• David Woodhouse's avatar
    x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs · 18bb117d
    David Woodhouse authored
    commit c995efd5 upstream.
    
    On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU
    does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for
    where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace.
    
    This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks
    userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in
    userspace may then be executed speculatively.
    
    Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted
    to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this
    happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with
    IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI.
    
    On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the
    RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much
    overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting
    empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many
    other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full
    solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even
    when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be
    required on context switch.
    
    [ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and
      	changelog ]
    
    [js] backport to 4.4 -- __switch_to_asm does not exist there, we
         have to patch the switch_to macros for both x86_32 and x86_64.
    Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Acked-by: default avatarArjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
    Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
    Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
    Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
    Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
    Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com
    Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
    Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
    Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
    Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
    Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
    Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
    Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.ukSigned-off-by: default avatarJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    18bb117d
bugs.c 7.9 KB