stack/erp5: patch waitress-1.4.4 for CVE-2022-24761.

component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-1.patch

+From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:30:30 -0700
+Subject: Add new regular expressions for Chunked Encoding
+
+This also moves some regular expressions for QUOTED_PAIR/QUOTED_STRING
+into this module from utilities so that they may be reused.
+
+Part of CVE-2022-24761
+---
+ src/waitress/rfc7230.py   | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/waitress/utilities.py | 28 +++-------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/waitress/rfc7230.py b/src/waitress/rfc7230.py
+index cd33c90..0b76a38 100644
+--- a/src/waitress/rfc7230.py
++++ b/src/waitress/rfc7230.py
+@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ import re
+ 
+ from .compat import tobytes
+ 
++HEXDIG = "[0-9a-fA-F]"
++DIGIT = "[0-9]"
++
+ WS = "[ \t]"
+ OWS = WS + "{0,}?"
+ RWS = WS + "{1,}?"
+@@ -27,6 +30,12 @@ TOKEN = TCHAR + "{1,}"
+ #                  ; visible (printing) characters
+ VCHAR = r"\x21-\x7e"
+ 
++# The '\\' between \x5b and \x5d is needed to escape \x5d (']')
++QDTEXT = "[\t \x21\x23-\x5b\\\x5d-\x7e" + OBS_TEXT + "]"
++
++QUOTED_PAIR = r"\\" + "([\t " + VCHAR + OBS_TEXT + "])"
++QUOTED_STRING = '"(?:(?:' + QDTEXT + ")|(?:" + QUOTED_PAIR + '))*"'
++
+ # header-field   = field-name ":" OWS field-value OWS
+ # field-name     = token
+ # field-value    = *( field-content / obs-fold )
+@@ -45,8 +54,24 @@ FIELD_CONTENT = FIELD_VCHAR + "+(?:[ \t]+" + FIELD_VCHAR + "+)*"
+ # Which allows the field value here to just see if there is even a value in the first place
+ FIELD_VALUE = "(?:" + FIELD_CONTENT + ")?"
+ 
+-HEADER_FIELD = re.compile(
++# chunk-ext      = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
++# chunk-ext-name = token
++# chunk-ext-val  = token / quoted-string
++
++CHUNK_EXT_NAME = TOKEN
++CHUNK_EXT_VAL = "(?:" + TOKEN + ")|(?:" + QUOTED_STRING + ")"
++CHUNK_EXT = (
++    "(?:;(?P<extension>" + CHUNK_EXT_NAME + ")(?:=(?P<value>" + CHUNK_EXT_VAL + "))?)*"
++)
++
++# Pre-compiled regular expressions for use elsewhere
++ONLY_HEXDIG_RE = re.compile(("^" + HEXDIG + "+$").encode("latin-1"))
++ONLY_DIGIT_RE = re.compile(("^" + DIGIT + "+$").encode("latin-1"))
++HEADER_FIELD_RE = re.compile(
+     tobytes(
+         "^(?P<name>" + TOKEN + "):" + OWS + "(?P<value>" + FIELD_VALUE + ")" + OWS + "$"
+     )
+ )
++QUOTED_PAIR_RE = re.compile(QUOTED_PAIR)
++QUOTED_STRING_RE = re.compile(QUOTED_STRING)
++CHUNK_EXT_RE = re.compile(("^" + CHUNK_EXT + "$").encode("latin-1"))
+diff --git a/src/waitress/utilities.py b/src/waitress/utilities.py
+index 556bed2..fa59657 100644
+--- a/src/waitress/utilities.py
++++ b/src/waitress/utilities.py
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import re
+ import stat
+ import time
+ 
+-from .rfc7230 import OBS_TEXT, VCHAR
++from .rfc7230 import QUOTED_PAIR_RE, QUOTED_STRING_RE
+ 
+ logger = logging.getLogger("waitress")
+ queue_logger = logging.getLogger("waitress.queue")
+@@ -216,32 +216,10 @@ def parse_http_date(d):
+     return retval
+ 
+ 
+-# RFC 5234 Appendix B.1 "Core Rules":
+-# VCHAR         =  %x21-7E
+-#                  ; visible (printing) characters
+-vchar_re = VCHAR
+-
+-# RFC 7230 Section 3.2.6 "Field Value Components":
+-# quoted-string = DQUOTE *( qdtext / quoted-pair ) DQUOTE
+-# qdtext        = HTAB / SP /%x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E / obs-text
+-# obs-text      = %x80-FF
+-# quoted-pair   = "\" ( HTAB / SP / VCHAR / obs-text )
+-obs_text_re = OBS_TEXT
+-
+-# The '\\' between \x5b and \x5d is needed to escape \x5d (']')
+-qdtext_re = "[\t \x21\x23-\x5b\\\x5d-\x7e" + obs_text_re + "]"
+-
+-quoted_pair_re = r"\\" + "([\t " + vchar_re + obs_text_re + "])"
+-quoted_string_re = '"(?:(?:' + qdtext_re + ")|(?:" + quoted_pair_re + '))*"'
+-
+-quoted_string = re.compile(quoted_string_re)
+-quoted_pair = re.compile(quoted_pair_re)
+-
+-
+ def undquote(value):
+     if value.startswith('"') and value.endswith('"'):
+         # So it claims to be DQUOTE'ed, let's validate that
+-        matches = quoted_string.match(value)
++        matches = QUOTED_STRING_RE.match(value)
+ 
+         if matches and matches.end() == len(value):
+             # Remove the DQUOTE's from the value
+@@ -249,7 +227,7 @@ def undquote(value):
+ 
+             # Remove all backslashes that are followed by a valid vchar or
+             # obs-text
+-            value = quoted_pair.sub(r"\1", value)
++            value = QUOTED_PAIR_RE.sub(r"\1", value)
+ 
+             return value
+     elif not value.startswith('"') and not value.endswith('"'):

