commit b11306b5 upstream.

Calculate the host-reserved cr4 bits at runtime based on the system's
capabilities (using logic similar to __do_cpuid_func()), and use the
dynamically generated mask for the reserved bit check in kvm_set_cr4()
instead using of the static CR4_RESERVED_BITS define.  This prevents
userspace from "enabling" features in cr4 that are not supported by the
system, e.g. by ignoring KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID and specifying a bogus
CPUID for the vCPU.

Allowing userspace to set unsupported bits in cr4 can lead to a variety
of undesirable behavior, e.g. failed VM-Enter, and in general increases
KVM's attack surface.  A crafty userspace can even abuse CR4.LA57 to
induce an unchecked #GP on a WRMSR.

On a platform without LA57 support:

  KVM_SET_CPUID2 // CPUID_7_0_ECX.LA57 = 1
  KVM_SET_SREGS  // CR4.LA57 = 1
  KVM_SET_MSRS   // KERNEL_GS_BASE = 0x0004000000000000
  KVM_RUN

leads to a #GP when writing KERNEL_GS_BASE into hardware:

  unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0xc0000102 (tried to write 0x0004000000000000)
  at rIP: 0xffffffffa00f239a (vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest+0x10a/0x1d0 [kvm_intel])
  Call Trace:
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x671/0x1c70 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x36b/0x5d0 [kvm]
   do_vfs_ioctl+0xa1/0x620
   ksys_ioctl+0x66/0x70
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x170
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7fc08133bf47

Note, the above sequence fails VM-Enter due to invalid guest state.
Userspace can allow VM-Enter to succeed (after the WRMSR #GP) by adding
a KVM_SET_SREGS w/ CR4.LA57=0 after KVM_SET_MSRS, in which case KVM will
technically leak the host's KERNEL_GS_BASE into the guest.  But, as
KERNEL_GS_BASE is a userspace-defined value/address, the leak is largely
benign as a malicious userspace would simply be exposing its own data to
the guest, and attacking a benevolent userspace would require multiple
bugs in the userspace VMM.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>