apparmor: refactor profile rules and attachments

In preparation for moving from a single set of rules and a single
attachment to multiple rulesets and attachments separate from the
profile refactor attachment information and ruleset info into their
own structures.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c

@@ -611,30 +611,29 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_ns_revision_fops = {
 static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
 			     const char *match_str, size_t match_len)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	struct aa_perms tmp = { };
-	struct aa_dfa *dfa;
 	aa_state_t state = DFA_NOMATCH;
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return;
-	if (profile->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
-		dfa = profile->file.dfa;
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa,
-					 profile->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+	if (rules->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa,
+					 rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 					 match_str + 1, match_len - 1);
 		if (state) {
 			struct path_cond cond = { };
 
-			tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(profile->file), state, &cond));
+			tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
 		}
-	} else if (profile->policy.dfa) {
-		if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, *match_str))
+	} else if (rules->policy.dfa) {
+		if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str))
 			return;	/* no change to current perms */
-		dfa = profile->policy.dfa;
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->policy.start[0],
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa,
+					 rules->policy.start[0],
 					 match_str, match_len);
 		if (state)
-			tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+			tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 	}
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 	aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp);
@@ -1093,9 +1092,9 @@ static int seq_profile_attach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	struct aa_proxy *proxy = seq->private;
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
 	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
-	if (profile->attach)
-		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach);
-	else if (profile->xmatch.dfa)
+	if (profile->attach.xmatch_str)
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach.xmatch_str);
+	else if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa)
 		seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n");
 	else
 		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);

security/apparmor/capability.c

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 		      int cap, int error)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	struct audit_cache *ent;
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 
@@ -72,13 +73,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (likely(!error)) {
 		/* test if auditing is being forced */
 		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
-			   !cap_raised(profile->caps.audit, cap)))
+			   !cap_raised(rules->caps.audit, cap)))
 			return 0;
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 	} else if (KILL_MODE(profile) ||
-		   cap_raised(profile->caps.kill, cap)) {
+		   cap_raised(rules->caps.kill, cap)) {
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-	} else if (cap_raised(profile->caps.quiet, cap) &&
+	} else if (cap_raised(rules->caps.quiet, cap) &&
 		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
 		/* quiet auditing */
@@ -114,10 +115,11 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
 			   unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	int error;
 
-	if (cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) &&
-	    !cap_raised(profile->caps.denied, cap))
+	if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) &&
+	    !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap))
 		error = 0;
 	else
 		error = -EPERM;

security/apparmor/file.c

@@ -224,11 +224,12 @@ int __aa_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_profile *profile, const char *name,
 		   u32 request, struct path_cond *cond, int flags,
 		   struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	int e = 0;
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return 0;
-	aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), profile->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+	aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 		     name, cond, perms);
 	if (request & ~perms->allow)
 		e = -EACCES;
@@ -316,6 +317,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     const struct path *target, char *buffer2,
 			     struct path_cond *cond)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	const char *lname, *tname = NULL;
 	struct aa_perms lperms = {}, perms;
 	const char *info = NULL;
@@ -336,16 +338,16 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
 
 	error = -EACCES;
 	/* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */
-	state = aa_str_perms(&(profile->file),
-			     profile->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname,
+	state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file),
+			     rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], lname,
 			     cond, &lperms);
 
 	if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK))
 		goto audit;
 
 	/* test to see if target can be paired with link */
-	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
-	aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), state, tname, cond, &perms);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state);
+	aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, tname, cond, &perms);
 
 	/* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry
 	 * in the link pair.
@@ -367,7 +369,7 @@ static int profile_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	/* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are
 	 * a subset of the allowed permissions on target.
 	 */
-	aa_str_perms(&(profile->file), profile->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
+	aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 		     tname, cond, &perms);
 
 	/* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */

security/apparmor/include/label.h

@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ for ((I).i = (I).j = 0;							\
 	struct label_it i;						\
 	int ret = 0;							\
 	label_for_each(i, (L), profile) {				\
-		if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, (C))) {			\
+		if (RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, (C))) {		\
 			ret = 1;					\
 			break;						\
 		}							\
@@ -357,9 +357,10 @@ static inline const char *aa_label_str_split(const char *str)
 
 
 struct aa_perms;
-int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
-		   aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
-		   struct aa_perms *perms);
+struct aa_ruleset;
+int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+		   struct aa_label *label, aa_state_t state, bool subns,
+		   u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms);
 
 
 /**

security/apparmor/include/perms.h

@@ -207,7 +207,8 @@ void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     struct aa_perms *perms);
 void aa_perms_accum(struct aa_perms *accum, struct aa_perms *addend);
 void aa_perms_accum_raw(struct aa_perms *accum, struct aa_perms *addend);
-void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
+void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			    struct aa_ruleset *rules, struct aa_label *label,
 			    int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms);
 int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target,
 			  u32 request, int type, u32 *deny,

security/apparmor/include/policy.h

@@ -123,6 +123,43 @@ struct aa_data {
 	struct rhash_head head;
 };
 
+/* struct aa_ruleset - data covering mediation rules
+ * @size: the memory consumed by this ruleset
+ * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+ * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+ * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+ * @secmark_count: number of secmark entries
+ * @secmark: secmark label match info
+ */
+struct aa_ruleset {
+	int size;
+
+	/* TODO: merge policy and file */
+	struct aa_policydb policy;
+	struct aa_policydb file;
+	struct aa_caps caps;
+
+	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+
+	int secmark_count;
+	struct aa_secmark *secmark;
+};
+
+/* struct aa_attachment - data and rules for a profiles attachment
+ * @xmatch_str: human readable attachment string
+ * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
+ * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
+ * @xattr_count: number of xattrs in table
+ * @xattrs: table of xattrs
+ */
+struct aa_attachment {
+	const char *xmatch_str;
+	struct aa_policydb xmatch;
+	unsigned int xmatch_len;
+	int xattr_count;
+	char **xattrs;
+};
 
 /* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
  * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
@@ -130,18 +167,13 @@ struct aa_data {
  * @parent: parent of profile
  * @ns: namespace the profile is in
  * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
- * @attach: human readable attachment string
- * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
- * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
+ *
  * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
  * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
  * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior
  * @disconnected: what to prepend if attach_disconnected is specified
- * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
- * @policy: general match rules governing policy
- * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
- * @caps: capabilities for the profile
- * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+ * @attach: attachment rules for the profile
+ * @rules: rules to be enforced
  *
  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
  * @dirname: name of the profile dir in apparmorfs
@@ -166,27 +198,13 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	struct aa_ns *ns;
 	const char *rename;
 
-	const char *attach;
-	struct aa_policydb xmatch;
-	unsigned int xmatch_len;
-
 	enum audit_mode audit;
 	long mode;
 	u32 path_flags;
 	const char *disconnected;
-	int size;
 
-	struct aa_policydb policy;
-	struct aa_policydb file;
-	struct aa_caps caps;
-
-	int xattr_count;
-	char **xattrs;
-
-	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
-
-	int secmark_count;
-	struct aa_secmark *secmark;
+	struct aa_attachment attach;
+	struct aa_ruleset rules;
 
 	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
 	unsigned char *hash;
@@ -247,24 +265,24 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
 	return labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(&p->label));
 }
 
-static inline aa_state_t PROFILE_MEDIATES(struct aa_profile *profile,
-					    unsigned char class)
+static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES(struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+				       unsigned char class)
 {
 	if (class <= AA_CLASS_LAST)
-		return profile->policy.start[class];
+		return rules->policy.start[class];
 	else
-		return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa,
-					profile->policy.start[0], &class, 1);
+		return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa,
+					rules->policy.start[0], &class, 1);
 }
 
