• Ben Seri's avatar
    Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element. · 0ae86454
    Ben Seri authored
    commit 06e7e776 upstream.
    
    In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function
    l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without
    initialization:
    
    struct l2cap_conf_efs efs;
    
    In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of
    these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the
    memcpy call that will write to the efs variable:
    
    ...
    case L2CAP_CONF_EFS:
    if (olen == sizeof(efs))
    memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen);
    ...
    
    The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that
    if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be
    added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built:
    
    l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs);
    
    So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an
    L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not
    sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be
    avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the
    attacker (16 bytes).
    
    This issue has been assigned CVE-2017-1000410
    
    Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
    Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
    Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarBen Seri <ben@armis.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    0ae86454
l2cap_core.c 179 KB