• Davide Caratti's avatar
    openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets · 7c0ea593
    Davide Caratti authored
    running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
    following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
    
     BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
     Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367
    
     CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
     Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
     Call Trace:
      dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
      print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
      kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
      ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
      ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
      do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
      ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
      ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
      genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
      genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
      netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
      genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
      netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
      netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
      sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
      ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
      ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
      __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
      do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
      entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
     RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
     Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
     RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
     RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
     RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
     R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
     R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0
    
     The buggy address belongs to the page:
     page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
     flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
     raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
     raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
     page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
    
     addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
      ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
    
     this frame has 2 objects:
      [32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
      [192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
    
     Memory state around the buggy address:
      ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
     >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                             ^
      ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    
    for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
    in the following call graph:
    
      ip_do_fragment()
        ip_skb_dst_mtu()
          ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
            ip_mtu_locked()
    
    the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
    turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
    the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
    in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
    
    Fixes: d52e5a7e ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt")
    Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
    Acked-by: default avatarEelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    7c0ea593
actions.c 38.4 KB