-static inline aa_state_t PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
-					     u16 AF) {
-	aa_state_t state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+static inline aa_state_t RULE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_ruleset *rules, u16 AF)
+{
+	aa_state_t state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
 	__be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
 
 	if (!state)
 		return DFA_NOMATCH;
-	return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
 }
 
 /**

security/apparmor/ipc.c

@@ -78,19 +78,20 @@ static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			       struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	struct aa_perms perms;
 	aa_state_t state;
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
-	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
+	    !RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
 		return 0;
 
 	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
 	/* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
-	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
-			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
+	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa,
+			    rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
 			    aad(sa)->signal);
-	aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
+	aa_label_match(profile, rules, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
 }

security/apparmor/label.c

@@ -1266,20 +1266,21 @@ static inline bool label_is_visible(struct aa_profile *profile,
  * visibility test.
  */
 static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 struct aa_ruleset *rules,
 					 struct aa_profile *tp,
 					 aa_state_t state)
 {
 	const char *ns_name;
 
 	if (profile->ns == tp->ns)
-		return aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+		return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
 
 	/* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
 	ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, ":", 1);
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, ns_name);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, ":", 1);
-	return aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, ns_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	return aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1298,6 +1299,7 @@ static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *        check to be stacked.
  */
 static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				struct aa_ruleset *rules,
 				struct aa_label *label,
 				aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
 				struct aa_perms *perms)
@@ -1309,7 +1311,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
 			continue;
-		state = match_component(profile, tp, state);
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, state);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
 		goto next;
@@ -1323,12 +1325,12 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
 			continue;
-		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, "//&");
-		state = match_component(profile, tp, state);
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, "//&");
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, state);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
 	}
-	*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+	*perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms);
 	if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -1343,6 +1345,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 /**
  * label_components_match - find perms for all subcomponents of a label
  * @profile: profile to find perms for
+ * @rules: ruleset to search
  * @label: label to check access permissions for
  * @start: state to start match in
  * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns
@@ -1356,6 +1359,7 @@ static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *        check to be stacked.
  */
 static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
+				  struct aa_ruleset *rules,
 				  struct aa_label *label, aa_state_t start,
 				  bool subns, u32 request,
 				  struct aa_perms *perms)
@@ -1369,7 +1373,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
 			continue;
-		state = match_component(profile, tp, start);
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, start);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
 		goto next;
@@ -1379,16 +1383,16 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return 0;
 
 next:
-	tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+	tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 	aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
 	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
 			continue;
-		state = match_component(profile, tp, start);
+		state = match_component(profile, rules, tp, start);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
-		tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+		tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 		aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
 	}
@@ -1406,6 +1410,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 /**
  * aa_label_match - do a multi-component label match
  * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @rules: ruleset to search
  * @label: label to match (NOT NULL)
  * @state: state to start in
  * @subns: whether to match subns components
@@ -1414,18 +1419,18 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
  *
  * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state
  */
-int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
-		   aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
-		   struct aa_perms *perms)
+int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+		   struct aa_label *label, aa_state_t state, bool subns,
+		   u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
-	int error = label_compound_match(profile, label, state, subns, request,
-					 perms);
+	int error = label_compound_match(profile, rules, label, state, subns,
+					 request, perms);
 	if (!error)
 		return error;
 
 	*perms = allperms;
-	return label_components_match(profile, label, state, subns, request,
-				      perms);
+	return label_components_match(profile, rules, label, state, subns,
+				      request, perms);
 }
 
 

security/apparmor/lib.c

@@ -331,16 +331,18 @@ void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms)
 		perms->prompt = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
 }
 
-void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
+void aa_profile_match_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
+			    struct aa_ruleset *rules,
+			    struct aa_label *label,
 			    int type, u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
 	/* TODO: doesn't yet handle extended types */
 	aa_state_t state;
 
-	state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
-			    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_LABEL],
+	state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa,
+			    rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_LABEL],
 			    type);
-	aa_label_match(profile, label, state, false, request, perms);
+	aa_label_match(profile, rules, label, state, false, request, perms);
 }
 
