• zhenwei pi's avatar
    crypto: public_key: fix overflow during implicit conversion · f985911b
    zhenwei pi authored
    Hit kernel warning like this, it can be reproduced by verifying 256
    bytes datafile by keyctl command, run script:
    RAWDATA=rawdata
    SIGDATA=sigdata
    
    modprobe pkcs8_key_parser
    
    rm -rf *.der *.pem *.pfx
    rm -rf $RAWDATA
    dd if=/dev/random of=$RAWDATA bs=256 count=1
    
    openssl req -nodes -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem \
      -subj "/C=CN/ST=GD/L=SZ/O=vihoo/OU=dev/CN=xx.com/emailAddress=yy@xx.com"
    
    KEY_ID=`openssl pkcs8 -in key.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -outform DER | keyctl \
      padd asymmetric 123 @s`
    
    keyctl pkey_sign $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1 > $SIGDATA
    keyctl pkey_verify $KEY_ID 0 $RAWDATA $SIGDATA enc=pkcs1 hash=sha1
    
    Then the kernel reports:
     WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 344556 at crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:540
       pkcs1pad_verify+0x160/0x190
     ...
     Call Trace:
      public_key_verify_signature+0x282/0x380
      ? software_key_query+0x12d/0x180
      ? keyctl_pkey_params_get+0xd6/0x130
      asymmetric_key_verify_signature+0x66/0x80
      keyctl_pkey_verify+0xa5/0x100
      do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
      entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
    
    The reason of this issue, in function 'asymmetric_key_verify_signature':
    '.digest_size(u8) = params->in_len(u32)' leads overflow of an u8 value,
    so use u32 instead of u8 for digest_size field. And reorder struct
    public_key_signature, it saves 8 bytes on a 64-bit machine.
    
    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
    Signed-off-by: default avatarzhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
    Reviewed-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
    f985911b
public_key.h 2.38 KB