component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-2.patch

+From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:32:24 -0700
+Subject: Be more strict in parsing Content-Length
+
+Validate that we are only parsing digits and nothing else. RFC7230 is
+explicit in that the Content-Length can only exist of 1*DIGIT and may
+not include any additional sign information.
+
+The Python int() function parses `+10` as `10` which means we were more
+lenient than the standard intended.
+
+Part of CVE-2022-24761
+---
+ src/waitress/parser.py | 12 ++++++------
+ tests/test_parser.py   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/waitress/parser.py b/src/waitress/parser.py
+index 765fe59..acaf494 100644
+--- a/src/waitress/parser.py
++++ b/src/waitress/parser.py
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ from io import BytesIO
+ from waitress.buffers import OverflowableBuffer
+ from waitress.compat import tostr, unquote_bytes_to_wsgi, urlparse
+ from waitress.receiver import ChunkedReceiver, FixedStreamReceiver
++from waitress.rfc7230 import HEADER_FIELD_RE, ONLY_DIGIT_RE
+ from waitress.utilities import (
+     BadRequest,
+     RequestEntityTooLarge,
+@@ -29,8 +30,6 @@ from waitress.utilities import (
+     ServerNotImplemented,
+     find_double_newline,
+ )
+-from .rfc7230 import HEADER_FIELD
+-
+ 
+ class ParsingError(Exception):
+     pass
+@@ -209,7 +208,7 @@ class HTTPRequestParser(object):
+ 
+         headers = self.headers
+         for line in lines:
+-            header = HEADER_FIELD.match(line)
++            header = HEADER_FIELD_RE.match(line)
+ 
+             if not header:
+                 raise ParsingError("Invalid header")
+@@ -299,11 +298,12 @@ class HTTPRequestParser(object):
+                 self.connection_close = True
+ 
+         if not self.chunked:
+-            try:
+-                cl = int(headers.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", 0))
+-            except ValueError:
++            cl = headers.get("CONTENT_LENGTH", "0")
++
++            if not ONLY_DIGIT_RE.match(cl.encode("latin-1")):
+                 raise ParsingError("Content-Length is invalid")
+ 
++            cl = int(cl)
+             self.content_length = cl
+             if cl > 0:
+                 buf = OverflowableBuffer(self.adj.inbuf_overflow)
+diff --git a/tests/test_parser.py b/tests/test_parser.py
+index 91837c7..eabf353 100644
+--- a/tests/test_parser.py
++++ b/tests/test_parser.py
+@@ -194,6 +194,30 @@ class TestHTTPRequestParser(unittest.TestCase):
+         else:  # pragma: nocover
+             self.assertTrue(False)
+ 
++    def test_parse_header_bad_content_length_plus(self):
++        from waitress.parser import ParsingError
++
++        data = b"GET /foobar HTTP/8.4\r\ncontent-length: +10\r\n"
++
++        try:
++            self.parser.parse_header(data)
++        except ParsingError as e:
++            self.assertIn("Content-Length is invalid", e.args[0])
++        else:  # pragma: nocover
++            self.assertTrue(False)
++
++    def test_parse_header_bad_content_length_minus(self):
++        from waitress.parser import ParsingError
++
++        data = b"GET /foobar HTTP/8.4\r\ncontent-length: -10\r\n"
++
++        try:
++            self.parser.parse_header(data)
++        except ParsingError as e:
++            self.assertIn("Content-Length is invalid", e.args[0])
++        else:  # pragma: nocover
++            self.assertTrue(False)
++
+     def test_parse_header_multiple_content_length(self):
+         from waitress.parser import ParsingError
+ 

