• Nicolai Stange's avatar
    crypto: dh - introduce common code for built-in safe-prime group support · d902981f
    Nicolai Stange authored
    Recent work on NVME in-band authentication support ([1]) needs to invoke
    the "dh" KPP with the FFDHE safe-prime group parameters as specified in
    RFC 7919 and generate ephemeral keys suitable for the respective group. By
    coincidence, the requirements from NIST SP800-56Arev3,
    sec. 5.5.2 ("Assurance of Domain-Parameter Validity") basically boil down
    to disallowing any group parameters not among the approved safe-prime
    groups specified in either RFC 7919 or RFC 3526 in FIPS mode. Furthermore,
    SP800-56Arev3 specifies the respective security strength for each of the
    approved safe-prime groups, which has a direct impact on the minimum key
    lengths.
    
    In this light, it's desirable to introduce built-in support for the
    RFC 7919 safe-prime groups to the kernel's DH implementation, provide a
    SP800-56Arev3 conforming key generation primitive for those and render
    non-approved group parameters unusable in FIPS mode on the way.
    
    As suggested ([2]) in the course of discussion to previous iterations of
    this patchset, the built-in support for ffdhe groups would be best made
    available in the form of templates wrapping the existing "dh"
    implementation, one for each group specified by RFC 7919: ffdhe2048(dh),
    ffdhe3072(dh), ffdhe4096(dh), ffdhe6144(dh) and ffdhe8192(dh). As these
    templates differ only in the safe-prime constants they'd configure the
    inner "dh" transforms with, they can share almost all of their
    "dh"-wrapping template implementation code.
    
    Introduce this common code to dh_generic. The actual dump of the RFC 7919
    safe-prime constants will be deferred to the next patch in order to
    facilitate review. The ephemeral key generation primitive mentioned above
    likewise deserves a patch on its own, as does the mechanism by which
    unapproved groups are rendered unusable in FIPS mode.
    
    Define a struct dh_safe_prime container for specifying the individual
    templates' associated safe-prime group constants. All ffdheXYZ(dh) template
    instances will store a pointer to such a dh_safe_prime in their context
    areas each. Implement the common __dh_safe_prime_create() template
    instantiation helper. The intention is that the individual ffdheXYZ(dh)
    crypto_templates' ->create() implementations will simply forward any calls
    to __dh_safe_prime_create(), passing a suitable dh_safe_prime in addition
    to the received ->create() arguments. __dh_safe_prime_create() would then
    create and register a kpp_instance as appropriate, storing the given
    dh_safe_prime pointer alongside a crypto_kpp_spawn for the inner "dh"
    kpp_alg in the context area.
    
    As the ffdheXYZ(dh) kpp_instances are supposed to act as proxies to the
    inner "dh" kpp_alg, make each of their associated crypto_kpp transforms to
    in turn own an inner "dh" transform, a pointer to which gets stored in the
    context area. Setup and teardown are getting handled from the outer
    ->init_tfm() and ->exit_tfm() respectively.
    
    In order to achieve the overall goal and let the ffdheXYZ(dh) kpp_instances
    configure the inner "dh" transforms with the respective group parameters,
    make their common ->set_secret(), the new dh_safe_prime_set_secret(), fill
    in the P and G values before forwarding the call to the inner "dh"'s
    ->set_secret(). Note that the outer ->set_secret() can obtain the P value
    associated with the given ffdheXYZ(dh) kpp_instance by means of the
    dh_safe_prime referenced from the latter's context. The value of G OTOH
    always equals constant 2 for the safe-prime groups.
    
    Finally, make the remaining two kpp_alg primitives both operating on
    kpp_requests, i.e. ->generate_public_key() and ->compute_shared_secret(),
    to merely forward any request to the inner "dh" implementation. However, a
    kpp_request instance received from the outside cannot get simply passed
    on as-is, because its associated transform (crypto_kpp_reqtfm()) will have
    been set to the outer ffdheXYZ(dh) one. In order to handle this, reserve
    some space in the outer ffdheXYZ(dh) kpp_requests' context areas for in
    turn storing an inner kpp_request suitable for "dh" each. Make the outer
    ->generate_public_key() and ->compute_shared_secret() respectively to setup
    this inner kpp_request by means of the new dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req()
    helper before handing it over to the "dh" implementation for further
    processing. dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req() basically copies the outer
    kpp_request received from the outside over to the inner one, but installs
    the inner transform and its own ->complete() proxy callback therein. This
    completion callback, the new dh_safe_prime_complete_req(), doesn't do
    anything beyond completing the outer request. Note that there exist some
    examples in crypto/, which would simply install the completion handler
    from the outer request at the inner one in similar setups, e.g. seqiv.
    However, this would mean that the user-provided completion handler won't
    get called with the address of the outer kpp_request initially submitted
    and the handler might not be prepared for this. Users could certainly work
    around this by setting the callback ->data properly, but IMO it's cleaner
    this way. Furthermore, it might make sense to extend
    dh_safe_prime_complete_req() in the future and move e.g. those
    post-computation FIPS checks from the generic "dh" implementation to the
    ffdheXYZ(dh) templates.
    
    [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211202152358.60116-1-hare@suse.de
    [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211217055227.GA20698@gondor.apana.org.auSigned-off-by: default avatarNicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
    Reviewed-by: default avatarHannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    d902981f
dh.c 10.3 KB