 
@@ -355,7 +357,8 @@ int aa_profile_label_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target,
 	aad(sa)->peer = &target->label;
 	aad(sa)->request = request;
 
-	aa_profile_match_label(profile, &target->label, type, request, &perms);
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, &profile->rules, &target->label, type,
+			       request, &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 	*deny |= request & perms.deny;
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, aa_audit_perms_cb);

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
 				continue;
 			*effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
-						   profile->caps.allow);
+						   profile->rules.caps.allow);
 			*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
-						   profile->caps.allow);
+						   profile->rules.caps.allow);
 		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();

security/apparmor/mount.c

@@ -303,13 +303,14 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
 {
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
 	const char *mntpnt = NULL, *info = NULL;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	int pos, error;
 
 	AA_BUG(!profile);
 	AA_BUG(!mntpath);
 	AA_BUG(!buffer);
 
-	if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
 		return 0;
 
 	error = aa_path_name(mntpath, path_flags(profile, mntpath), buffer,
@@ -324,8 +325,8 @@ static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	}
 
 	error = -EACCES;
-	pos = do_match_mnt(&profile->policy,
-			   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+	pos = do_match_mnt(&rules->policy,
+			   rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 			   mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms);
 	if (pos) {
 		info = mnt_info_table[pos];
@@ -363,7 +364,7 @@ static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 	AA_BUG(!profile);
 	AA_BUG(devpath && !devbuffer);
 
-	if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(&profile->rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (devpath) {
@@ -565,6 +566,7 @@ int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name,
 static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 			  char *buffer)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
 	const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 	aa_state_t state;
@@ -573,7 +575,7 @@ static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 	AA_BUG(!profile);
 	AA_BUG(!path);
 
-	if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+	if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
 		return 0;
 
 	error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), buffer, &name,
@@ -581,10 +583,10 @@ static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 	if (error)
 		goto audit;
 
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
-			     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa,
+			     rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 			     name);
-	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 	if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
 		error = -EACCES;
 
@@ -624,6 +626,7 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					const struct path *old_path,
 					char *old_buffer)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
 	const char *trans_name = NULL;
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
@@ -635,7 +638,7 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	AA_BUG(!old_path);
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
-	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
+	    !RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_MOUNT))
 		return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label);
 
 	error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
@@ -650,12 +653,12 @@ static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		goto audit;
 
 	error = -EACCES;
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
-			     profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa,
+			     rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
 			     new_name);
-	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
-	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->policy.dfa, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 
 	if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow)
 		error = 0;

security/apparmor/net.c

@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 		       u32 request, u16 family, int type)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
 	aa_state_t state;
 	__be16 buffer[2];
@@ -117,15 +118,15 @@ int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return 0;
-	state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
 	if (!state)
 		return 0;
 
 	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
 	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
 				 4);
-	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&profile->policy, state);
+	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
@@ -216,25 +217,26 @@ static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
 {
 	int i, ret;
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 
-	if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
+	if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
-		if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
-			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++) {
+		if (!rules->secmark[i].secid) {
+			ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&rules->secmark[i]);
 			if (ret)
 				return ret;
 		}
 
-		if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
-		    profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
-			if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
+		if (rules->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
+		    rules->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
+			if (rules->secmark[i].deny)
 				perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
 			else
 				perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
 
-			if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
+			if (rules->secmark[i].audit)
 				perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
 		}
 	}

security/apparmor/policy.c

@@ -193,6 +193,30 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
 	kfree_sensitive(data);
 }
 
+static void free_attachment(struct aa_attachment *attach)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++)
+		kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs[i]);
+	kfree_sensitive(attach->xattrs);
+	aa_destroy_policydb(&attach->xmatch);
+}
+
+static void free_ruleset(struct aa_ruleset *rules)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	aa_destroy_policydb(&rules->file);
+	aa_destroy_policydb(&rules->policy);
+	aa_free_cap_rules(&rules->caps);
+	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&rules->rlimits);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rules->secmark_count; i++)
+		kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark[i].label);
+	kfree_sensitive(rules->secmark);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_free_profile - free a profile
  * @profile: the profile to free  (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -206,7 +230,6 @@ static void aa_free_data(void *ptr, void *arg)
 void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
 	struct rhashtable *rht;
-	int i;
 
 	AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
 
@@ -220,19 +243,10 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_put_ns(profile->ns);
 	kfree_sensitive(profile->rename);
 
-	aa_destroy_policydb(&profile->file);
-	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
-	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++)
-		kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs[i]);
-	kfree_sensitive(profile->xattrs);
-	for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++)
-		kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark[i].label);
-	kfree_sensitive(profile->secmark);
+	free_attachment(&profile->attach);
+	free_ruleset(&profile->rules);
 	kfree_sensitive(profile->dirname);
-	aa_destroy_policydb(&profile->xmatch);
-	aa_destroy_policydb(&profile->policy);
+
 	if (profile->data) {
 		rht = profile->data;
 		profile->data = NULL;
@@ -544,8 +558,8 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat,
 	/* released on free_profile */
 	rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent));
 	profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns);
-	profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
-	profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+	profile->rules.file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+	profile->rules.policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
 
 	mutex_lock_nested(&profile->ns->lock, profile->ns->level);
 	p = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, bname);

security/apparmor/policy_ns.c

@@ -91,8 +91,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *alloc_unconfined(const char *name)
 	profile->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
 		FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED;
 	profile->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED;
-	profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
-	profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+	profile->rules.file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+	profile->rules.policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
 
 	return profile;
 }

security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c

@@ -556,12 +556,12 @@ static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 
 		if (unpack_array(e, NULL, &size) != TRI_TRUE)
 			goto fail;
-		profile->xattr_count = size;
-		profile->xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!profile->xattrs)
+		profile->attach.xattr_count = size;
+		profile->attach.xattrs = kcalloc(size, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!profile->attach.xattrs)
 			goto fail;
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->xattrs[i], NULL))
+			if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->attach.xattrs[i], NULL))
 				goto fail;
 		}
 		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
@@ -579,6 +579,7 @@ static bool unpack_xattrs(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 
 static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	void *pos = e->pos;
 	u16 size;
 	int i;
@@ -587,19 +588,19 @@ static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 		if (unpack_array(e, NULL, &size) != TRI_TRUE)
 			goto fail;
 
-		profile->secmark = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct aa_secmark),
+		rules->secmark = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct aa_secmark),
 					   GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!profile->secmark)
+		if (!rules->secmark)
 			goto fail;
 
-		profile->secmark_count = size;
+		rules->secmark_count = size;
 
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			if (!unpack_u8(e, &profile->secmark[i].audit, NULL))
+			if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].audit, NULL))
 				goto fail;
-			if (!unpack_u8(e, &profile->secmark[i].deny, NULL))
+			if (!unpack_u8(e, &rules->secmark[i].deny, NULL))
 				goto fail;
-			if (!unpack_strdup(e, &profile->secmark[i].label, NULL))
+			if (!unpack_strdup(e, &rules->secmark[i].label, NULL))
 				goto fail;
 		}
 		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
@@ -611,12 +612,12 @@ static bool unpack_secmark(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 	return true;
 
 fail:
-	if (profile->secmark) {
+	if (rules->secmark) {
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
-			kfree(profile->secmark[i].label);
-		kfree(profile->secmark);
-		profile->secmark_count = 0;
-		profile->secmark = NULL;
+			kfree(rules->secmark[i].label);
+		kfree(rules->secmark);
+		rules->secmark_count = 0;
+		rules->secmark = NULL;
 	}
 
 	e->pos = pos;
@@ -634,7 +635,7 @@ static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 		u32 tmp = 0;
 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
 			goto fail;
-		profile->rlimits.mask = tmp;
+		profile->rules.rlimits.mask = tmp;
 