component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-3.patch

+From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:35:01 -0700
+Subject: Update tests to remove invalid chunked encoding chunk-size
+
+RFC7230 states the following:
+
+     chunk          = chunk-size [ chunk-ext ] CRLF
+                      chunk-data CRLF
+     chunk-size     = 1*HEXDIG
+
+Where chunk-ext is:
+
+     chunk-ext      = *( ";" chunk-ext-name [ "=" chunk-ext-val ] )
+
+Only if there is a chunk-ext should there be a `;` after the 1*HEXDIG.
+And a chunk-ext that is empty is invalid.
+
+Part of CVE-2022-24761
+---
+ tests/test_functional.py | 6 +++---
+ tests/test_parser.py     | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/test_functional.py b/tests/test_functional.py
+index e894497..7a54b22 100644
+--- a/tests/test_functional.py
++++ b/tests/test_functional.py
+@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ class EchoTests(object):
+         self.assertFalse("transfer-encoding" in headers)
+ 
+     def test_chunking_request_with_content(self):
+-        control_line = b"20;\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
++        control_line = b"20\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
+         s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+         expected = s * 12
+         header = tobytes("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n")
+@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ class EchoTests(object):
+         self.assertFalse("transfer-encoding" in headers)
+ 
+     def test_broken_chunked_encoding(self):
+-        control_line = "20;\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
++        control_line = "20\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
+         s = "This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+         to_send = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
+         to_send += control_line + s + "\r\n"
+@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ class EchoTests(object):
+         self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+ 
+     def test_broken_chunked_encoding_missing_chunk_end(self):
+-        control_line = "20;\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
++        control_line = "20\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
+         s = "This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+         to_send = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
+         to_send += control_line + s
+diff --git a/tests/test_parser.py b/tests/test_parser.py
+index eabf353..420f280 100644
+--- a/tests/test_parser.py
++++ b/tests/test_parser.py
+@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ class TestHTTPRequestParser(unittest.TestCase):
+             b"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n"
+             b"X-Foo: 1\r\n"
+             b"\r\n"
+-            b"1d;\r\n"
++            b"1d\r\n"
+             b"This string has 29 characters\r\n"
+             b"0\r\n\r\n"
+         )

