powerpc/ima: Fix secure boot rules in ima arch policy
To prevent verifying the kernel module appended signature twice (finit_module), once by the module_sig_check() and again by IMA, powerpc secure boot rules define an IMA architecture specific policy rule only if CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is not enabled. This, unfortunately, does not take into account the ability of enabling "sig_enforce" on the boot command line (module.sig_enforce=1). Including the IMA module appraise rule results in failing the finit_module syscall, unless the module signing public key is loaded onto the IMA keyring. This patch fixes secure boot policy rules to be based on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG instead. Fixes: 4238fad3 ("powerpc/ima: Add support to initialize ima policy rules") Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1588342612-14532-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
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