 		if (unpack_array(e, NULL, &size) != TRI_TRUE ||
 		    size > RLIM_NLIMITS)
@@ -644,7 +645,7 @@ static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
 			int a = aa_map_resource(i);
 			if (!unpack_u64(e, &tmp2, NULL))
 				goto fail;
-			profile->rlimits.limits[a].rlim_max = tmp2;
+			profile->rules.rlimits.limits[a].rlim_max = tmp2;
 		}
 		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
 			goto fail;
@@ -816,6 +817,7 @@ static int datacmp(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg, const void *obj)
  */
 static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules;
 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 	const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
 	const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
@@ -850,27 +852,30 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!profile)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	rules = &profile->rules;
 
 	/* profile renaming is optional */
 	(void) unpack_str(e, &profile->rename, "rename");
 
 	/* attachment string is optional */
-	(void) unpack_str(e, &profile->attach, "attach");
+	(void) unpack_str(e, &profile->attach.xmatch_str, "attach");
 
 	/* xmatch is optional and may be NULL */
-	error = unpack_pdb(e, &profile->xmatch, false, false, &info);
-	if (error)
+	error = unpack_pdb(e, &profile->attach.xmatch, false, false, &info);
+	if (error) {
+		info = "bad xmatch";
 		goto fail;
+	}
 
 	/* neither xmatch_len not xmatch_perms are optional if xmatch is set */
-	if (profile->xmatch.dfa) {
+	if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa) {
 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) {
 			info = "missing xmatch len";
 			goto fail;
 		}
-		profile->xmatch_len = tmp;
-		profile->xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH] = DFA_START;
-		if (aa_compat_map_xmatch(&profile->xmatch)) {
+		profile->attach.xmatch_len = tmp;
+		profile->attach.xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH] = DFA_START;
+		if (aa_compat_map_xmatch(&profile->attach.xmatch)) {
 			info = "failed to convert xmatch permission table";
 			goto fail;
 		}
@@ -926,11 +931,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 		profile->path_flags = PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED;
 
 	info = "failed to unpack profile capabilities";
-	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL))
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL))
 		goto fail;
-	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
 		goto fail;
-	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL))
+	if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL))
 		goto fail;
 	if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL))
 		goto fail;
@@ -938,11 +943,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 	info = "failed to unpack upper profile capabilities";
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
 		/* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
-		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL))
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
-		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL))
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
-		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL))
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(tmpcap.cap[1]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
@@ -953,9 +958,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 	info = "failed to unpack extended profile capabilities";
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) {
 		/* optional extended caps mediation mask */
-		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL))
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
-		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(rules->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
 		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
 			goto fail;
@@ -979,40 +984,41 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
 		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
 		info = "failed to unpack policydb";
-		error = unpack_pdb(e, &profile->policy, true, false, &info);
+		error = unpack_pdb(e, &rules->policy, true, false,
+				   &info);
 		if (error)
 			goto fail;
 		/* Fixup: drop when we get rid of start array */
-		if (aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa, profile->policy.start[0],
+		if (aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa, rules->policy.start[0],
 				AA_CLASS_FILE))
-			profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE] =
-			  aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
-				      profile->policy.start[0],
+			rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE] =
+			  aa_dfa_next(rules->policy.dfa,
+				      rules->policy.start[0],
 				      AA_CLASS_FILE);
 		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
 			goto fail;
-		if (aa_compat_map_policy(&profile->policy, e->version)) {
+		if (aa_compat_map_policy(&rules->policy, e->version)) {
 			info = "failed to remap policydb permission table";
 			goto fail;
 		}
 	} else
-		profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+		rules->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
 
 	/* get file rules */
-	error = unpack_pdb(e, &profile->file, false, true, &info);
+	error = unpack_pdb(e, &rules->file, false, true, &info);
 	if (error) {
 		goto fail;
-	} else if (profile->file.dfa) {
-		if (aa_compat_map_file(&profile->file)) {
+	} else if (rules->file.dfa) {
+		if (aa_compat_map_file(&rules->file)) {
 			info = "failed to remap file permission table";
 			goto fail;
 		}
-	} else if (profile->policy.dfa &&
-		   profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]) {
-		profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
-		profile->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
+	} else if (rules->policy.dfa &&
+		   rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]) {
+		rules->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(rules->policy.dfa);
+		rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = rules->policy.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
 	} else
-		profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
+		rules->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa);
 