component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-4.patch

+From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:42:51 -0700
+Subject: Error when receiving back Chunk Extension
+
+Waitress discards chunked extensions and does no further processing on
+them, however it failed to validate that the chunked encoding extension
+did not contain invalid data.
+
+We now validate that if there are any chunked extensions that they are
+well-formed, if they are not and contain invalid characters, then
+Waitress will now correctly return a Bad Request and stop any further
+processing of the request.
+
+Part of CVE-2022-24761
+---
+ src/waitress/receiver.py | 11 ++++++++++-
+ tests/test_functional.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/test_receiver.py   | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/waitress/receiver.py b/src/waitress/receiver.py
+index 5d1568d..106dbc7 100644
+--- a/src/waitress/receiver.py
++++ b/src/waitress/receiver.py
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ """Data Chunk Receiver
+ """
+ 
++from waitress.rfc7230 import CHUNK_EXT_RE, ONLY_HEXDIG_RE
+ from waitress.utilities import BadRequest, find_double_newline
+ 
+ 
+@@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
+                     s = b""
+                 else:
+                     self.chunk_end = b""
++
+                     if pos == 0:
+                         # Chop off the terminating CR LF from the chunk
+                         s = s[2:]
+@@ -140,7 +142,14 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
+                         semi = line.find(b";")
+ 
+                         if semi >= 0:
+-                            # discard extension info.
++                            extinfo = line[semi:]
++                            valid_ext_info = CHUNK_EXT_RE.match(extinfo)
++
++                            if not valid_ext_info:
++                                self.error = BadRequest("Invalid chunk extension")
++                                self.all_chunks_received = True
++
++                                break
+                             line = line[:semi]
+                         try:
+                             sz = int(line.strip(), 16)  # hexadecimal
+diff --git a/tests/test_functional.py b/tests/test_functional.py
+index 7a54b22..853942c 100644
+--- a/tests/test_functional.py
++++ b/tests/test_functional.py
+@@ -345,6 +345,28 @@ class EchoTests(object):
+         self.send_check_error(to_send)
+         self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+ 
++    def test_broken_chunked_encoding_invalid_extension(self):
++        control_line = b"20;invalid=\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
++        s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
++        to_send = b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
++        to_send += control_line + s + b"\r\n"
++        self.connect()
++        self.sock.send(to_send)
++        with self.sock.makefile("rb", 0) as fp:
++            line, headers, response_body = read_http(fp)
++            self.assertline(line, "400", "Bad Request", "HTTP/1.1")
++            cl = int(headers["content-length"])
++            self.assertEqual(cl, len(response_body))
++            self.assertIn(b"Invalid chunk extension", response_body)
++            self.assertEqual(
++                sorted(headers.keys()),
++                ["connection", "content-length", "content-type", "date", "server"],
++            )
++            self.assertEqual(headers["content-type"], "text/plain")
++            # connection has been closed
++            self.send_check_error(to_send)
++            self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
++
+     def test_broken_chunked_encoding_missing_chunk_end(self):
+         control_line = "20\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
+         s = "This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+diff --git a/tests/test_receiver.py b/tests/test_receiver.py
+index b4910bb..a6261ea 100644
+--- a/tests/test_receiver.py
++++ b/tests/test_receiver.py
+@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+ import unittest
+ 
++import pytest
++
+ 
+ class TestFixedStreamReceiver(unittest.TestCase):
+     def _makeOne(self, cl, buf):
+@@ -226,6 +228,41 @@ class TestChunkedReceiver(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual(inst.error, None)
+ 
+ 
++class TestChunkedReceiverParametrized:
++    def _makeOne(self, buf):
++        from waitress.receiver import ChunkedReceiver
++
++        return ChunkedReceiver(buf)
++
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++        "invalid_extension", [b"\n", b"invalid=", b"\r", b"invalid = true"]
++    )
++    def test_received_invalid_extensions(self, invalid_extension):
++        from waitress.utilities import BadRequest
++
++        buf = DummyBuffer()
++        inst = self._makeOne(buf)
++        data = b"4;" + invalid_extension + b"\r\ntest\r\n"
++        result = inst.received(data)
++        assert result == len(data)
++        assert inst.error.__class__ == BadRequest
++        assert inst.error.body == "Invalid chunk extension"
++
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++        "valid_extension", [b"test", b"valid=true", b"valid=true;other=true"]
++    )
++    def test_received_valid_extensions(self, valid_extension):
++        # While waitress may ignore extensions in Chunked Encoding, we do want
++        # to make sure that we don't fail when we do encounter one that is
++        # valid
++        buf = DummyBuffer()
++        inst = self._makeOne(buf)
++        data = b"4;" + valid_extension + b"\r\ntest\r\n"
++        result = inst.received(data)
++        assert result == len(data)
++        assert inst.error == None
++
++
+ class DummyBuffer(object):
+     def __init__(self, data=None):
+         if data is None:

