Commit 8d24d77c authored by Benjamin Peterson's avatar Benjamin Peterson

url unquote the path before checking if it refers to a CGI script (closes #21766)

parent ce817cb3
......@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ class CGIHTTPRequestHandler(SimpleHTTPServer.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
path begins with one of the strings in self.cgi_directories
(and the next character is a '/' or the end of the string).
"""
collapsed_path = _url_collapse_path(self.path)
collapsed_path = _url_collapse_path(urllib.unquote(self.path))
dir_sep = collapsed_path.find('/', 1)
head, tail = collapsed_path[:dir_sep], collapsed_path[dir_sep+1:]
if head in self.cgi_directories:
......
......@@ -510,6 +510,11 @@ class CGIHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
(res.read(), res.getheader('Content-type'), res.status))
self.assertEqual(os.environ['SERVER_SOFTWARE'], signature)
def test_urlquote_decoding_in_cgi_check(self):
res = self.request('/cgi-bin%2ffile1.py')
self.assertEqual((b'Hello World\n', 'text/html', 200),
(res.read(), res.getheader('Content-type'), res.status))
class SimpleHTTPRequestHandlerTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
""" Test url parsing """
......
......@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ Core and Builtins
Library
-------
- Issue #21766: Prevent a security hole in CGIHTTPServer by URL unquoting paths
before checking for a CGI script at that path.
- Issue #21310: Fixed possible resource leak in failed open().
- Issue #21304: Backport the key derivation function hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac from
......
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