Commit 73b8b1cd authored by Benjamin Peterson's avatar Benjamin Peterson

url unquote the path before checking if it refers to a CGI script (closes #21766)

parent 49991deb
......@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ class CGIHTTPRequestHandler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
(and the next character is a '/' or the end of the string).
"""
collapsed_path = _url_collapse_path(self.path)
collapsed_path = _url_collapse_path(urllib.parse.unquote(self.path))
dir_sep = collapsed_path.find('/', 1)
head, tail = collapsed_path[:dir_sep], collapsed_path[dir_sep+1:]
if head in self.cgi_directories:
......
......@@ -461,6 +461,11 @@ class CGIHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
(res.read(), res.getheader('Content-type'), res.status))
self.assertEqual(os.environ['SERVER_SOFTWARE'], signature)
def test_urlquote_decoding_in_cgi_check(self):
res = self.request('/cgi-bin%2ffile1.py')
self.assertEqual((b'Hello World\n', 'text/html', 200),
(res.read(), res.getheader('Content-type'), res.status))
class SocketlessRequestHandler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
def __init__(self):
......
......@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ What's New in Python 3.2.6?
Library
-------
- Issue #21766: Prevent a security hole in CGIHTTPServer by URL unquoting paths
before checking for a CGI script at that path.
- Fix arbitrary memory access in JSONDecoder.raw_decode with a negative second
parameter. Bug reported by Guido Vranken.
......
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