned int cur_step;
unsigned int enabled_steps;
};
``enabled_steps`` is a bitmask that specifies whether decryption,
verity, or both is enabled. After the bio completes, for each needed
postprocessing step the filesystem enqueues the bio_post_read_ctx on a
workqueue, and then the workqueue work does the decryption or
verification. Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error
occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked.
Files on ext4 and f2fs may contain holes. Normally, ``->readpages()``
simply zeroes holes and sets the corresponding pages Uptodate; no bios
are issued. To prevent this case from bypassing fs-verity, these
filesystems use fsverity_verify_page() to verify hole pages.
ext4 and f2fs disable direct I/O on verity files, since otherwise
direct I/O would bypass fs-verity. (They also do the same for
encrypted files.)
Userspace utility
=================
This document focuses on the kernel, but a userspace utility for
fs-verity can be found at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git
See the README.md file in the fsverity-utils source tree for details,
including examples of setting up fs-verity protected files.
Tests
=====
To test fs-verity, use xfstests. For example, using `kvm-xfstests
<https://github.com/tytso/xfstests-bld/blob/master/Documentation/kvm-quickstart.md>`_::
kvm-xfstests -c ext4,f2fs -g verity
FAQ
===
This section answers frequently asked questions about fs-verity that
weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
:Q: Why isn't fs-verity part of IMA?
:A: fs-verity and IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) have
different focuses. fs-verity is a filesystem-level mechanism for
hashing individual files using a Merkle tree. In contrast, IMA
specifies a system-wide policy that specifies which files are
hashed and what to do with those hashes, such as log them,
authenticate them, or add them to a measurement list.
IMA is planned to support the fs-verity hashing mechanism as an
alternative to doing full file hashes, for people who want the
performance and security benefits of the Merkle tree based hash.
But it doesn't make sense to force all uses of fs-verity to be
through IMA. As a standalone filesystem feature, fs-verity
already meets many users' needs, and it's testable like other
filesystem features e.g. with xfstests.
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just modify the
hashes in the Merkle tree, which is stored on-disk?
:A: To verify the authenticity of an fs-verity file you must verify
the authenticity of the "file measurement", which is basically the
root hash of the Merkle tree. See `Use cases`_.
:Q: Isn't fs-verity useless because the attacker can just replace a
verity file with a non-verity one?
:A: See `Use cases`_. In the initial use case, it's really trusted
userspace code that authenticates the files; fs-verity is just a
tool to do this job efficiently and securely. The trusted
userspace code will consider non-verity files to be inauthentic.
:Q: Why does the Merkle tree need to be stored on-disk? Couldn't you
store just the root hash?
:A: If the Merkle tree wasn't stored on-disk, then you'd have to
compute the entire tree when the file is first accessed, even if
just one byte is being read. This is a fundamental consequence of
how Merkle tree hashing works. To verify a leaf node, you need to
verify the whole path to the root hash, including the root node
(the thing which the root hash is a hash of). But if the root
node isn't stored on-disk, you have to compute it by hashing its
children, and so on until you've actually hashed the entire file.
That defeats most of the point of doing a Merkle tree-based hash,
since if you have to hash the whole file ahead of time anyway,
then you could simply do sha256(file) instead. That would be much
simpler, and a bit faster too.
It's true that an in-memory Merkle tree could still provide the
advantage of verification on every read rather than just on the
first read. However, it would be inefficient because every time a
hash page gets evicted (you can't pin the entire Merkle tree into
memory, since it may be very large), in order to restore it you
again need to hash everything below it in the tree. This again
defeats most of the point of doing a Merkle tree-based hash, since
a single block read could trigger re-hashing gigabytes of data.
:Q: But couldn't you store just the leaf nodes and compute the rest?
:A: See previous answer; this really just moves up one level, since
one could alternatively interpret the data blocks as being the
leaf nodes of the Merkle tree. It's true that the tree can be
computed much faster if the leaf level is stored rather than just
the data, but that's only because each level is less than 1% the
size of the level below (assuming the recommended settings of
SHA-256 and 4K blocks). For the exact same reason, by storing
"just the leaf nodes" you'd already be storing over 99% of the
tree, so you might as well simply store the whole tree.
:Q: Can the Merkle tree be built ahead of time, e.g. distributed as
part of a package that is installed to many computers?
:A: This isn't currently supported. It was part of the original
design, but was removed to simplify the kernel UAPI and because it
wasn't a critical use case. Files are usually installed once and
used many times, and cryptographic hashing is somewhat fast on
most modern processors.
:Q: Why doesn't fs-verity support writes?
:A: Write support would be very difficult and would require a
completely different design, so it's well outside the scope of
fs-verity. Write support would require:
- A way to maintain consistency between the data and hashes,
including all levels of hashes, since corruption after a crash
(especially of potentially the entire file!) is unacceptable.
The main options for solving this are data journalling,
copy-on-write, and log-structured volume. But it's very hard to
retrofit existing filesystems with new consistency mechanisms.
Data journalling is available on ext4, but is very slow.
- Rebuilding the the Merkle tree after every write, which would be
extremely inefficient. Alternatively, a different authenticated
dictionary structure such as an "authenticated skiplist" could
be used. However, this would be far more complex.
Compare it to dm-verity vs. dm-integrity. dm-verity is very
simple: the kernel just verifies read-only data against a
read-only Merkle tree. In contrast, dm-integrity supports writes
but is slow, is much more complex, and doesn't actually support
full-device authentication since it authenticates each sector
independently, i.e. there is no "root hash". It doesn't really
make sense for the same device-mapper target to support these two
very different cases; the same applies to fs-verity.
:Q: Since verity files are immutable, why isn't the immutable bit set?
:A: The existing "immutable" bit (FS_IMMUTABLE_FL) already has a
specific set of semantics which not only make the file contents
read-only, but also prevent the file from being deleted, renamed,
linked to, or having its owner or mode changed. These extra
properties are unwanted for fs-verity, so reusing the immutable
bit isn't appropriate.
:Q: Why does the API use ioctls instead of setxattr() and getxattr()?
:A: Abusing the xattr interface for basically arbitrary syscalls is
heavily frowned upon by most of the Linux filesystem developers.
An xattr should really just be an xattr on-disk, not an API to
e.g. magically trigger construction of a Merkle tree.
:Q: Does fs-verity support remote filesystems?
:A: Only ext4 and f2fs support is implemented currently, but in
principle any filesystem that can store per-file verity metadata
can support fs-verity, regardless of whether it's local or remote.
Some filesystems may have fewer options of where to store the
verity metadata; one possibility is to store it past the end of
the file and "hide" it from userspace by manipulating i_size. The
data verification functions provided by ``fs/verity/`` also assume
that the filesystem uses the Linux pagecache, but both local and
remote filesystems normally do so.
:Q: Why is anything filesystem-specific at all? Shouldn't fs-verity
be implemented entirely at the VFS level?
:A: There are many reasons why this is not possible or would be very
difficult, including the following:
- To prevent bypassing verification, pages must not be marked
Uptodate until they've been verified. Currently, each
filesystem is responsible for marking pages Uptodate via
``->readpages()``. Therefore, currently it's not possible for
the VFS to do the verification on its own. Changing this would
require significant changes to the VFS and all filesystems.
- It would require defining a filesystem-independent way to store
the verity metadata. Extended attributes don't work for this
because (a) the Merkle tree may be gigabytes, but many
filesystems assume that all xattrs fit into a single 4K
filesystem block, and (b) ext4 and f2fs encryption doesn't
encrypt xattrs, yet the Merkle tree *must* be encrypted when the
file contents are, because it stores hashes of the plaintext
file contents.
So the verity metadata would have to be stored in an actual
file. Using a separate file would be very ugly, since the
metadata is fundamentally part of the file to be protected, and
it could cause problems where users could delete the real file
but not the metadata file or vice versa. On the other hand,
having it be in the same file would break applications unless
filesystems' notion of i_size were divorced from the VFS's,
which would be complex and require changes to all filesystems.
- It's desirable that FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY uses the filesystem's
transaction mechanism so that either the file ends up with
verity enabled, or no changes were made. Allowing intermediate
states to occur after a crash may cause problems.
Documentation/filesystems/index.rst
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -36,3 +36,4 @@ filesystem implementations.
journalling
fscrypt
fsverity
Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ Code Seq# Include File Comments
'f' 00-0F fs/ext4/ext4.h conflict!
'f' 00-0F linux/fs.h conflict!
'f' 00-0F fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h conflict!
'f' 81-8F linux/fsverity.h
'g' 00-0F linux/usb/gadgetfs.h
'g' 20-2F linux/usb/g_printer.h
'h' 00-7F conflict! Charon filesystem
......
MAINTAINERS
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -6694,6 +6694,18 @@ S: Maintained
F: fs/notify/
F: include/linux/fsnotify*.h
FSVERITY: READ-ONLY FILE-BASED AUTHENTICITY PROTECTION
M: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
M: Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
L: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org
Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-fscrypt/list/
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt.git fsverity
S: Supported
F: fs/verity/
F: include/linux/fsverity.h
F: include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h
F: Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst
FUJITSU LAPTOP EXTRAS
M: Jonathan Woithe <jwoithe@just42.net>
L: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
......
fs/Kconfig
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ config MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING
source "fs/crypto/Kconfig"
source "fs/verity/Kconfig"
source "fs/notify/Kconfig"
source "fs/quota/Kconfig"
......
fs/Makefile
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AIO) += aio.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IO_URING) += io_uring.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FS_DAX) += dax.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto/
obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity/
obj-$(CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING) += locks.o
obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o compat_ioctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BINFMT_AOUT) += binfmt_aout.o
......
fs/ext4/Makefile
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ ext4-y := balloc.o bitmap.o block_validity.o dir.o ext4_jbd2.o extents.o \
ext4-$(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o
ext4-$(CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY) += xattr_security.o
ext4-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity.o
fs/ext4/ext4.h
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#endif
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
......@@ -395,6 +396,7 @@ struct flex_groups {
#define EXT4_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000 /* Top of directory hierarchies*/
#define EXT4_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000 /* Set to each huge file */
#define EXT4_EXTENTS_FL 0x00080000 /* Inode uses extents */
#define EXT4_VERITY_FL 0x00100000 /* Verity protected inode */
#define EXT4_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000 /* Inode used for large EA */
#define EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000 /* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */
#define EXT4_INLINE_DATA_FL 0x10000000 /* Inode has inline data. */
......@@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ struct flex_groups {
#define EXT4_CASEFOLD_FL 0x40000000 /* Casefolded file */
#define EXT4_RESERVED_FL 0x80000000 /* reserved for ext4 lib */
#define EXT4_FL_USER_VISIBLE 0x704BDFFF /* User visible flags */
#define EXT4_FL_USER_VISIBLE 0x705BDFFF /* User visible flags */
#define EXT4_FL_USER_MODIFIABLE 0x604BC0FF /* User modifiable flags */
/* Flags we can manipulate with through EXT4_IOC_FSSETXATTR */
......@@ -467,6 +469,7 @@ enum {
EXT4_INODE_TOPDIR = 17, /* Top of directory hierarchies*/
EXT4_INODE_HUGE_FILE = 18, /* Set to each huge file */
EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS = 19, /* Inode uses extents */
EXT4_INODE_VERITY = 20, /* Verity protected inode */
EXT4_INODE_EA_INODE = 21, /* Inode used for large EA */
EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS = 22, /* Blocks allocated beyond EOF */
EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA = 28, /* Data in inode. */
......@@ -512,6 +515,7 @@ static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void)
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(TOPDIR);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(HUGE_FILE);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EXTENTS);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(VERITY);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EA_INODE);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(EOFBLOCKS);
CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(INLINE_DATA);
......@@ -1560,6 +1564,7 @@ enum {
EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA, /* may have in-inode data */
EXT4_STATE_EXT_PRECACHED, /* extents have been precached */
EXT4_STATE_LUSTRE_EA_INODE, /* Lustre-style ea_inode */
EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, /* building fs-verity Merkle tree */
};
#define EXT4_INODE_BIT_FNS(name, field, offset) \
......@@ -1610,6 +1615,12 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flags(struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
#define EXT4_SB(sb) (sb)
#endif
static inline bool ext4_verity_in_progress(struct inode *inode)
{
return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
}
#define NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) EXT4_I(inode)->i_dtime
/*
......@@ -1662,6 +1673,7 @@ static inline void ext4_clear_state_flags(struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM 0x0400
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_READONLY 0x1000
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT 0x2000
#define EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY 0x8000
#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_COMPRESSION 0x0001
#define EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FILETYPE 0x0002
......@@ -1756,6 +1768,7 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(bigalloc, BIGALLOC)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(metadata_csum, METADATA_CSUM)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(readonly, READONLY)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(project, PROJECT)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_FUNCS(verity, VERITY)
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(compression, COMPRESSION)
EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(filetype, FILETYPE)
......@@ -1813,7 +1826,8 @@ EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_FUNCS(casefold, CASEFOLD)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_BIGALLOC |\
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM|\
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_QUOTA |\
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT)
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT |\
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_VERITY)
#define EXTN_FEATURE_FUNCS(ver) \
static inline bool ext4_has_unknown_ext##ver##_compat_features(struct super_block *sb) \
......@@ -3177,6 +3191,8 @@ static inline void ext4_set_de_type(struct super_block *sb,
extern int ext4_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages, struct page *page,
unsigned nr_pages, bool is_readahead);
extern int __init ext4_init_post_read_processing(void);
extern void ext4_exit_post_read_processing(void);
/* symlink.c */
extern const struct inode_operations ext4_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations;
......@@ -3283,6 +3299,9 @@ extern int ext4_bio_write_page(struct ext4_io_submit *io,
/* mmp.c */
extern int ext4_multi_mount_protect(struct super_block *, ext4_fsblk_t);
/* verity.c */
extern const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops;
/*
* Add new method to test whether block and inode bitmaps are properly
* initialized. With uninit_bg reading the block from disk is not enough
......