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) {
 		info = "out of memory";
@@ -1202,28 +1208,28 @@ static bool verify_perms(struct aa_policydb *pdb)
  */
 static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
-	if ((profile->file.dfa &&
-	     !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->file.dfa,
-				profile->file.trans.size)) ||
-	    (profile->policy.dfa &&
-	     !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->policy.dfa,
-				profile->policy.trans.size))) {
+	if ((profile->rules.file.dfa &&
+	     !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->rules.file.dfa,
+				profile->rules.file.trans.size)) ||
+	    (profile->rules.policy.dfa &&
+	     !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->rules.policy.dfa,
+				profile->rules.policy.trans.size))) {
 		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
 			    "Unpack: Invalid named transition", NULL, -EPROTO);
 		return -EPROTO;
 	}
 
-	if (!verify_perms(&profile->file)) {
+	if (!verify_perms(&profile->rules.file)) {
 		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
 			    "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO);
 		return -EPROTO;
 	}
-	if (!verify_perms(&profile->policy)) {
+	if (!verify_perms(&profile->rules.policy)) {
 		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
 			    "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO);
 		return -EPROTO;
 	}
-	if (!verify_perms(&profile->xmatch)) {
+	if (!verify_perms(&profile->attach.xmatch)) {
 		audit_iface(profile, NULL, NULL,
 			    "Unpack: Invalid perm index", NULL, -EPROTO);
 		return -EPROTO;

security/apparmor/resource.c

@@ -82,10 +82,11 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
 static int profile_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
 			     struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = &profile->rules;
 	int e = 0;
 
-	if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max >
-	    profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
+	if (rules->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && new_rlim->rlim_max >
+	    rules->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max)
 		e = -EACCES;
 	return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, NULL, NULL,
 			      e);
@@ -153,12 +154,12 @@ void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old_l, struct aa_label *new_l)
 	 * to the lesser of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit
 	 */
 	label_for_each_confined(i, old_l, old) {
-		if (old->rlimits.mask) {
+		if (old->rules.rlimits.mask) {
 			int j;
 
 			for (j = 0, mask = 1; j < RLIM_NLIMITS; j++,
 				     mask <<= 1) {
-				if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) {
+				if (old->rules.rlimits.mask & mask) {
 					rlim = current->signal->rlim + j;
 					initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + j;
 					rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,
@@ -172,15 +173,15 @@ void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_label *old_l, struct aa_label *new_l)
 	label_for_each_confined(i, new_l, new) {
 		int j;
 
-		if (!new->rlimits.mask)
+		if (!new->rules.rlimits.mask)
 			continue;
 		for (j = 0, mask = 1; j < RLIM_NLIMITS; j++, mask <<= 1) {
-			if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask))
+			if (!(new->rules.rlimits.mask & mask))
 				continue;
 
 			rlim = current->signal->rlim + j;
 			rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max,
-					     new->rlimits.limits[j].rlim_max);
+					     new->rules.rlimits.limits[j].rlim_max);
 			/* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
 			rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max);
 		}

security/apparmor/task.c

@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 }
 
-/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* assumes check for RULE_MEDIATES is already done */
 /* TODO: conditionals */
 static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
 
 	aad(sa)->peer = peer;
-	aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
-			       &perms);
+	aa_profile_match_label(profile, &profile->rules, peer,
+			       AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, &perms);
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
 	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
 }
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
 			       struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
 	if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
-	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+	    !RULE_MEDIATES(&tracee->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
 		return 0;
 
 	return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
 	if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+	if (RULE_MEDIATES(&tracer->rules, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
 		return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
 
 	/* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */