Merge branch 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of...

Merge branch 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator fixes from Jason Donenfeld:

 - Some Kconfig changes resulted in BIG_KEYS being unselectable, which
   Justin sent a patch to fix.

 - Geert pointed out that moving to BLAKE2s bloated vmlinux on little
   machines, like m68k, so we now compensate for this.

 - Numerous style and house cleaning fixes, meant to have a cleaner base
   for future changes.

* 'random-5.17-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
  random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account()
  random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense
  random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
  random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants
  random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_
  random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants
  random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants
  random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global
  random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument
  random: remove incomplete last_data logic
  random: cleanup integer types
  random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction
  random: fix typo in comments
  lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size
  lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard
  lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries

crypto/Kconfig

@@ -1928,5 +1928,3 @@ source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
 source "certs/Kconfig"
 
 endif	# if CRYPTO
-
-source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"

drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c

@@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
 		static_identity->static_public, private_key);
 }
 
+static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
+{
+	struct blake2s_state state;
+	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
+	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
+	int i;
+
+	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
+		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
+	} else
+		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
+
+	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+}
+
 /* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
  *  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
  *  - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
@@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 		 ((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
 
 	/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
-	blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+	hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
 
 	if (!first_dst || !first_len)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
 	output[0] = 1;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
 
 	if (!second_dst || !second_len)
@@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 
 	/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
 
 	if (!third_dst || !third_len)
@@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
 
 	/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
 	output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
-	blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
-			BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 	memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
 
 out:

include/crypto/blake2s.h

@@ -101,7 +101,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
 	blake2s_final(&state, out);
 }
 
-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
-		     const size_t keylen);
-
 #endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */

include/trace/events/random.h

@@ -28,80 +28,71 @@ TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
 );
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
+	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
 		__field(	  int,	bytes			)
 		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
 		__entry->bytes		= bytes;
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
+	TP_printk("input pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
+		  __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP)
 );
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
+	TP_ARGS(bytes, IP)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int bits, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP),
+	TP_ARGS(bits, entropy_count, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
 		__field(	  int,	bits			)
 		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
 		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
 		__entry->bits		= bits;
 		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
-		  __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
+	TP_printk("input pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
+		  __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
+	TP_PROTO(int debit_bits),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
+	TP_ARGS( debit_bits),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
 		__field(	  int,	debit_bits		)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
 		__entry->debit_bits	= debit_bits;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
-		  __entry->debit_bits)
+	TP_printk("input pool: debit_bits %d", __entry->debit_bits)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
@@ -170,36 +161,31 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
 );
 
 DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
+	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
 
 	TP_STRUCT__entry(
-		__field( const char *,	pool_name		)
 		__field(	  int,	nbytes			)
 		__field(	  int,	entropy_count		)
 		__field(unsigned long,	IP			)
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
-		__entry->pool_name	= pool_name;
 		__entry->nbytes		= nbytes;
 		__entry->entropy_count	= entropy_count;
 		__entry->IP		= IP;
 	),
 
-	TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
-		  __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
-		  (void *)__entry->IP)
+	TP_printk("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
+		  __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
 );
 
 
 DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
-	TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
-		 unsigned long IP),
+	TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP),
 
-	TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
+	TP_ARGS(nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
 );
 
 TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,

lib/Kconfig

@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ config INDIRECT_IOMEM_FALLBACK
 	  mmio accesses when the IO memory address is not a registered
 	  emulated region.
 
+source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
+
 config CRC_CCITT
 	tristate "CRC-CCITT functions"
 	help

lib/crypto/Kconfig

 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
+menu "Crypto library routines"
+
 config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
 	tristate
 
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
 	tristate
-	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+	select XOR_BLOCKS
 	help
 	  This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
 	  ChaCha library interface that require the generic code as a
@@ -40,7 +42,8 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
-	tristate
+	tristate "ChaCha library interface"
+	depends on CRYPTO
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
 	help
@@ -65,7 +68,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
-	tristate
+	tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
 	help
@@ -100,7 +103,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
 	  of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
-	tristate
+	tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
 	help
@@ -109,14 +112,18 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
 	  is available and enabled.
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
-	tristate
+	tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
 	depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
+	depends on CRYPTO
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
+	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
 	tristate
 
 config CRYPTO_LIB_SM4
 	tristate
+
+endmenu

lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
  * #include <stdio.h>
  *
  * #include <openssl/evp.h>
- * #include <openssl/hmac.h>
  *
  * #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT	256
  *
@@ -58,16 +57,6 @@
  *	}
  *	printf("};\n\n");
  *
- *	printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
- *
- *	HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL);
- *	print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- *
- *	HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL);
- *	print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- *
- *	printf("};\n");
- *
  *	return 0;
  *}
  */
@@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
     0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
 };
 
-static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
-  { 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70,
-    0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79,
-    0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, },
-  { 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9,
-    0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f,
-    0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, },
-};
-
 bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
 {
 	u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
@@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (success) {
-		blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key));
-		success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-
-		blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf));
-		success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-
-		if (!success)
-			pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n");
-	}
-
 	return success;
 }

lib/crypto/blake2s.c

@@ -30,43 +30,6 @@ void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
 
-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
-		     const size_t keylen)
-{
-	struct blake2s_state state;
-	u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
-	u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
-	int i;
-
-	if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-		blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-		blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
-		blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
-	} else
-		memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
-		x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
-
-	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
-	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
-		x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
-
-	blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
-
-	memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac);
-
 static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
 {
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&

lib/sha1.c

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 #include <crypto/sha1.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
 #define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
 	__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
 	E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
-	B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
+	B = ror32(B, 2); \
+	TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
 
 #define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E)  SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
 #define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@
 void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 {
 	__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
+	unsigned int i = 0;
 
 	A = digest[0];
 	B = digest[1];
@@ -92,94 +95,24 @@ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
 	E = digest[4];
 
 	/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
-	T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
+	for (; i < 16; ++i)
+		T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
-	T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 20; ++i)
+		T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 2 */
-	T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 40; ++i)
+		T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 3 */
-	T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 60; ++i)
+		T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	/* Round 4 */
-	T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
-	T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
-	T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
-	T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
-	T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
-	T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
+	for (; i < 80; ++i)
+		T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
 
 	digest[0] += A;
 	digest[1] += B;