fs/ext4/file.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -457,6 +457,10 @@ static int ext4_file_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = fsverity_file_open(inode, filp);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Set up the jbd2_inode if we are opening the inode for
* writing and the journal is present
......
fs/ext4/inode.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -1340,6 +1340,9 @@ static int ext4_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
}
if (ret) {
bool extended = (pos + len > inode->i_size) &&
!ext4_verity_in_progress(inode);
unlock_page(page);
/*
* __block_write_begin may have instantiated a few blocks
......@@ -1349,11 +1352,11 @@ static int ext4_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
* Add inode to orphan list in case we crash before
* truncate finishes
*/
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
if (extended && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
if (extended) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might
......@@ -1406,6 +1409,7 @@ static int ext4_write_end(struct file *file,
int ret = 0, ret2;
int i_size_changed = 0;
int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode);
bool verity = ext4_verity_in_progress(inode);
trace_ext4_write_end(inode, pos, len, copied);
if (inline_data) {
......@@ -1423,12 +1427,16 @@ static int ext4_write_end(struct file *file,
/*
* it's important to update i_size while still holding page lock:
* page writeout could otherwise come in and zero beyond i_size.
*
* If FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY is running on this inode, then Merkle tree
* blocks are being written past EOF, so skip the i_size update.
*/
if (!verity)
i_size_changed = ext4_update_inode_size(inode, pos + copied);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (old_size < pos)
if (old_size < pos && !verity)
pagecache_isize_extended(inode, old_size, pos);
/*
* Don't mark the inode dirty under page lock. First, it unnecessarily
......@@ -1439,7 +1447,7 @@ static int ext4_write_end(struct file *file,
if (i_size_changed || inline_data)
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && !verity && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
/* if we have allocated more blocks and copied
* less. We will have blocks allocated outside
* inode->i_size. So truncate them
......@@ -1450,7 +1458,7 @@ static int ext4_write_end(struct file *file,
if (!ret)
ret = ret2;
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && !verity) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might still be
......@@ -1511,6 +1519,7 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(struct file *file,
unsigned from, to;
int size_changed = 0;
int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode);
bool verity = ext4_verity_in_progress(inode);
trace_ext4_journalled_write_end(inode, pos, len, copied);
from = pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
......@@ -1540,13 +1549,14 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(struct file *file,
if (!partial)
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
if (!verity)
size_changed = ext4_update_inode_size(inode, pos + copied);
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (old_size < pos)
if (old_size < pos && !verity)
pagecache_isize_extended(inode, old_size, pos);
if (size_changed || inline_data) {
......@@ -1555,7 +1565,7 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(struct file *file,
ret = ret2;
}
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && !verity && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
/* if we have allocated more blocks and copied
* less. We will have blocks allocated outside
* inode->i_size. So truncate them
......@@ -1566,7 +1576,7 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(struct file *file,
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (!ret)
ret = ret2;
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && !verity) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might still be
......@@ -2162,7 +2172,8 @@ static int ext4_writepage(struct page *page,
trace_ext4_writepage(page);
size = i_size_read(inode);
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT)
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT &&
!ext4_verity_in_progress(inode))
len = size & ~PAGE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_SIZE;
......@@ -2246,7 +2257,8 @@ static int mpage_submit_page(struct mpage_da_data *mpd, struct page *page)
* after page tables are updated.
*/
size = i_size_read(mpd->inode);
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT)
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT &&
!ext4_verity_in_progress(mpd->inode))
len = size & ~PAGE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_SIZE;
......@@ -2345,6 +2357,9 @@ static int mpage_process_page_bufs(struct mpage_da_data *mpd,
ext4_lblk_t blocks = (i_size_read(inode) + i_blocksize(inode) - 1)
>> inode->i_blkbits;
if (ext4_verity_in_progress(inode))
blocks = EXT_MAX_BLOCKS;
do {
BUG_ON(buffer_locked(bh));
......@@ -3061,8 +3076,8 @@ static int ext4_da_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (ext4_nonda_switch(inode->i_sb) ||
S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (ext4_nonda_switch(inode->i_sb) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
ext4_verity_in_progress(inode)) {
*fsdata = (void *)FALL_BACK_TO_NONDELALLOC;
return ext4_write_begin(file, mapping, pos,
len, flags, pagep, fsdata);
......@@ -3897,6 +3912,8 @@ static ssize_t ext4_direct_IO(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
#endif
if (fsverity_active(inode))
return 0;
/*
* If we are doing data journalling we don't support O_DIRECT
......@@ -4736,6 +4753,8 @@ static bool ext4_should_use_dax(struct inode *inode)
return false;
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT))
return false;
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY))
return false;
return true;
}
......@@ -4760,9 +4779,11 @@ void ext4_set_inode_flags(struct inode *inode)
new_fl |= S_ENCRYPTED;
if (flags & EXT4_CASEFOLD_FL)
new_fl |= S_CASEFOLD;
if (flags & EXT4_VERITY_FL)
new_fl |= S_VERITY;
inode_set_flags(inode, new_fl,
S_SYNC|S_APPEND|S_IMMUTABLE|S_NOATIME|S_DIRSYNC|S_DAX|
S_ENCRYPTED|S_CASEFOLD);
S_ENCRYPTED|S_CASEFOLD|S_VERITY);
}
static blkcnt_t ext4_inode_blocks(struct ext4_inode *raw_inode,
......@@ -5552,6 +5573,10 @@ int ext4_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if (error)
return error;
error = fsverity_prepare_setattr(dentry, attr);
if (error)
return error;
if (is_quota_modification(inode, attr)) {
error = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (error)
......
fs/ext4/ioctl.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -1198,6 +1198,17 @@ long ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
}
case EXT4_IOC_SHUTDOWN:
return ext4_shutdown(sb, arg);
case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
if (!ext4_has_feature_verity(sb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return fsverity_ioctl_enable(filp, (const void __user *)arg);
case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
if (!ext4_has_feature_verity(sb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return fsverity_ioctl_measure(filp, (void __user *)arg);
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
......@@ -1265,6 +1276,8 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS:
case EXT4_IOC_SHUTDOWN:
case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP:
case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
break;
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
......
fs/ext4/readpage.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -47,13 +47,103 @@
#include "ext4.h"
static inline bool ext4_bio_encrypted(struct bio *bio)
#define NUM_PREALLOC_POST_READ_CTXS 128
static struct kmem_cache *bio_post_read_ctx_cache;
static mempool_t *bio_post_read_ctx_pool;
/* postprocessing steps for read bios */
enum bio_post_read_step {
STEP_INITIAL = 0,
STEP_DECRYPT,
STEP_VERITY,
};
struct bio_post_read_ctx {
struct bio *bio;
struct work_struct work;
unsigned int cur_step;
unsigned int enabled_steps;
};
static void __read_end_io(struct bio *bio)
{
struct page *page;
struct bio_vec *bv;
struct bvec_iter_all iter_all;
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) {
page = bv->bv_page;
/* PG_error was set if any post_read step failed */
if (bio->bi_status || PageError(page)) {
ClearPageUptodate(page);
/* will re-read again later */
ClearPageError(page);
} else {
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
unlock_page(page);
}
if (bio->bi_private)
mempool_free(bio->bi_private, bio_post_read_ctx_pool);
bio_put(bio);
}
static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx);
static void decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx =
container_of(work, struct bio_post_read_ctx, work);
fscrypt_decrypt_bio(ctx->bio);
bio_post_read_processing(ctx);
}
static void verity_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx =
container_of(work, struct bio_post_read_ctx, work);
fsverity_verify_bio(ctx->bio);
bio_post_read_processing(ctx);
}
static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
* We use different work queues for decryption and for verity because
* verity may require reading metadata pages that need decryption, and
* we shouldn't recurse to the same workqueue.
*/
switch (++ctx->cur_step) {
case STEP_DECRYPT:
if (ctx->enabled_steps & (1 << STEP_DECRYPT)) {
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_work);
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work);
return;
}
ctx->cur_step++;
/* fall-through */
case STEP_VERITY:
if (ctx->enabled_steps & (1 << STEP_VERITY)) {
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verity_work);
fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work);
return;
}
ctx->cur_step++;
/* fall-through */
default:
__read_end_io(ctx->bio);
}
}
static bool bio_post_read_required(struct bio *bio)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
return unlikely(bio->bi_private != NULL);
#else
return false;
#endif
return bio->bi_private && !bio->bi_status;
}
/*
......@@ -70,30 +160,53 @@ static inline bool ext4_bio_encrypted(struct bio *bio)
*/
static void mpage_end_io(struct bio *bio)
{
struct bio_vec *bv;
struct bvec_iter_all iter_all;
if (bio_post_read_required(bio)) {
struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx = bio->bi_private;
if (ext4_bio_encrypted(bio)) {
if (bio->bi_status) {
fscrypt_release_ctx(bio->bi_private);
} else {
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio(bio->bi_private, bio);
ctx->cur_step = STEP_INITIAL;
bio_post_read_processing(ctx);
return;
}
}
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) {
struct page *page = bv->bv_page;
__read_end_io(bio);
}
if (!bio->bi_status) {
SetPageUptodate(page);
} else {
ClearPageUptodate(page);
SetPageError(page);
}
unlock_page(page);
static inline bool ext4_need_verity(const struct inode *inode, pgoff_t idx)
{
return fsverity_active(inode) &&
idx < DIV_ROUND_UP(inode->i_size, PAGE_SIZE);
}
static struct bio_post_read_ctx *get_bio_post_read_ctx(struct inode *inode,
struct bio *bio,
pgoff_t first_idx)
{
unsigned int post_read_steps = 0;
struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx = NULL;
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_DECRYPT;
if (ext4_need_verity(inode, first_idx))
post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_VERITY;
if (post_read_steps) {
ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_post_read_ctx_pool, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ctx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ctx->bio = bio;
ctx->enabled_steps = post_read_steps;
bio->bi_private = ctx;
}
return ctx;
}
bio_put(bio);
static inline loff_t ext4_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
(IS_VERITY(inode) || ext4_verity_in_progress(inode)))
return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
return i_size_read(inode);
}
int ext4_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
......@@ -141,7 +254,8 @@ int ext4_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
block_in_file = (sector_t)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blkbits);
last_block = block_in_file + nr_pages * blocks_per_page;
last_block_in_file = (i_size_read(inode) + blocksize - 1) >> blkbits;
last_block_in_file = (ext4_readpage_limit(inode) +
blocksize - 1) >> blkbits;
if (last_block > last_block_in_file)
last_block = last_block_in_file;
page_block = 0;
......@@ -218,6 +332,9 @@ int ext4_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
zero_user_segment(page, first_hole << blkbits,
PAGE_SIZE);
if (first_hole == 0) {
if (ext4_need_verity(inode, page->index) &&
!fsverity_verify_page(page))
goto set_error_page;
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
goto next_page;
......@@ -241,18 +358,16 @@ int ext4_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
bio = NULL;
}
if (bio == NULL) {
struct fscrypt_ctx *ctx = NULL;
struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx;
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
ctx = fscrypt_get_ctx(GFP_NOFS);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
goto set_error_page;
}
bio = bio_alloc(GFP_KERNEL,
min_t(int, nr_pages, BIO_MAX_PAGES));
if (!bio) {
if (ctx)
fscrypt_release_ctx(ctx);
if (!bio)
goto set_error_page;
ctx = get_bio_post_read_ctx(inode, bio, page->index);
if (IS_ERR(ctx)) {
bio_put(bio);
bio = NULL;
goto set_error_page;
}
bio_set_dev(bio, bdev);
......@@ -293,3 +408,29 @@ int ext4_mpage_readpages(struct address_space *mapping,
submit_bio(bio);
return 0;
}
int __init ext4_init_post_read_processing(void)
{
bio_post_read_ctx_cache =
kmem_cache_create("ext4_bio_post_read_ctx",
sizeof(struct bio_post_read_ctx), 0, 0, NULL);
if (!bio_post_read_ctx_cache)
goto fail;
bio_post_read_ctx_pool =
mempool_create_slab_pool(NUM_PREALLOC_POST_READ_CTXS,
bio_post_read_ctx_cache);
if (!bio_post_read_ctx_pool)
goto fail_free_cache;
return 0;
fail_free_cache:
kmem_cache_destroy(bio_post_read_ctx_cache);
fail:
return -ENOMEM;
}
void ext4_exit_post_read_processing(void)
{
mempool_destroy(bio_post_read_ctx_pool);
kmem_cache_destroy(bio_post_read_ctx_cache);
}
fs/ext4/super.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ void ext4_clear_inode(struct inode *inode)
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode = NULL;
}
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode);
fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode);
}
static struct inode *ext4_nfs_get_inode(struct super_block *sb,
......@@ -4275,6 +4276,9 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
sb->s_cop = &ext4_cryptops;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
sb->s_vop = &ext4_verityops;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sb->dq_op = &ext4_quota_operations;
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb))
......@@ -4422,6 +4426,11 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_verity(sb) && blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported blocksize for fs-verity");
goto failed_mount_wq;
}
if (DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(sbi) && !sb_rdonly(sb) &&
!ext4_has_feature_encrypt(sb)) {
ext4_set_feature_encrypt(sb);
......@@ -6097,6 +6106,10 @@ static int __init ext4_init_fs(void)
return err;
err = ext4_init_pending();
if (err)
goto out7;
err = ext4_init_post_read_processing();
if (err)
goto out6;
......@@ -6138,8 +6151,10 @@ static int __init ext4_init_fs(void)
out4:
ext4_exit_pageio();
out5:
ext4_exit_pending();
ext4_exit_post_read_processing();
out6:
ext4_exit_pending();
out7:
ext4_exit_es();
return err;
......@@ -6156,6 +6171,7 @@ static void __exit ext4_exit_fs(void)
ext4_exit_sysfs();
ext4_exit_system_zone();
ext4_exit_pageio();
ext4_exit_post_read_processing();
ext4_exit_es();
ext4_exit_pending();
}
......
fs/ext4/sysfs.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -242,6 +242,9 @@ EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(encryption);
#ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE
EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(casefold);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(verity);
#endif
EXT4_ATTR_FEATURE(metadata_csum_seed);
static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = {
......@@ -253,6 +256,9 @@ static struct attribute *ext4_feat_attrs[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_UNICODE
ATTR_LIST(casefold),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
ATTR_LIST(verity),
#endif
ATTR_LIST(metadata_csum_seed),
NULL,
......
fs/ext4/verity.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/ext4/verity.c: fs-verity support for ext4
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* Implementation of fsverity_operations for ext4.
*
* ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past
* the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This
* approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully
* beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally
* by ext4 with only some relatively small changes to ext4. This approach
* avoids having to depend on the EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing
* ext4's xattr support to support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and
* to support encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be
* encrypted when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
*
* Using a 64K boundary rather than a 4K one keeps things ready for
* architectures with 64K pages, and it doesn't necessarily waste space on-disk
* since there can be a hole between i_size and the start of the Merkle tree.
*/
#include <linux/quotaops.h>
#include "ext4.h"
#include "ext4_extents.h"
#include "ext4_jbd2.h"
static inline loff_t ext4_verity_metadata_pos(const struct inode *inode)
{
return round_up(inode->i_size, 65536);
}
/*
* Read some verity metadata from the inode. __vfs_read() can't be used because
* we need to read beyond i_size.
*/
static int pagecache_read(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos)
{
while (count) {
size_t n = min_t(size_t, count,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(pos));
struct page *page;
void *addr;
page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, pos >> PAGE_SHIFT,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(page))
return PTR_ERR(page);
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(buf, addr + offset_in_page(pos), n);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
put_page(page);
buf += n;
pos += n;
count -= n;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Write some verity metadata to the inode for FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
* kernel_write() can't be used because the file descriptor is readonly.
*/
static int pagecache_write(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos)
{
if (pos + count > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
return -EFBIG;
while (count) {
size_t n = min_t(size_t, count,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(pos));
struct page *page;
void *fsdata;
void *addr;
int res;
res = pagecache_write_begin(NULL, inode->i_mapping, pos, n, 0,
&page, &fsdata);
if (res)
return res;
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(addr + offset_in_page(pos), buf, n);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
res = pagecache_write_end(NULL, inode->i_mapping, pos, n, n,
page, fsdata);
if (res < 0)
return res;
if (res != n)
return -EIO;
buf += n;
pos += n;
count -= n;
}
return 0;
}
static int ext4_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
const int credits = 2; /* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_add() */
handle_t *handle;
int err;
if (ext4_verity_in_progress(inode))
return -EBUSY;
/*
* Since the file was opened readonly, we have to initialize the jbd
* inode and quotas here and not rely on ->open() doing it. This must
* be done before evicting the inline data.
*/
err = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode);
if (err)
return err;
err = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (err)
return err;
err = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode);
if (err)
return err;
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
ext4_warning_inode(inode,
"verity is only allowed on extent-based files");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/*
* ext4 uses the last allocated block to find the verity descriptor, so
* we must remove any other blocks past EOF which might confuse things.
*/
err = ext4_truncate(inode);
if (err)
return err;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_INODE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
err = ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
if (err == 0)
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
return err;
}
/*
* ext4 stores the verity descriptor beginning on the next filesystem block
* boundary after the Merkle tree. Then, the descriptor size is stored in the
* last 4 bytes of the last allocated filesystem block --- which is either the
* block in which the descriptor ends, or the next block after that if there
* weren't at least 4 bytes remaining.
*
* We can't simply store the descriptor in an xattr because it *must* be
* encrypted when ext4 encryption is used, but ext4 encryption doesn't encrypt
* xattrs. Also, if the descriptor includes a large signature blob it may be
* too large to store in an xattr without the EA_INODE feature.
*/
static int ext4_write_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, const void *desc,
size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size)
{
const u64 desc_pos = round_up(ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode) +
merkle_tree_size, i_blocksize(inode));
const u64 desc_end = desc_pos + desc_size;
const __le32 desc_size_disk = cpu_to_le32(desc_size);
const u64 desc_size_pos = round_up(desc_end + sizeof(desc_size_disk),
i_blocksize(inode)) -
sizeof(desc_size_disk);
int err;
err = pagecache_write(inode, desc, desc_size, desc_pos);
if (err)
return err;
return pagecache_write(inode, &desc_size_disk, sizeof(desc_size_disk),
desc_size_pos);
}
static int ext4_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc,
size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
const int credits = 2; /* superblock and inode for ext4_orphan_del() */
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
int err2;
if (desc != NULL) {
/* Succeeded; write the verity descriptor. */
err = ext4_write_verity_descriptor(inode, desc, desc_size,
merkle_tree_size);
/* Write all pages before clearing VERITY_IN_PROGRESS. */
if (!err)
err = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
}
/* If we failed, truncate anything we wrote past i_size. */
if (desc == NULL || err)
ext4_truncate(inode);
/*
* We must always clean up by clearing EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS and
* deleting the inode from the orphan list, even if something failed.
* If everything succeeded, we'll also set the verity bit in the same
* transaction.
*/
ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_INODE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
return PTR_ERR(handle);
}
err2 = ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
if (err2)
goto out_stop;
if (desc != NULL && !err) {
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_stop;
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_VERITY);
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode);
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
}
out_stop:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
return err ?: err2;
}
static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor_location(struct inode *inode,
size_t *desc_size_ret,
u64 *desc_pos_ret)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path;
struct ext4_extent *last_extent;
u32 end_lblk;
u64 desc_size_pos;
__le32 desc_size_disk;
u32 desc_size;
u64 desc_pos;
int err;
/*
* Descriptor size is in last 4 bytes of last allocated block.
* See ext4_write_verity_descriptor().
*/
if (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "verity file doesn't use extents");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, EXT_MAX_BLOCKS - 1, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
last_extent = path[path->p_depth].p_ext;
if (!last_extent) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "verity file has no extents");
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
end_lblk = le32_to_cpu(last_extent->ee_block) +
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(last_extent);
desc_size_pos = (u64)end_lblk << inode->i_blkbits;
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
if (desc_size_pos < sizeof(desc_size_disk))
goto bad;
desc_size_pos -= sizeof(desc_size_disk);
err = pagecache_read(inode, &desc_size_disk, sizeof(desc_size_disk),
desc_size_pos);
if (err)
return err;
desc_size = le32_to_cpu(desc_size_disk);
/*
* The descriptor is stored just before the desc_size_disk, but starting
* on a filesystem block boundary.
*/
if (desc_size > INT_MAX || desc_size > desc_size_pos)
goto bad;
desc_pos = round_down(desc_size_pos - desc_size, i_blocksize(inode));
if (desc_pos < ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode))
goto bad;
*desc_size_ret = desc_size;
*desc_pos_ret = desc_pos;
return 0;
bad:
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "verity file corrupted; can't find descriptor");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
size_t desc_size = 0;
u64 desc_pos = 0;
int err;
err = ext4_get_verity_descriptor_location(inode, &desc_size, &desc_pos);
if (err)
return err;
if (buf_size) {
if (desc_size > buf_size)
return -ERANGE;
err = pagecache_read(inode, buf, desc_size, desc_pos);
if (err)
return err;
}
return desc_size;
}
static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
pgoff_t index)
{
index += ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, index, NULL);
}
static int ext4_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize)
{
loff_t pos = ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
}
const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops = {
.begin_enable_verity = ext4_begin_enable_verity,
.end_enable_verity = ext4_end_enable_verity,
.get_verity_descriptor = ext4_get_verity_descriptor,
.read_merkle_tree_page = ext4_read_merkle_tree_page,
.write_merkle_tree_block = ext4_write_merkle_tree_block,
};
fs/f2fs/Makefile
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS) += debug.o
f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR) += xattr.o
f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o
f2fs-$(CONFIG_F2FS_IO_TRACE) += trace.o
f2fs-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += verity.o
fs/f2fs/data.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ static enum count_type __read_io_type(struct page *page)
enum bio_post_read_step {
STEP_INITIAL = 0,
STEP_DECRYPT,
STEP_VERITY,
};
struct bio_post_read_ctx {
......@@ -120,8 +121,23 @@ static void decrypt_work(struct work_struct *work)
bio_post_read_processing(ctx);
}
static void verity_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx =
container_of(work, struct bio_post_read_ctx, work);
fsverity_verify_bio(ctx->bio);
bio_post_read_processing(ctx);
}
static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx)
{
/*
* We use different work queues for decryption and for verity because
* verity may require reading metadata pages that need decryption, and
* we shouldn't recurse to the same workqueue.
*/
switch (++ctx->cur_step) {
case STEP_DECRYPT:
if (ctx->enabled_steps & (1 << STEP_DECRYPT)) {
......@@ -131,6 +147,14 @@ static void bio_post_read_processing(struct bio_post_read_ctx *ctx)
}
ctx->cur_step++;
/* fall-through */
case STEP_VERITY:
if (ctx->enabled_steps & (1 << STEP_VERITY)) {
INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verity_work);
fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work);
return;
}
ctx->cur_step++;
/* fall-through */
default:
__read_end_io(ctx->bio);
}
......@@ -608,8 +632,15 @@ void f2fs_submit_page_write(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
up_write(&io->io_rwsem);
}
static inline bool f2fs_need_verity(const struct inode *inode, pgoff_t idx)
{
return fsverity_active(inode) &&
idx < DIV_ROUND_UP(inode->i_size, PAGE_SIZE);
}
static struct bio *f2fs_grab_read_bio(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr,
unsigned nr_pages, unsigned op_flag)
unsigned nr_pages, unsigned op_flag,
pgoff_t first_idx)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct bio *bio;
......@@ -625,6 +656,10 @@ static struct bio *f2fs_grab_read_bio(struct inode *inode, block_t blkaddr,
if (f2fs_encrypted_file(inode))
post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_DECRYPT;
if (f2fs_need_verity(inode, first_idx))
post_read_steps |= 1 << STEP_VERITY;
if (post_read_steps) {
ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_post_read_ctx_pool, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ctx) {
......@@ -646,7 +681,7 @@ static int f2fs_submit_page_read(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct bio *bio;
bio = f2fs_grab_read_bio(inode, blkaddr, 1, 0);
bio = f2fs_grab_read_bio(inode, blkaddr, 1, 0, page->index);
if (IS_ERR(bio))
return PTR_ERR(bio);
......@@ -1569,6 +1604,15 @@ int f2fs_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
return ret;
}
static inline loff_t f2fs_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
(IS_VERITY(inode) || f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode)))
return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
return i_size_read(inode);
}
static int f2fs_read_single_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned nr_pages,
struct f2fs_map_blocks *map,
......@@ -1587,7 +1631,7 @@ static int f2fs_read_single_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
block_in_file = (sector_t)page_index(page);
last_block = block_in_file + nr_pages;
last_block_in_file = (i_size_read(inode) + blocksize - 1) >>
last_block_in_file = (f2fs_readpage_limit(inode) + blocksize - 1) >>
blkbits;
if (last_block > last_block_in_file)
last_block = last_block_in_file;
......@@ -1632,6 +1676,11 @@ static int f2fs_read_single_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
} else {
zero_out:
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (f2fs_need_verity(inode, page->index) &&
!fsverity_verify_page(page)) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
......@@ -1650,7 +1699,7 @@ static int f2fs_read_single_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
}
if (bio == NULL) {
bio = f2fs_grab_read_bio(inode, block_nr, nr_pages,
is_readahead ? REQ_RAHEAD : 0);
is_readahead ? REQ_RAHEAD : 0, page->index);
if (IS_ERR(bio)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bio);
bio = NULL;
......@@ -2052,7 +2101,7 @@ static int __write_data_page(struct page *page, bool *submitted,
if (unlikely(is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING)))
goto redirty_out;
if (page->index < end_index)
if (page->index < end_index || f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode))
goto write;
/*
......@@ -2427,7 +2476,8 @@ static void f2fs_write_failed(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t to)
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode);
if (to > i_size) {
/* In the fs-verity case, f2fs_end_enable_verity() does the truncate */
if (to > i_size && !f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode)) {
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_gc_rwsem[WRITE]);
down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem);
......@@ -2458,7 +2508,8 @@ static int prepare_write_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
* the block addresses when there is no need to fill the page.
*/
if (!f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) && len == PAGE_SIZE &&
!is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_PREALLOC))
!is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_NO_PREALLOC) &&
!f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode))
return 0;
/* f2fs_lock_op avoids race between write CP and convert_inline_page */
......@@ -2597,7 +2648,8 @@ static int f2fs_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
if (len == PAGE_SIZE || PageUptodate(page))
return 0;
if (!(pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) && (pos + len) >= i_size_read(inode)) {
if (!(pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) && (pos + len) >= i_size_read(inode) &&
!f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode)) {
zero_user_segment(page, len, PAGE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
......@@ -2660,7 +2712,8 @@ static int f2fs_write_end(struct file *file,
set_page_dirty(page);
if (pos + copied > i_size_read(inode))
if (pos + copied > i_size_read(inode) &&
!f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode))
f2fs_i_size_write(inode, pos + copied);
unlock_out:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
......@@ -3104,7 +3157,9 @@ void f2fs_clear_page_cache_dirty_tag(struct page *page)
int __init f2fs_init_post_read_processing(void)
{
bio_post_read_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_post_read_ctx, 0);
bio_post_read_ctx_cache =
kmem_cache_create("f2fs_bio_post_read_ctx",
sizeof(struct bio_post_read_ctx), 0, 0, NULL);
if (!bio_post_read_ctx_cache)
goto fail;
bio_post_read_ctx_pool =
......
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS
#define f2fs_bug_on(sbi, condition) BUG_ON(condition)
......@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ struct f2fs_mount_info {
#define F2FS_FEATURE_QUOTA_INO 0x0080
#define F2FS_FEATURE_INODE_CRTIME 0x0100
#define F2FS_FEATURE_LOST_FOUND 0x0200
#define F2FS_FEATURE_VERITY 0x0400 /* reserved */
#define F2FS_FEATURE_VERITY 0x0400
#define F2FS_FEATURE_SB_CHKSUM 0x0800
#define __F2FS_HAS_FEATURE(raw_super, mask) \
......@@ -630,7 +631,7 @@ enum {
#define FADVISE_ENC_NAME_BIT 0x08
#define FADVISE_KEEP_SIZE_BIT 0x10
#define FADVISE_HOT_BIT 0x20
#define FADVISE_VERITY_BIT 0x40 /* reserved */
#define FADVISE_VERITY_BIT 0x40
#define FADVISE_MODIFIABLE_BITS (FADVISE_COLD_BIT | FADVISE_HOT_BIT)
......@@ -650,6 +651,8 @@ enum {
#define file_is_hot(inode) is_file(inode, FADVISE_HOT_BIT)
#define file_set_hot(inode) set_file(inode, FADVISE_HOT_BIT)
#define file_clear_hot(inode) clear_file(inode, FADVISE_HOT_BIT)
#define file_is_verity(inode) is_file(inode, FADVISE_VERITY_BIT)
#define file_set_verity(inode) set_file(inode, FADVISE_VERITY_BIT)
#define DEF_DIR_LEVEL 0
......@@ -2412,6 +2415,7 @@ enum {
FI_PROJ_INHERIT, /* indicate file inherits projectid */
FI_PIN_FILE, /* indicate file should not be gced */
FI_ATOMIC_REVOKE_REQUEST, /* request to drop atomic data */
FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS, /* building fs-verity Merkle tree */
};
static inline void __mark_inode_dirty_flag(struct inode *inode,
......@@ -2451,6 +2455,12 @@ static inline void clear_inode_flag(struct inode *inode, int flag)
__mark_inode_dirty_flag(inode, flag, false);
}
static inline bool f2fs_verity_in_progress(struct inode *inode)
{
return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
}
static inline void set_acl_inode(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
{
F2FS_I(inode)->i_acl_mode = mode;
......@@ -3521,6 +3531,9 @@ void f2fs_exit_sysfs(void);
int f2fs_register_sysfs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);
void f2fs_unregister_sysfs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);
/* verity.c */
extern const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops;
/*
* crypto support
*/
......@@ -3543,7 +3556,7 @@ static inline void f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode)
*/
static inline bool f2fs_post_read_required(struct inode *inode)
{
return f2fs_encrypted_file(inode);
return f2fs_encrypted_file(inode) || fsverity_active(inode);
}
#define F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(name, flagname) \
......@@ -3561,6 +3574,7 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(flexible_inline_xattr, FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(quota_ino, QUOTA_INO);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(inode_crtime, INODE_CRTIME);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(lost_found, LOST_FOUND);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(verity, VERITY);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(sb_chksum, SB_CHKSUM);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
......
fs/f2fs/file.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -493,6 +493,10 @@ static int f2fs_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
int err = fscrypt_file_open(inode, filp);
if (err)
return err;
err = fsverity_file_open(inode, filp);
if (err)
return err;
......@@ -778,6 +782,10 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if (err)
return err;
err = fsverity_prepare_setattr(dentry, attr);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_quota_modification(inode, attr)) {
err = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (err)
......@@ -1705,7 +1713,8 @@ static const struct {
FS_PROJINHERIT_FL | \
FS_ENCRYPT_FL | \
FS_INLINE_DATA_FL | \
FS_NOCOW_FL)
FS_NOCOW_FL | \
FS_VERITY_FL)
#define F2FS_SETTABLE_FS_FL ( \
FS_SYNC_FL | \
......@@ -1750,6 +1759,8 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_getflags(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))
fsflags |= FS_ENCRYPT_FL;
if (IS_VERITY(inode))
fsflags |= FS_VERITY_FL;
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode) || f2fs_has_inline_dentry(inode))
fsflags |= FS_INLINE_DATA_FL;
if (is_inode_flag_set(inode, FI_PIN_FILE))
......@@ -3103,6 +3114,30 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_resize_fs(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
return ret;
}
static int f2fs_ioc_enable_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
f2fs_update_time(F2FS_I_SB(inode), REQ_TIME);
if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity(F2FS_I_SB(inode))) {
f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode),
"Can't enable fs-verity on inode %lu: the verity feature is not enabled on this filesystem.\n",
inode->i_ino);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return fsverity_ioctl_enable(filp, (const void __user *)arg);
}
static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
{
if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp))))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return fsverity_ioctl_measure(filp, (void __user *)arg);
}
long f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(F2FS_I_SB(file_inode(filp)))))
......@@ -3171,6 +3206,10 @@ long f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return f2fs_ioc_precache_extents(filp, arg);
case F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS:
return f2fs_ioc_resize_fs(filp, arg);
case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
return f2fs_ioc_enable_verity(filp, arg);
case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
return f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(filp, arg);
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
......@@ -3290,6 +3329,8 @@ long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case F2FS_IOC_SET_PIN_FILE:
case F2FS_IOC_PRECACHE_EXTENTS:
case F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS:
case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY:
case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY:
break;
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
......
fs/f2fs/inode.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -46,9 +46,11 @@ void f2fs_set_inode_flags(struct inode *inode)
new_fl |= S_DIRSYNC;
if (file_is_encrypt(inode))
new_fl |= S_ENCRYPTED;
if (file_is_verity(inode))
new_fl |= S_VERITY;
inode_set_flags(inode, new_fl,
S_SYNC|S_APPEND|S_IMMUTABLE|S_NOATIME|S_DIRSYNC|
S_ENCRYPTED);
S_ENCRYPTED|S_VERITY);
}
static void __get_inode_rdev(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_inode *ri)
......@@ -733,6 +735,7 @@ void f2fs_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
}
out_clear:
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode);
fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode);
clear_inode(inode);
}
......
fs/f2fs/super.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -3145,6 +3145,9 @@ static int f2fs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
sb->s_op = &f2fs_sops;
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
sb->s_cop = &f2fs_cryptops;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
sb->s_vop = &f2fs_verityops;
#endif
sb->s_xattr = f2fs_xattr_handlers;
sb->s_export_op = &f2fs_export_ops;
......
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ static ssize_t features_show(struct f2fs_attr *a,
if (f2fs_sb_has_lost_found(sbi))
len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "%s%s",
len ? ", " : "", "lost_found");
if (f2fs_sb_has_verity(sbi))
len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "%s%s",
len ? ", " : "", "verity");
if (f2fs_sb_has_sb_chksum(sbi))
len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "%s%s",
len ? ", " : "", "sb_checksum");
......@@ -364,6 +367,7 @@ enum feat_id {
FEAT_QUOTA_INO,
FEAT_INODE_CRTIME,
FEAT_LOST_FOUND,
FEAT_VERITY,
FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM,
};
......@@ -381,6 +385,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_feature_show(struct f2fs_attr *a,
case FEAT_QUOTA_INO:
case FEAT_INODE_CRTIME:
case FEAT_LOST_FOUND:
case FEAT_VERITY:
case FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM:
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "supported\n");
}
......@@ -470,6 +475,9 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(flexible_inline_xattr, FEAT_FLEXIBLE_INLINE_XATTR);
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(quota_ino, FEAT_QUOTA_INO);
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(inode_crtime, FEAT_INODE_CRTIME);
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(lost_found, FEAT_LOST_FOUND);
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(verity, FEAT_VERITY);
#endif
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(sb_checksum, FEAT_SB_CHECKSUM);
#define ATTR_LIST(name) (&f2fs_attr_##name.attr)
......@@ -534,6 +542,9 @@ static struct attribute *f2fs_feat_attrs[] = {
ATTR_LIST(quota_ino),
ATTR_LIST(inode_crtime),
ATTR_LIST(lost_found),
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
ATTR_LIST(verity),
#endif
ATTR_LIST(sb_checksum),
NULL,
};
......
fs/f2fs/verity.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/f2fs/verity.c: fs-verity support for f2fs
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
/*
* Implementation of fsverity_operations for f2fs.
*
* Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
* fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first 64K
* boundary beyond i_size. This approach works because (a) verity files are
* readonly, and (b) pages fully beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but
* can be read/written internally by f2fs with only some relatively small
* changes to f2fs. Extended attributes cannot be used because (a) f2fs limits
* the total size of an inode's xattr entries to 4096 bytes, which wouldn't be
* enough for even a single Merkle tree block, and (b) f2fs encryption doesn't
* encrypt xattrs, yet the verity metadata *must* be encrypted when the file is
* because it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
*
* Using a 64K boundary rather than a 4K one keeps things ready for
* architectures with 64K pages, and it doesn't necessarily waste space on-disk
* since there can be a hole between i_size and the start of the Merkle tree.
*/
#include <linux/f2fs_fs.h>
#include "f2fs.h"
#include "xattr.h"
static inline loff_t f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(const struct inode *inode)
{
return round_up(inode->i_size, 65536);
}
/*
* Read some verity metadata from the inode. __vfs_read() can't be used because
* we need to read beyond i_size.
*/
static int pagecache_read(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos)
{
while (count) {
size_t n = min_t(size_t, count,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(pos));
struct page *page;
void *addr;
page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, pos >> PAGE_SHIFT,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(page))
return PTR_ERR(page);
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(buf, addr + offset_in_page(pos), n);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
put_page(page);
buf += n;
pos += n;
count -= n;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Write some verity metadata to the inode for FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
* kernel_write() can't be used because the file descriptor is readonly.
*/
static int pagecache_write(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t count,
loff_t pos)
{
if (pos + count > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
return -EFBIG;
while (count) {
size_t n = min_t(size_t, count,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(pos));
struct page *page;
void *fsdata;
void *addr;
int res;
res = pagecache_write_begin(NULL, inode->i_mapping, pos, n, 0,
&page, &fsdata);
if (res)
return res;
addr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(addr + offset_in_page(pos), buf, n);
kunmap_atomic(addr);
res = pagecache_write_end(NULL, inode->i_mapping, pos, n, n,
page, fsdata);
if (res < 0)
return res;
if (res != n)
return -EIO;
buf += n;
pos += n;
count -= n;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Format of f2fs verity xattr. This points to the location of the verity
* descriptor within the file data rather than containing it directly because
* the verity descriptor *must* be encrypted when f2fs encryption is used. But,
* f2fs encryption does not encrypt xattrs.
*/
struct fsverity_descriptor_location {
__le32 version;
__le32 size;
__le64 pos;
};
static int f2fs_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
int err;
if (f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode))
return -EBUSY;
if (f2fs_is_atomic_file(inode) || f2fs_is_volatile_file(inode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Since the file was opened readonly, we have to initialize the quotas
* here and not rely on ->open() doing it. This must be done before
* evicting the inline data.
*/
err = dquot_initialize(inode);
if (err)
return err;
err = f2fs_convert_inline_inode(inode);
if (err)
return err;
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
return 0;
}
static int f2fs_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc,
size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
u64 desc_pos = f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + merkle_tree_size;
struct fsverity_descriptor_location dloc = {
.version = cpu_to_le32(1),
.size = cpu_to_le32(desc_size),
.pos = cpu_to_le64(desc_pos),
};
int err = 0;
if (desc != NULL) {
/* Succeeded; write the verity descriptor. */
err = pagecache_write(inode, desc, desc_size, desc_pos);
/* Write all pages before clearing FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS. */
if (!err)
err = filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
}
/* If we failed, truncate anything we wrote past i_size. */
if (desc == NULL || err)
f2fs_truncate(inode);
clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_VERITY_IN_PROGRESS);
if (desc != NULL && !err) {
err = f2fs_setxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY,
F2FS_XATTR_NAME_VERITY, &dloc, sizeof(dloc),
NULL, XATTR_CREATE);
if (!err) {
file_set_verity(inode);
f2fs_set_inode_flags(inode);
f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode, true);
}
}
return err;
}
static int f2fs_get_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
size_t buf_size)
{
struct fsverity_descriptor_location dloc;
int res;
u32 size;
u64 pos;
/* Get the descriptor location */
res = f2fs_getxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY,
F2FS_XATTR_NAME_VERITY, &dloc, sizeof(dloc), NULL);
if (res < 0 && res != -ERANGE)
return res;
if (res != sizeof(dloc) || dloc.version != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "unknown verity xattr format");
return -EINVAL;
}
size = le32_to_cpu(dloc.size);
pos = le64_to_cpu(dloc.pos);
/* Get the descriptor */
if (pos + size < pos || pos + size > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes ||
pos < f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) || size > INT_MAX) {
f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "invalid verity xattr");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (buf_size) {
if (size > buf_size)
return -ERANGE;
res = pagecache_read(inode, buf, size, pos);
if (res)
return res;
}
return size;
}
static struct page *f2fs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
pgoff_t index)
{
index += f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
return read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, index, NULL);
}
static int f2fs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize)
{
loff_t pos = f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
}
const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops = {
.begin_enable_verity = f2fs_begin_enable_verity,
.end_enable_verity = f2fs_end_enable_verity,
.get_verity_descriptor = f2fs_get_verity_descriptor,
.read_merkle_tree_page = f2fs_read_merkle_tree_page,
.write_merkle_tree_block = f2fs_write_merkle_tree_block,
};
fs/f2fs/xattr.h
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -34,8 +34,10 @@
#define F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ADVISE 7
/* Should be same as EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION */
#define F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION 9
#define F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_VERITY 11
#define F2FS_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "c"
#define F2FS_XATTR_NAME_VERITY "v"
struct f2fs_xattr_header {
__le32 h_magic; /* magic number for identification */
......
fs/verity/Kconfig 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
config FS_VERITY
bool "FS Verity (read-only file-based authenticity protection)"
select CRYPTO
# SHA-256 is selected as it's intended to be the default hash algorithm.
# To avoid bloat, other wanted algorithms must be selected explicitly.
select CRYPTO_SHA256
help
This option enables fs-verity. fs-verity is the dm-verity
mechanism implemented at the file level. On supported
filesystems (currently EXT4 and F2FS), userspace can use an
ioctl to enable verity for a file, which causes the filesystem
to build a Merkle tree for the file. The filesystem will then
transparently verify any data read from the file against the
Merkle tree. The file is also made read-only.
This serves as an integrity check, but the availability of the
Merkle tree root hash also allows efficiently supporting
various use cases where normally the whole file would need to
be hashed at once, such as: (a) auditing (logging the file's
hash), or (b) authenticity verification (comparing the hash
against a known good value, e.g. from a digital signature).
fs-verity is especially useful on large files where not all
the contents may actually be needed. Also, fs-verity verifies
data each time it is paged back in, which provides better
protection against malicious disks vs. an ahead-of-time hash.
If unsure, say N.
config FS_VERITY_DEBUG
bool "FS Verity debugging"
depends on FS_VERITY
help
Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default.
Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer.
config FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
bool "FS Verity builtin signature support"
depends on FS_VERITY
select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
help
Support verifying signatures of verity files against the X.509
certificates that have been loaded into the ".fs-verity"
kernel keyring.
This is meant as a relatively simple mechanism that can be
used to provide an authenticity guarantee for verity files, as
an alternative to IMA appraisal. Userspace programs still
need to check that the verity bit is set in order to get an
authenticity guarantee.
If unsure, say N.
fs/verity/Makefile 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \
hash_algs.o \
init.o \
measure.o \
open.o \
verify.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) += signature.o
fs/verity/enable.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/enable.c: ioctl to enable verity on a file
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
static int build_merkle_tree_level(struct inode *inode, unsigned int level,
u64 num_blocks_to_hash,
const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
u8 *pending_hashes,
struct ahash_request *req)
{
const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
unsigned int pending_size = 0;
u64 dst_block_num;
u64 i;
int err;
if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE)) /* checked earlier too */
return -EINVAL;
if (level < params->num_levels) {
dst_block_num = params->level_start[level];
} else {
if (WARN_ON(num_blocks_to_hash != 1))
return -EINVAL;
dst_block_num = 0; /* unused */
}
for (i = 0; i < num_blocks_to_hash; i++) {
struct page *src_page;
if ((pgoff_t)i % 10000 == 0 || i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash)
pr_debug("Hashing block %llu of %llu for level %u\n",
i + 1, num_blocks_to_hash, level);
if (level == 0) {
/* Leaf: hashing a data block */
src_page = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, i, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading data page %llu",
err, i);
return err;
}
} else {
/* Non-leaf: hashing hash block from level below */
src_page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
params->level_start[level - 1] + i);
if (IS_ERR(src_page)) {
err = PTR_ERR(src_page);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %llu",
err, params->level_start[level - 1] + i);
return err;
}
}
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, src_page,
&pending_hashes[pending_size]);
put_page(src_page);
if (err)
return err;
pending_size += params->digest_size;
if (level == params->num_levels) /* Root hash? */
return 0;
if (pending_size + params->digest_size > params->block_size ||
i + 1 == num_blocks_to_hash) {
/* Flush the pending hash block */
memset(&pending_hashes[pending_size], 0,
params->block_size - pending_size);
err = vops->write_merkle_tree_block(inode,
pending_hashes,
dst_block_num,
params->log_blocksize);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d writing Merkle tree block %llu",
err, dst_block_num);
return err;
}
dst_block_num++;
pending_size = 0;
}
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
cond_resched();
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Build the Merkle tree for the given inode using the given parameters, and
* return the root hash in @root_hash.
*
* The tree is written to a filesystem-specific location as determined by the
* ->write_merkle_tree_block() method. However, the blocks that comprise the
* tree are the same for all filesystems.
*/
static int build_merkle_tree(struct inode *inode,
const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
u8 *root_hash)
{
u8 *pending_hashes;
struct ahash_request *req;
u64 blocks;
unsigned int level;
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (inode->i_size == 0) {
/* Empty file is a special case; root hash is all 0's */
memset(root_hash, 0, params->digest_size);
return 0;
}
pending_hashes = kmalloc(params->block_size, GFP_KERNEL);
req = ahash_request_alloc(params->hash_alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pending_hashes || !req)
goto out;
/*
* Build each level of the Merkle tree, starting at the leaf level
* (level 0) and ascending to the root node (level 'num_levels - 1').
* Then at the end (level 'num_levels'), calculate the root hash.
*/
blocks = (inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >>
params->log_blocksize;
for (level = 0; level <= params->num_levels; level++) {
err = build_merkle_tree_level(inode, level, blocks, params,
pending_hashes, req);
if (err)
goto out;
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
params->log_arity;
}
memcpy(root_hash, pending_hashes, params->digest_size);
err = 0;
out:
kfree(pending_hashes);
ahash_request_free(req);
return err;
}
static int enable_verity(struct file *filp,
const struct fsverity_enable_arg *arg)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop;
struct merkle_tree_params params = { };
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
size_t desc_size = sizeof(*desc) + arg->sig_size;
struct fsverity_info *vi;
int err;
/* Start initializing the fsverity_descriptor */
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
return -ENOMEM;
desc->version = 1;
desc->hash_algorithm = arg->hash_algorithm;
desc->log_blocksize = ilog2(arg->block_size);
/* Get the salt if the user provided one */
if (arg->salt_size &&
copy_from_user(desc->salt,
(const u8 __user *)(uintptr_t)arg->salt_ptr,
arg->salt_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size;
/* Get the signature if the user provided one */
if (arg->sig_size &&
copy_from_user(desc->signature,
(const u8 __user *)(uintptr_t)arg->sig_ptr,
arg->sig_size)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
desc->sig_size = cpu_to_le32(arg->sig_size);
desc->data_size = cpu_to_le64(inode->i_size);
/* Prepare the Merkle tree parameters */
err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(&params, inode,
arg->hash_algorithm,
desc->log_blocksize,
desc->salt, desc->salt_size);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Start enabling verity on this file, serialized by the inode lock.
* Fail if verity is already enabled or is already being enabled.
*/
inode_lock(inode);
if (IS_VERITY(inode))
err = -EEXIST;
else
err = vops->begin_enable_verity(filp);
inode_unlock(inode);
if (err)
goto out;
/*
* Build the Merkle tree. Don't hold the inode lock during this, since
* on huge files this may take a very long time and we don't want to
* force unrelated syscalls like chown() to block forever. We don't
* need the inode lock here because deny_write_access() already prevents
* the file from being written to or truncated, and we still serialize
* ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity() using the inode
* lock and only allow one process to be here at a time on a given file.
