Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Add the necessary glue so that the kernel can run as a confidential
   SEV-SNP vTOM guest on Hyper-V. A vTOM guest basically splits the
   address space in two parts: encrypted and unencrypted. The use case
   being running unmodified guests on the Hyper-V confidential computing
   hypervisor

 - Double-buffer messages between the guest and the hardware PSP device
   so that no partial buffers are copied back'n'forth and thus potential
   message integrity and leak attacks are possible

 - Name the return value the sev-guest driver returns when the hw PSP
   device hasn't been called, explicitly

 - Cleanups

* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.4_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms
  init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done
  x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently
  Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls
  x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work
  x86/ioremap: Add hypervisor callback for private MMIO mapping in coco VM
  x86/sev: Change snp_guest_issue_request()'s fw_err argument
  virt/coco/sev-guest: Double-buffer messages
  crypto: ccp: Get rid of __sev_platform_init_locked()'s local function pointer
  crypto: ccp - Name -1 return value as SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL