Pull x86 confidential computing update from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add support for unaccepted memory as specified in the UEFI spec v2.9.

   The gist of it all is that Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidential
   computing guests define the notion of accepting memory before using
   it and thus preventing a whole set of attacks against such guests
   like memory replay and the like.

   There are a couple of strategies of how memory should be accepted -
   the current implementation does an on-demand way of accepting.

* tag 'x86_cc_for_v6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  virt: sevguest: Add CONFIG_CRYPTO dependency
  x86/efi: Safely enable unaccepted memory in UEFI
  x86/sev: Add SNP-specific unaccepted memory support
  x86/sev: Use large PSC requests if applicable
  x86/sev: Allow for use of the early boot GHCB for PSC requests
  x86/sev: Put PSC struct on the stack in prep for unaccepted memory support
  x86/sev: Fix calculation of end address based on number of pages
  x86/tdx: Add unaccepted memory support
  x86/tdx: Refactor try_accept_one()
  x86/tdx: Make _tdx_hypercall() and __tdx_module_call() available in boot stub
  efi/unaccepted: Avoid load_unaligned_zeropad() stepping into unaccepted memory
  efi: Add unaccepted memory support
  x86/boot/compressed: Handle unaccepted memory
  efi/libstub: Implement support for unaccepted memory
  efi/x86: Get full memory map in allocate_e820()
  mm: Add support for unaccepted memory