*/
pr_debug("Building Merkle tree...\n");
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(desc->root_hash) < FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
err = build_merkle_tree(inode, &params, desc->root_hash);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d building Merkle tree", err);
goto rollback;
}
pr_debug("Done building Merkle tree. Root hash is %s:%*phN\n",
params.hash_alg->name, params.digest_size, desc->root_hash);
/*
* Create the fsverity_info. Don't bother trying to save work by
* reusing the merkle_tree_params from above. Instead, just create the
* fsverity_info from the fsverity_descriptor as if it were just loaded
* from disk. This is simpler, and it serves as an extra check that the
* metadata we're writing is valid before actually enabling verity.
*/
vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc, desc_size);
if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
err = PTR_ERR(vi);
goto rollback;
}
if (arg->sig_size)
pr_debug("Storing a %u-byte PKCS#7 signature alongside the file\n",
arg->sig_size);
/*
* Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file.
* Serialized with ->begin_enable_verity() by the inode lock.
*/
inode_lock(inode);
err = vops->end_enable_verity(filp, desc, desc_size, params.tree_size);
inode_unlock(inode);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "%ps() failed with err %d",
vops->end_enable_verity, err);
fsverity_free_info(vi);
} else if (WARN_ON(!IS_VERITY(inode))) {
err = -EINVAL;
fsverity_free_info(vi);
} else {
/* Successfully enabled verity */
/*
* Readers can start using ->i_verity_info immediately, so it
* can't be rolled back once set. So don't set it until just
* after the filesystem has successfully enabled verity.
*/
fsverity_set_info(inode, vi);
}
out:
kfree(params.hashstate);
kfree(desc);
return err;
rollback:
inode_lock(inode);
(void)vops->end_enable_verity(filp, NULL, 0, params.tree_size);
inode_unlock(inode);
goto out;
}
/**
* fsverity_ioctl_enable() - enable verity on a file
*
* Enable fs-verity on a file. See the "FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY" section of
* Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
struct fsverity_enable_arg arg;
int err;
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (arg.version != 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.__reserved1 ||
memchr_inv(arg.__reserved2, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved2)))
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.block_size != PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
if (arg.salt_size > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt))
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (arg.sig_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/*
* Require a regular file with write access. But the actual fd must
* still be readonly so that we can lock out all writers. This is
* needed to guarantee that no writable fds exist to the file once it
* has verity enabled, and to stabilize the data being hashed.
*/
err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (err)
return err;
if (IS_APPEND(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return -EISDIR;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
err = mnt_want_write_file(filp);
if (err) /* -EROFS */
return err;
err = deny_write_access(filp);
if (err) /* -ETXTBSY */
goto out_drop_write;
err = enable_verity(filp, &arg);
if (err)
goto out_allow_write_access;
/*
* Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after
* being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache
* again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since
* these pages didn't undergo verification against the file measurement
* which fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the
* pagecache to ensure that all future reads are verified.
*/
filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping);
/*
* allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access().
* Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files.
*/
out_allow_write_access:
allow_write_access(filp);
out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write_file(filp);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_enable);
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
#define DEBUG
#endif
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
struct ahash_request;
/*
* Implementation limit: maximum depth of the Merkle tree. For now 8 is plenty;
* it's enough for over U64_MAX bytes of data using SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 8
/*
* Largest digest size among all hash algorithms supported by fs-verity.
* Currently assumed to be <= size of fsverity_descriptor::root_hash.
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
struct fsverity_hash_alg {
struct crypto_ahash *tfm; /* hash tfm, allocated on demand */
const char *name; /* crypto API name, e.g. sha256 */
unsigned int digest_size; /* digest size in bytes, e.g. 32 for SHA-256 */
unsigned int block_size; /* block size in bytes, e.g. 64 for SHA-256 */
};
/* Merkle tree parameters: hash algorithm, initial hash state, and topology */
struct merkle_tree_params {
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; /* the hash algorithm */
const u8 *hashstate; /* initial hash state or NULL */
unsigned int digest_size; /* same as hash_alg->digest_size */
unsigned int block_size; /* size of data and tree blocks */
unsigned int hashes_per_block; /* number of hashes per tree block */
unsigned int log_blocksize; /* log2(block_size) */
unsigned int log_arity; /* log2(hashes_per_block) */
unsigned int num_levels; /* number of levels in Merkle tree */
u64 tree_size; /* Merkle tree size in bytes */
/*
* Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0)
* to root level ('num_levels - 1')
*/
u64 level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
};
/**
* fsverity_info - cached verity metadata for an inode
*
* When a verity file is first opened, an instance of this struct is allocated
* and stored in ->i_verity_info; it remains until the inode is evicted. It
* caches information about the Merkle tree that's needed to efficiently verify
* data read from the file. It also caches the file measurement. The Merkle
* tree pages themselves are not cached here, but the filesystem may cache them.
*/
struct fsverity_info {
struct merkle_tree_params tree_params;
u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
u8 measurement[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
const struct inode *inode;
};
/*
* Merkle tree properties. The file measurement is the hash of this structure
* excluding the signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
struct fsverity_descriptor {
__u8 version; /* must be 1 */
__u8 hash_algorithm; /* Merkle tree hash algorithm */
__u8 log_blocksize; /* log2 of size of data and tree blocks */
__u8 salt_size; /* size of salt in bytes; 0 if none */
__le32 sig_size; /* size of signature in bytes; 0 if none */
__le64 data_size; /* size of file the Merkle tree is built over */
__u8 root_hash[64]; /* Merkle tree root hash */
__u8 salt[32]; /* salt prepended to each hashed block */
__u8 __reserved[144]; /* must be 0's */
__u8 signature[]; /* optional PKCS#7 signature */
};
/* Arbitrary limit to bound the kmalloc() size. Can be changed. */
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 16384
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE (FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \
sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor))
/*
* Format in which verity file measurements are signed. This is the same as
* 'struct fsverity_digest', except here some magic bytes are prepended to
* provide some context about what is being signed in case the same key is used
* for non-fsverity purposes, and here the fields have fixed endianness.
*/
struct fsverity_signed_digest {
char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */
__le16 digest_algorithm;
__le16 digest_size;
__u8 digest[];
};
/* hash_algs.c */
extern struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[];
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int num);
const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out);
int fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out);
void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void);
/* init.c */
extern void __printf(3, 4) __cold
fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
const char *fmt, ...);
#define fsverity_warn(inode, fmt, ...) \
fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_WARNING, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define fsverity_err(inode, fmt, ...) \
fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
/* open.c */
int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int hash_algorithm,
unsigned int log_blocksize,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
void *desc, size_t desc_size);
void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi);
void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi);
int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void);
void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache(void);
/* signature.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
size_t desc_size);
int __init fsverity_init_signature(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */
static inline int
fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
size_t desc_size)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int fsverity_init_signature(void)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */
/* verify.c */
int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void);
void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue(void);
#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */
fs/verity/hash_algs.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/hash_algs.c: fs-verity hash algorithms
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
/* The hash algorithms supported by fs-verity */
struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[] = {
[FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256] = {
.name = "sha256",
.digest_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
.block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE,
},
[FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA512] = {
.name = "sha512",
.digest_size = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE,
.block_size = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE,
},
};
/**
* fsverity_get_hash_alg() - validate and prepare a hash algorithm
* @inode: optional inode for logging purposes
* @num: the hash algorithm number
*
* Get the struct fsverity_hash_alg for the given hash algorithm number, and
* ensure it has a hash transform ready to go. The hash transforms are
* allocated on-demand so that we don't waste resources unnecessarily, and
* because the crypto modules may be initialized later than fs/verity/.
*
* Return: pointer to the hash alg on success, else an ERR_PTR()
*/
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int num)
{
struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg;
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
int err;
if (num >= ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs) ||
!fsverity_hash_algs[num].name) {
fsverity_warn(inode, "Unknown hash algorithm number: %u", num);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[num];
/* pairs with cmpxchg() below */
tfm = READ_ONCE(alg->tfm);
if (likely(tfm != NULL))
return alg;
/*
* Using the shash API would make things a bit simpler, but the ahash
* API is preferable as it allows the use of crypto accelerators.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(alg->name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
fsverity_warn(inode,
"Missing crypto API support for hash algorithm \"%s\"",
alg->name);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG);
}
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error allocating hash algorithm \"%s\": %ld",
alg->name, PTR_ERR(tfm));
return ERR_CAST(tfm);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON(alg->digest_size != crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm)))
goto err_free_tfm;
if (WARN_ON(alg->block_size != crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm)))
goto err_free_tfm;
pr_info("%s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
alg->name, crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm));
/* pairs with READ_ONCE() above */
if (cmpxchg(&alg->tfm, NULL, tfm) != NULL)
crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
return alg;
err_free_tfm:
crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
/**
* fsverity_prepare_hash_state() - precompute the initial hash state
* @alg: hash algorithm
* @salt: a salt which is to be prepended to all data to be hashed
* @salt_size: salt size in bytes, possibly 0
*
* Return: NULL if the salt is empty, otherwise the kmalloc()'ed precomputed
* initial hash state on success or an ERR_PTR() on failure.
*/
const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size)
{
u8 *hashstate = NULL;
struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
u8 *padded_salt = NULL;
size_t padded_salt_size;
struct scatterlist sg;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int err;
if (salt_size == 0)
return NULL;
hashstate = kmalloc(crypto_ahash_statesize(alg->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hashstate)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
req = ahash_request_alloc(alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free;
}
/*
* Zero-pad the salt to the next multiple of the input size of the hash
* algorithm's compression function, e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-256 or 128
* bytes for SHA-512. This ensures that the hash algorithm won't have
* any bytes buffered internally after processing the salt, thus making
* salted hashing just as fast as unsalted hashing.
*/
padded_salt_size = round_up(salt_size, alg->block_size);
padded_salt = kzalloc(padded_salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!padded_salt) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free;
}
memcpy(padded_salt, salt, salt_size);
sg_init_one(&sg, padded_salt, padded_salt_size);
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, NULL, padded_salt_size);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
if (err)
goto err_free;
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait);
if (err)
goto err_free;
err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate);
if (err)
goto err_free;
out:
ahash_request_free(req);
kfree(padded_salt);
return hashstate;
err_free:
kfree(hashstate);
hashstate = ERR_PTR(err);
goto out;
}
/**
* fsverity_hash_page() - hash a single data or hash page
* @params: the Merkle tree's parameters
* @inode: inode for which the hashing is being done
* @req: preallocated hash request
* @page: the page to hash
* @out: output digest, size 'params->digest_size' bytes
*
* Hash a single data or hash block, assuming block_size == PAGE_SIZE.
* The hash is salted if a salt is specified in the Merkle tree parameters.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out)
{
struct scatterlist sg;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int err;
if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
sg_set_page(&sg, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, PAGE_SIZE);
if (params->hashstate) {
err = crypto_ahash_import(req, params->hashstate);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d importing hash state", err);
return err;
}
err = crypto_ahash_finup(req);
} else {
err = crypto_ahash_digest(req);
}
err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
if (err)
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing page hash", err);
return err;
}
/**
* fsverity_hash_buffer() - hash some data
* @alg: the hash algorithm to use
* @data: the data to hash
* @size: size of data to hash, in bytes
* @out: output digest, size 'alg->digest_size' bytes
*
* Hash some data which is located in physically contiguous memory (i.e. memory
* allocated by kmalloc(), not by vmalloc()). No salt is used.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out)
{
struct ahash_request *req;
struct scatterlist sg;
DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
int err;
req = ahash_request_alloc(alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req)
return -ENOMEM;
sg_init_one(&sg, data, size);
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, size);
err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
ahash_request_free(req);
return err;
}
void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void)
{
size_t i;
/*
* Sanity check the hash algorithms (could be a build-time check, but
* they're in an array)
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(fsverity_hash_algs); i++) {
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg = &fsverity_hash_algs[i];
if (!alg->name)
continue;
BUG_ON(alg->digest_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
/*
* For efficiency, the implementation currently assumes the
* digest and block sizes are powers of 2. This limitation can
* be lifted if the code is updated to handle other values.
*/
BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->digest_size));
BUG_ON(!is_power_of_2(alg->block_size));
}
}
fs/verity/init.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/init.c: fs-verity module initialization and logging
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
void fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
if (!__ratelimit(&rs))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
if (inode)
printk("%sfs-verity (%s, inode %lu): %pV\n",
level, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, &vaf);
else
printk("%sfs-verity: %pV\n", level, &vaf);
va_end(args);
}
static int __init fsverity_init(void)
{
int err;
fsverity_check_hash_algs();
err = fsverity_init_info_cache();
if (err)
return err;
err = fsverity_init_workqueue();
if (err)
goto err_exit_info_cache;
err = fsverity_init_signature();
if (err)
goto err_exit_workqueue;
pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n");
return 0;
err_exit_workqueue:
fsverity_exit_workqueue();
err_exit_info_cache:
fsverity_exit_info_cache();
return err;
}
late_initcall(fsverity_init)
fs/verity/measure.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/measure.c: ioctl to get a verity file's measurement
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
/**
* fsverity_ioctl_measure() - get a verity file's measurement
*
* Retrieve the file measurement that the kernel is enforcing for reads from a
* verity file. See the "FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY" section of
* Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst for the documentation.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
{
const struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
struct fsverity_digest __user *uarg = _uarg;
const struct fsverity_info *vi;
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
struct fsverity_digest arg;
vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
if (!vi)
return -ENODATA; /* not a verity file */
hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
/*
* The user specifies the digest_size their buffer has space for; we can
* return the digest if it fits in the available space. We write back
* the actual size, which may be shorter than the user-specified size.
*/
if (get_user(arg.digest_size, &uarg->digest_size))
return -EFAULT;
if (arg.digest_size < hash_alg->digest_size)
return -EOVERFLOW;
memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
arg.digest_algorithm = hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs;
arg.digest_size = hash_alg->digest_size;
if (copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(uarg->digest, vi->measurement, hash_alg->digest_size))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_ioctl_measure);
fs/verity/open.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/open.c: opening fs-verity files
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/slab.h>
static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep;
/**
* fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params() - initialize Merkle tree parameters
* @params: the parameters struct to initialize
* @inode: the inode for which the Merkle tree is being built
* @hash_algorithm: number of hash algorithm to use
* @log_blocksize: log base 2 of block size to use
* @salt: pointer to salt (optional)
* @salt_size: size of salt, possibly 0
*
* Validate the hash algorithm and block size, then compute the tree topology
* (num levels, num blocks in each level, etc.) and initialize @params.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int hash_algorithm,
unsigned int log_blocksize,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size)
{
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
int err;
u64 blocks;
u64 offset;
int level;
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
hash_alg = fsverity_get_hash_alg(inode, hash_algorithm);
if (IS_ERR(hash_alg))
return PTR_ERR(hash_alg);
params->hash_alg = hash_alg;
params->digest_size = hash_alg->digest_size;
params->hashstate = fsverity_prepare_hash_state(hash_alg, salt,
salt_size);
if (IS_ERR(params->hashstate)) {
err = PTR_ERR(params->hashstate);
params->hashstate = NULL;
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d preparing hash state", err);
goto out_err;
}
if (log_blocksize != PAGE_SHIFT) {
fsverity_warn(inode, "Unsupported log_blocksize: %u",
log_blocksize);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_blocksize = log_blocksize;
params->block_size = 1 << log_blocksize;
if (WARN_ON(!is_power_of_2(params->digest_size))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
if (params->block_size < 2 * params->digest_size) {
fsverity_warn(inode,
"Merkle tree block size (%u) too small for hash algorithm \"%s\"",
params->block_size, hash_alg->name);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
params->log_arity = params->log_blocksize - ilog2(params->digest_size);
params->hashes_per_block = 1 << params->log_arity;
pr_debug("Merkle tree uses %s with %u-byte blocks (%u hashes/block), salt=%*phN\n",
hash_alg->name, params->block_size, params->hashes_per_block,
(int)salt_size, salt);
/*
* Compute the number of levels in the Merkle tree and create a map from
* level to the starting block of that level. Level 'num_levels - 1' is
* the root and is stored first. Level 0 is the level directly "above"
* the data blocks and is stored last.
*/
/* Compute number of levels and the number of blocks in each level */
blocks = (inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> log_blocksize;
pr_debug("Data is %lld bytes (%llu blocks)\n", inode->i_size, blocks);
while (blocks > 1) {
if (params->num_levels >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Too many levels in Merkle tree");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_err;
}
blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
params->log_arity;
/* temporarily using level_start[] to store blocks in level */
params->level_start[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
}
/* Compute the starting block of each level */
offset = 0;
for (level = (int)params->num_levels - 1; level >= 0; level--) {
blocks = params->level_start[level];
params->level_start[level] = offset;
pr_debug("Level %d is %llu blocks starting at index %llu\n",
level, blocks, offset);
offset += blocks;
}
params->tree_size = offset << log_blocksize;
return 0;
out_err:
kfree(params->hashstate);
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
return err;
}
/*
* Compute the file measurement by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the
* signature and with the sig_size field set to 0.
*/
static int compute_file_measurement(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
u8 *measurement)
{
__le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size;
int err;
desc->sig_size = 0;
err = fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), measurement);
desc->sig_size = sig_size;
return err;
}
/*
* Validate the given fsverity_descriptor and create a new fsverity_info from
* it. The signature (if present) is also checked.
*/
struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
void *_desc, size_t desc_size)
{
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = _desc;
struct fsverity_info *vi;
int err;
if (desc_size < sizeof(*desc)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Unrecognized descriptor size: %zu bytes",
desc_size);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (desc->version != 1) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Unrecognized descriptor version: %u",
desc->version);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (memchr_inv(desc->__reserved, 0, sizeof(desc->__reserved))) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Reserved bits set in descriptor");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (desc->salt_size > sizeof(desc->salt)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Invalid salt_size: %u", desc->salt_size);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (le64_to_cpu(desc->data_size) != inode->i_size) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Wrong data_size: %llu (desc) != %lld (inode)",
le64_to_cpu(desc->data_size), inode->i_size);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
vi = kmem_cache_zalloc(fsverity_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vi)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
vi->inode = inode;
err = fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(&vi->tree_params, inode,
desc->hash_algorithm,
desc->log_blocksize,
desc->salt, desc->salt_size);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d initializing Merkle tree parameters",
err);
goto out;
}
memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size);
err = compute_file_measurement(vi->tree_params.hash_alg, desc,
vi->measurement);
if (err) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file measurement", err);
goto out;
}
pr_debug("Computed file measurement: %s:%*phN\n",
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name,
vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->measurement);
err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc, desc_size);
out:
if (err) {
fsverity_free_info(vi);
vi = ERR_PTR(err);
}
return vi;
}
void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
/*
* Multiple processes may race to set ->i_verity_info, so use cmpxchg.
* This pairs with the READ_ONCE() in fsverity_get_info().
*/
if (cmpxchg(&inode->i_verity_info, NULL, vi) != NULL)
fsverity_free_info(vi);
}
void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
{
if (!vi)
return;
kfree(vi->tree_params.hashstate);
kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi);
}
/* Ensure the inode has an ->i_verity_info */
static int ensure_verity_info(struct inode *inode)
{
struct fsverity_info *vi = fsverity_get_info(inode);
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc;
int res;
if (vi)
return 0;
res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor(inode, NULL, 0);
if (res < 0) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d getting verity descriptor size", res);
return res;
}
if (res > FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Verity descriptor is too large (%d bytes)",
res);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
desc = kmalloc(res, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
return -ENOMEM;
res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor(inode, desc, res);
if (res < 0) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d reading verity descriptor", res);
goto out_free_desc;
}
vi = fsverity_create_info(inode, desc, res);
if (IS_ERR(vi)) {
res = PTR_ERR(vi);
goto out_free_desc;
}
fsverity_set_info(inode, vi);
res = 0;
out_free_desc:
kfree(desc);
return res;
}
/**
* fsverity_file_open() - prepare to open a verity file
* @inode: the inode being opened
* @filp: the struct file being set up
*
* When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing. Otherwise,
* set up the inode's ->i_verity_info if not already done.
*
* When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open().
* Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (!IS_VERITY(inode))
return 0;
if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
pr_debug("Denying opening verity file (ino %lu) for write\n",
inode->i_ino);
return -EPERM;
}
return ensure_verity_info(inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_file_open);
/**
* fsverity_prepare_setattr() - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes
* @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed
* @attr: attributes to change
*
* Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't covered by the
* open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
if (IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
pr_debug("Denying truncate of verity file (ino %lu)\n",
d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_setattr);
/**
* fsverity_cleanup_inode() - free the inode's verity info, if present
*
* Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info.
*/
void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
fsverity_free_info(inode->i_verity_info);
inode->i_verity_info = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_cleanup_inode);
int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)
{
fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(fsverity_info,
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT,
measurement);
if (!fsverity_info_cachep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(fsverity_info_cachep);
fsverity_info_cachep = NULL;
}
fs/verity/signature.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/signature.c: verification of builtin signatures
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
/*
* /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures
* If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature.
*/
static int fsverity_require_signatures;
/*
* Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates.
*
* Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use
* keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions.
*/
static struct key *fsverity_keyring;
/**
* fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature
*
* If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file
* measurement, verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring.
*
* Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure
*/
int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc,
size_t desc_size)
{
const struct inode *inode = vi->inode;
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg;
const u32 sig_size = le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size);
struct fsverity_signed_digest *d;
int err;
if (sig_size == 0) {
if (fsverity_require_signatures) {
fsverity_err(inode,
"require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!");
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
if (sig_size > desc_size - sizeof(*desc)) {
fsverity_err(inode, "Signature overflows verity descriptor");
return -EBADMSG;
}
d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!d)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8);
d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs);
d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size);
memcpy(d->digest, vi->measurement, hash_alg->digest_size);
err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size,
desc->signature, sig_size,
fsverity_keyring,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
kfree(d);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOKEY)
fsverity_err(inode,
"File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring");
else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED)
fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature");
else if (err == -EBADMSG)
fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature");
else
fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature",
err);
return err;
}
pr_debug("Valid signature for file measurement %s:%*phN\n",
hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->measurement);
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static struct ctl_table_header *fsverity_sysctl_header;
static const struct ctl_path fsverity_sysctl_path[] = {
{ .procname = "fs", },
{ .procname = "verity", },
{ }
};
static struct ctl_table fsverity_sysctl_table[] = {
{
.procname = "require_signatures",
.data = &fsverity_require_signatures,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{ }
};
static int __init fsverity_sysctl_init(void)
{
fsverity_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_paths(fsverity_sysctl_path,
fsverity_sysctl_table);
if (!fsverity_sysctl_header) {
pr_err("sysctl registration failed!\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
#else /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */
static inline int __init fsverity_sysctl_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */
int __init fsverity_init_signature(void)
{
struct key *ring;
int err;
ring = keyring_alloc(".fs-verity", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE |
KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ring))
return PTR_ERR(ring);
err = fsverity_sysctl_init();
if (err)
goto err_put_ring;
fsverity_keyring = ring;
return 0;
err_put_ring:
key_put(ring);
return err;
}
fs/verity/verify.c 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* fs/verity/verify.c: data verification functions, i.e. hooks for ->readpages()
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#include "fsverity_private.h"
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/bio.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
static struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
/**
* hash_at_level() - compute the location of the block's hash at the given level
*
* @params: (in) the Merkle tree parameters
* @dindex: (in) the index of the data block being verified
* @level: (in) the level of hash we want (0 is leaf level)
* @hindex: (out) the index of the hash block containing the wanted hash
* @hoffset: (out) the byte offset to the wanted hash within the hash block
*/
static void hash_at_level(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
pgoff_t dindex, unsigned int level, pgoff_t *hindex,
unsigned int *hoffset)
{
pgoff_t position;
/* Offset of the hash within the level's region, in hashes */
position = dindex >> (level * params->log_arity);
/* Index of the hash block in the tree overall */
*hindex = params->level_start[level] + (position >> params->log_arity);
/* Offset of the wanted hash (in bytes) within the hash block */
*hoffset = (position & ((1 << params->log_arity) - 1)) <<
(params->log_blocksize - params->log_arity);
}
/* Extract a hash from a hash page */
static void extract_hash(struct page *hpage, unsigned int hoffset,
unsigned int hsize, u8 *out)
{
void *virt = kmap_atomic(hpage);
memcpy(out, virt + hoffset, hsize);
kunmap_atomic(virt);
}
static inline int cmp_hashes(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const u8 *want_hash, const u8 *real_hash,
pgoff_t index, int level)
{
const unsigned int hsize = vi->tree_params.digest_size;
if (memcmp(want_hash, real_hash, hsize) == 0)
return 0;
fsverity_err(vi->inode,
"FILE CORRUPTED! index=%lu, level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN",
index, level,
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash,
vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, hsize, real_hash);
return -EBADMSG;
}
/*
* Verify a single data page against the file's Merkle tree.