component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-5.patch

+From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 18:48:26 -0700
+Subject: Validate chunk size in Chunked Encoding are HEXDIG
+
+RFC7230 states that a chunk-size should be 1*HEXDIG, this is now
+validated before passing the resulting string to int() which would also
+parse other formats for hex, such as: `0x01` as `1` and `+0x01` as `1`.
+This would lead to a potential for a frontend proxy server and waitress
+to disagree on where a chunk started and ended, thereby potentially
+leading to request smuggling.
+
+With the increased validation if the size is not just hex digits,
+Waitress now returns a Bad Request and stops processing the request.
+
+Part of CVE-2022-24761
+---
+ src/waitress/receiver.py | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
+ tests/test_functional.py | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/test_receiver.py   | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/waitress/receiver.py b/src/waitress/receiver.py
+index 106dbc7..9e4bffe 100644
+--- a/src/waitress/receiver.py
++++ b/src/waitress/receiver.py
+@@ -150,12 +150,21 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
+                                 self.all_chunks_received = True
+ 
+                                 break
++
+                             line = line[:semi]
+-                        try:
+-                            sz = int(line.strip(), 16)  # hexadecimal
+-                        except ValueError:  # garbage in input
+-                            self.error = BadRequest("garbage in chunked encoding input")
+-                            sz = 0
++
++                        # Remove any whitespace
++                        line = line.strip()
++
++                        if not ONLY_HEXDIG_RE.match(line):
++                            self.error = BadRequest("Invalid chunk size")
++                            self.all_chunks_received = True
++
++                            break
++
++                        # Can not fail due to matching against the regular
++                        # expression above
++                        sz = int(line.strip(), 16)  # hexadecimal
+ 
+                         if sz > 0:
+                             # Start a new chunk.
+diff --git a/tests/test_functional.py b/tests/test_functional.py
+index 853942c..448e0c0 100644
+--- a/tests/test_functional.py
++++ b/tests/test_functional.py
+@@ -345,6 +345,28 @@ class EchoTests(object):
+         self.send_check_error(to_send)
+         self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
+ 
++    def test_broken_chunked_encoding_invalid_hex(self):
++        control_line = b"0x20\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
++        s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
++        to_send = b"GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n\r\n"
++        to_send += control_line + s + b"\r\n"
++        self.connect()
++        self.sock.send(to_send)
++        with self.sock.makefile("rb", 0) as fp:
++            line, headers, response_body = read_http(fp)
++            self.assertline(line, "400", "Bad Request", "HTTP/1.1")
++            cl = int(headers["content-length"])
++            self.assertEqual(cl, len(response_body))
++            self.assertIn(b"Invalid chunk size", response_body)
++            self.assertEqual(
++                sorted(headers.keys()),
++                ["connection", "content-length", "content-type", "date", "server"],
++            )
++            self.assertEqual(headers["content-type"], "text/plain")
++            # connection has been closed
++            self.send_check_error(to_send)
++            self.assertRaises(ConnectionClosed, read_http, fp)
++
+     def test_broken_chunked_encoding_invalid_extension(self):
+         control_line = b"20;invalid=\r\n"  # 20 hex = 32 dec
+         s = b"This string has 32 characters.\r\n"
+diff --git a/tests/test_receiver.py b/tests/test_receiver.py
+index a6261ea..17328d4 100644
+--- a/tests/test_receiver.py
++++ b/tests/test_receiver.py
+@@ -262,6 +262,18 @@ class TestChunkedReceiverParametrized:
+         assert result == len(data)
+         assert inst.error == None
+ 
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_size", [b"0x04", b"+0x04", b"x04", b"+04"])
++    def test_received_invalid_size(self, invalid_size):
++        from waitress.utilities import BadRequest
++
++        buf = DummyBuffer()
++        inst = self._makeOne(buf)
++        data = invalid_size + b"\r\ntest\r\n"
++        result = inst.received(data)
++        assert result == len(data)
++        assert inst.error.__class__ == BadRequest
++        assert inst.error.body == "Invalid chunk size"
++
+ 
+ class DummyBuffer(object):
+     def __init__(self, data=None):

component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-6.patch

+From: Bert JW Regeer <bertjw@regeer.org>
+Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2022 19:16:23 -0700
+Subject: Remove extraneous calls to .strip() in Chunked Encoding
+
+To be valid chunked encoding we should not be removing any whitespace as
+the standard does not allow for optional whitespace.
+
+If whitespace is encountered in the wrong place, it should lead to a 400
+Bad Request instead.
+
+Part of CVE-2022-24761
+---
+ src/waitress/receiver.py | 6 +-----
+ tests/test_receiver.py   | 4 +++-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/waitress/receiver.py b/src/waitress/receiver.py
+index 9e4bffe..806ff87 100644
+--- a/src/waitress/receiver.py
++++ b/src/waitress/receiver.py
+@@ -135,7 +135,6 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
+                     line = s[:pos]
+                     s = s[pos + 2 :]
+                     self.control_line = b""
+-                    line = line.strip()
+ 
+                     if line:
+                         # Begin a new chunk.
+@@ -153,9 +152,6 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
+ 
+                             line = line[:semi]
+ 
+-                        # Remove any whitespace
+-                        line = line.strip()
+-
+                         if not ONLY_HEXDIG_RE.match(line):
+                             self.error = BadRequest("Invalid chunk size")
+                             self.all_chunks_received = True
+@@ -164,7 +160,7 @@ class ChunkedReceiver(object):
+ 
+                         # Can not fail due to matching against the regular
+                         # expression above
+-                        sz = int(line.strip(), 16)  # hexadecimal
++                        sz = int(line, 16)  # hexadecimal
+ 
+                         if sz > 0:
+                             # Start a new chunk.
+diff --git a/tests/test_receiver.py b/tests/test_receiver.py
+index 17328d4..014f785 100644
+--- a/tests/test_receiver.py
++++ b/tests/test_receiver.py
+@@ -262,7 +262,9 @@ class TestChunkedReceiverParametrized:
+         assert result == len(data)
+         assert inst.error == None
+ 
+-    @pytest.mark.parametrize("invalid_size", [b"0x04", b"+0x04", b"x04", b"+04"])
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
++        "invalid_size", [b"0x04", b"+0x04", b"x04", b"+04", b" 04", b" 0x04"]
++    )
+     def test_received_invalid_size(self, invalid_size):
+         from waitress.utilities import BadRequest
+ 

stack/erp5/buildout.cfg

@@ -701,7 +701,15 @@ Acquisition-patches = ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/Acqu
 Acquisition-patch-options = -p1
 python-magic-patches = ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/python_magic/magic.patch#de0839bffac17801e39b60873a6c2068
 python-magic-patch-options = -p1
-
+# backported security patches for waitress-1.4.4 from Debian 1.4.4-1.1+deb11u1 package.
+waitress-patches =
+  ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-1.patch#a0508880f24662e48a20ce3bcbf440c2
+  ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-2.patch#1ff77cede06d5bc39a9891d3647708a2
+  ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-3.patch#8bab78102e0c2966f6bcafde7819ea8e
+  ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-4.patch#d752ca3ac251ebfaf36c667b28744c20
+  ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-5.patch#ad2765822397cd1e28e02a68a52d7768
+  ${:_profile_base_location_}/../../component/egg-patch/waitress/CVE-2022-24761-6.patch#85fc9c4105eabee3ff71c800b2ddf63b
+waitress-patch-options = -p1
 
 # neoppod installs bin/coverage so we inject erp5 plugin here so that coverage script can use it in report
 [neoppod]
@@ -740,6 +748,7 @@ pysvn = 1.9.15+SlapOSPatched001
 python-ldap = 2.4.32+SlapOSPatched001
 python-magic = 0.4.12+SlapOSPatched001
 PyPDF2 = 1.26.0+SlapOSPatched001
+waitress = 1.4.4+SlapOSPatched006
 ## https://lab.nexedi.com/nexedi/slapos/merge_requests/648
 pylint = 1.4.4+SlapOSPatched002
 # astroid 1.4.1 breaks testDynamicClassGeneration
@@ -827,8 +836,6 @@ cloudpickle = 0.5.3
 dask = 0.18.1
 toolz = 0.9.0
 zope.globalrequest = 1.5
-waitress = 1.4.4
-
 Products.ZSQLMethods = 2.13.5
 fpconst = 0.7.2
 graphviz = 0.5.2