*
* In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. However,
* for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages. Therefore we need
* only ascend the tree until an already-verified page is seen, as indicated by
* the PageChecked bit being set; then verify the path to that page.
*
* This code currently only supports the case where the verity block size is
* equal to PAGE_SIZE. Doing otherwise would be possible but tricky, since we
* wouldn't be able to use the PageChecked bit.
*
* Note that multiple processes may race to verify a hash page and mark it
* Checked, but it doesn't matter; the result will be the same either way.
*
* Return: true if the page is valid, else false.
*/
static bool verify_page(struct inode *inode, const struct fsverity_info *vi,
struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page)
{
const struct merkle_tree_params *params = &vi->tree_params;
const unsigned int hsize = params->digest_size;
const pgoff_t index = data_page->index;
int level;
u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
const u8 *want_hash;
u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct page *hpages[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
unsigned int hoffsets[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
int err;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(data_page) || PageUptodate(data_page)))
return false;
pr_debug_ratelimited("Verifying data page %lu...\n", index);
/*
* Starting at the leaf level, ascend the tree saving hash pages along
* the way until we find a verified hash page, indicated by PageChecked;
* or until we reach the root.
*/
for (level = 0; level < params->num_levels; level++) {
pgoff_t hindex;
unsigned int hoffset;
struct page *hpage;
hash_at_level(params, index, level, &hindex, &hoffset);
pr_debug_ratelimited("Level %d: hindex=%lu, hoffset=%u\n",
level, hindex, hoffset);
hpage = inode->i_sb->s_vop->read_merkle_tree_page(inode,
hindex);
if (IS_ERR(hpage)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hpage);
fsverity_err(inode,
"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %lu",
err, hindex);
goto out;
}
if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
extract_hash(hpage, hoffset, hsize, _want_hash);
want_hash = _want_hash;
put_page(hpage);
pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page already checked, want %s:%*phN\n",
params->hash_alg->name,
hsize, want_hash);
goto descend;
}
pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page not yet checked\n");
hpages[level] = hpage;
hoffsets[level] = hoffset;
}
want_hash = vi->root_hash;
pr_debug("Want root hash: %s:%*phN\n",
params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash);
descend:
/* Descend the tree verifying hash pages */
for (; level > 0; level--) {
struct page *hpage = hpages[level - 1];
unsigned int hoffset = hoffsets[level - 1];
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, hpage, real_hash);
if (err)
goto out;
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, level - 1);
if (err)
goto out;
SetPageChecked(hpage);
extract_hash(hpage, hoffset, hsize, _want_hash);
want_hash = _want_hash;
put_page(hpage);
pr_debug("Verified hash page at level %d, now want %s:%*phN\n",
level - 1, params->hash_alg->name, hsize, want_hash);
}
/* Finally, verify the data page */
err = fsverity_hash_page(params, inode, req, data_page, real_hash);
if (err)
goto out;
err = cmp_hashes(vi, want_hash, real_hash, index, -1);
out:
for (; level > 0; level--)
put_page(hpages[level - 1]);
return err == 0;
}
/**
* fsverity_verify_page() - verify a data page
*
* Verify a page that has just been read from a verity file. The page must be a
* pagecache page that is still locked and not yet uptodate.
*
* Return: true if the page is valid, else false.
*/
bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
struct ahash_request *req;
bool valid;
req = ahash_request_alloc(vi->tree_params.hash_alg->tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!req))
return false;
valid = verify_page(inode, vi, req, page);
ahash_request_free(req);
return valid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
/**
* fsverity_verify_bio() - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed
*
* Verify a set of pages that have just been read from a verity file. The pages
* must be pagecache pages that are still locked and not yet uptodate. Pages
* that fail verification are set to the Error state. Verification is skipped
* for pages already in the Error state, e.g. due to fscrypt decryption failure.
*
* This is a helper function for use by the ->readpages() method of filesystems
* that issue bios to read data directly into the page cache. Filesystems that
* populate the page cache without issuing bios (e.g. non block-based
* filesystems) must instead call fsverity_verify_page() directly on each page.
* All filesystems must also call fsverity_verify_page() on holes.
*/
void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host;
const struct fsverity_info *vi = inode->i_verity_info;
struct ahash_request *req;
struct bio_vec *bv;
struct bvec_iter_all iter_all;
req = ahash_request_alloc(vi->tree_params.hash_alg->tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!req)) {
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all)
SetPageError(bv->bv_page);
return;
}
bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) {
struct page *page = bv->bv_page;
if (!PageError(page) && !verify_page(inode, vi, req, page))
SetPageError(page);
}
ahash_request_free(req);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio);
#endif /* CONFIG_BLOCK */
/**
* fsverity_enqueue_verify_work() - enqueue work on the fs-verity workqueue
*
* Enqueue verification work for asynchronous processing.
*/
void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
queue_work(fsverity_read_workqueue, work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work);
int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void)
{
/*
* Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be verified in parallel
* even when they happen to complete on the same CPU. This sacrifices
* locality, but it's worthwhile since hashing is CPU-intensive.
*
* Also use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work,
* which blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
*/
fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue",
WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI,
num_online_cpus());
if (!fsverity_read_workqueue)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue(void)
{
destroy_workqueue(fsverity_read_workqueue);
fsverity_read_workqueue = NULL;
}
include/linux/fs.h
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ struct workqueue_struct;
struct iov_iter;
struct fscrypt_info;
struct fscrypt_operations;
struct fsverity_info;
struct fsverity_operations;
struct fs_context;
struct fs_parameter_description;
......@@ -723,6 +725,10 @@ struct inode {
struct fscrypt_info *i_crypt_info;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
struct fsverity_info *i_verity_info;
#endif
void *i_private; /* fs or device private pointer */
} __randomize_layout;
......@@ -1428,6 +1434,9 @@ struct super_block {
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
const struct fscrypt_operations *s_cop;
struct key *s_master_keys; /* master crypto keys in use */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
const struct fsverity_operations *s_vop;
#endif
struct hlist_bl_head s_roots; /* alternate root dentries for NFS */
struct list_head s_mounts; /* list of mounts; _not_ for fs use */
......@@ -1966,6 +1975,7 @@ struct super_operations {
#endif
#define S_ENCRYPTED 16384 /* Encrypted file (using fs/crypto/) */
#define S_CASEFOLD 32768 /* Casefolded file */
#define S_VERITY 65536 /* Verity file (using fs/verity/) */
/*
* Note that nosuid etc flags are inode-specific: setting some file-system
......@@ -2007,6 +2017,7 @@ static inline bool sb_rdonly(const struct super_block *sb) { return sb->s_flags
#define IS_DAX(inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_DAX)
#define IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_ENCRYPTED)
#define IS_CASEFOLDED(inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_CASEFOLD)
#define IS_VERITY(inode) ((inode)->i_flags & S_VERITY)
#define IS_WHITEOUT(inode) (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && \
(inode)->i_rdev == WHITEOUT_DEV)
......
include/linux/fsverity.h 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
*
* This header declares the interface between the fs/verity/ support layer and
* filesystems that support fs-verity.
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#ifndef _LINUX_FSVERITY_H
#define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
/* Verity operations for filesystems */
struct fsverity_operations {
/**
* Begin enabling verity on the given file.
*
* @filp: a readonly file descriptor for the file
*
* The filesystem must do any needed filesystem-specific preparations
* for enabling verity, e.g. evicting inline data. It also must return
* -EBUSY if verity is already being enabled on the given file.
*
* i_rwsem is held for write.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int (*begin_enable_verity)(struct file *filp);
/**
* End enabling verity on the given file.
*
* @filp: a readonly file descriptor for the file
* @desc: the verity descriptor to write, or NULL on failure
* @desc_size: size of verity descriptor, or 0 on failure
* @merkle_tree_size: total bytes the Merkle tree took up
*
* If desc == NULL, then enabling verity failed and the filesystem only
* must do any necessary cleanups. Else, it must also store the given
* verity descriptor to a fs-specific location associated with the inode
* and do any fs-specific actions needed to mark the inode as a verity
* inode, e.g. setting a bit in the on-disk inode. The filesystem is
* also responsible for setting the S_VERITY flag in the VFS inode.
*
* i_rwsem is held for write, but it may have been dropped between
* ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity().
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int (*end_enable_verity)(struct file *filp, const void *desc,
size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size);
/**
* Get the verity descriptor of the given inode.
*
* @inode: an inode with the S_VERITY flag set
* @buf: buffer in which to place the verity descriptor
* @bufsize: size of @buf, or 0 to retrieve the size only
*
* If bufsize == 0, then the size of the verity descriptor is returned.
* Otherwise the verity descriptor is written to 'buf' and its actual
* size is returned; -ERANGE is returned if it's too large. This may be
* called by multiple processes concurrently on the same inode.
*
* Return: the size on success, -errno on failure
*/
int (*get_verity_descriptor)(struct inode *inode, void *buf,
size_t bufsize);
/**
* Read a Merkle tree page of the given inode.
*
* @inode: the inode
* @index: 0-based index of the page within the Merkle tree
*
* This can be called at any time on an open verity file, as well as
* between ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity(). It may be
* called by multiple processes concurrently, even with the same page.
*
* Note that this must retrieve a *page*, not necessarily a *block*.
*
* Return: the page on success, ERR_PTR() on failure
*/
struct page *(*read_merkle_tree_page)(struct inode *inode,
pgoff_t index);
/**
* Write a Merkle tree block to the given inode.
*
* @inode: the inode for which the Merkle tree is being built
* @buf: block to write
* @index: 0-based index of the block within the Merkle tree
* @log_blocksize: log base 2 of the Merkle tree block size
*
* This is only called between ->begin_enable_verity() and
* ->end_enable_verity().
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
int (*write_merkle_tree_block)(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
u64 index, int log_blocksize);
};
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
static inline struct fsverity_info *fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode)
{
/* pairs with the cmpxchg() in fsverity_set_info() */
return READ_ONCE(inode->i_verity_info);
}
/* enable.c */
extern int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *arg);
/* measure.c */
extern int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);
/* open.c */
extern int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
extern int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
extern void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
/* verify.c */
extern bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page);
extern void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio);
extern void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work);
#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */
static inline struct fsverity_info *fsverity_get_info(const struct inode *inode)
{
return NULL;
}
/* enable.c */
static inline int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp,
const void __user *arg)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* measure.c */
static inline int fsverity_ioctl_measure(struct file *filp, void __user *arg)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* open.c */
static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
return IS_VERITY(inode) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;
}
static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *attr)
{
return IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;
}
static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
}
/* verify.c */
static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
{
WARN_ON(1);
return false;
}
static inline void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
{
WARN_ON(1);
}
static inline void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
WARN_ON(1);
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */
/**
* fsverity_active() - do reads from the inode need to go through fs-verity?
*
* This checks whether ->i_verity_info has been set.
*
* Filesystems call this from ->readpages() to check whether the pages need to
* be verified or not. Don't use IS_VERITY() for this purpose; it's subject to
* a race condition where the file is being read concurrently with
* FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY completing. (S_VERITY is set before ->i_verity_info.)
*/
static inline bool fsverity_active(const struct inode *inode)
{
return fsverity_get_info(inode) != NULL;
}
#endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */
include/uapi/linux/fs.h
View file @ f60c55a9
......@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct fsxattr {
#define FS_TOPDIR_FL 0x00020000 /* Top of directory hierarchies*/
#define FS_HUGE_FILE_FL 0x00040000 /* Reserved for ext4 */
#define FS_EXTENT_FL 0x00080000 /* Extents */
#define FS_VERITY_FL 0x00100000 /* Verity protected inode */
#define FS_EA_INODE_FL 0x00200000 /* Inode used for large EA */
#define FS_EOFBLOCKS_FL 0x00400000 /* Reserved for ext4 */
#define FS_NOCOW_FL 0x00800000 /* Do not cow file */
......
include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h 0 → 100644
View file @ f60c55a9
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
/*
* fs-verity user API
*
* These ioctls can be used on filesystems that support fs-verity. See the
* "User API" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst.
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H
#define _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H
#include <linux/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#define FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256 1
#define FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA512 2
struct fsverity_enable_arg {
__u32 version;
__u32 hash_algorithm;
__u32 block_size;
__u32 salt_size;
__u64 salt_ptr;
__u32 sig_size;
__u32 __reserved1;
__u64 sig_ptr;
__u64 __reserved2[11];
};
struct fsverity_digest {
__u16 digest_algorithm;
__u16 digest_size; /* input/output */
__u8 digest[];
};
#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IOW('f', 133, struct fsverity_enable_arg)
#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest)
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */
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