Commit 29a40ace authored by Oleg Nesterov's avatar Oleg Nesterov Committed by Linus Torvalds

fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access() from m_start() to proc_maps_open()

A simple test-case from Kirill Shutemov

	cat /proc/self/maps >/dev/null
	chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet
	exec /proc/self/net/packet

makes lockdep unhappy, cat/exec take seq_file->lock + cred_guard_mutex in
the opposite order.

It's a false positive and probably we should not allow "chmod +x" on proc
files. Still I think that we should avoid mm_access() and cred_guard_mutex
in sys_read() paths, security checking should happen at open time. Besides,
this doesn't even look right if the task changes its ->mm between m_stop()
and m_start().

Add the new "mm_struct *mm" member into struct proc_maps_private and change
proc_maps_open() to initialize it using proc_mem_open(). Change m_start() to
use priv->mm if atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) succeeds or return NULL (eof)
otherwise.

The only complication is that proc_maps_open() users should additionally do
mmdrop() in fop->release(), add the new proc_map_release() helper for that.

Note: this is the user-visible change, if the task execs after open("maps")
the new ->mm won't be visible via this file. I hope this is fine, and this
matches /proc/pid/mem bahaviour.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: default avatar"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Acked-by: default avatarKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: default avatarCyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
parent 5381e169
...@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *); ...@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *);
struct proc_maps_private { struct proc_maps_private {
struct pid *pid; struct pid *pid;
struct task_struct *task; struct task_struct *task;
struct mm_struct *mm;
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma; struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma;
#endif #endif
......
...@@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) ...@@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
if (!priv->task) if (!priv->task)
return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
mm = mm_access(priv->task, PTRACE_MODE_READ); mm = priv->mm;
if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm)) if (!mm || !atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
return mm; return NULL;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
tail_vma = get_gate_vma(mm); tail_vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
...@@ -240,9 +240,28 @@ static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, ...@@ -240,9 +240,28 @@ static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
priv->pid = proc_pid(inode); priv->pid = proc_pid(inode);
priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
seq_release_private(inode, file);
return err;
}
return 0; return 0;
} }
static int proc_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
if (priv->mm)
mmdrop(priv->mm);
return seq_release_private(inode, file);
}
static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *ops) const struct seq_operations *ops)
{ {
...@@ -398,14 +417,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations = { ...@@ -398,14 +417,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations = {
.open = pid_maps_open, .open = pid_maps_open,
.read = seq_read, .read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek, .llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private, .release = proc_map_release,
}; };
const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations = { const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations = {
.open = tid_maps_open, .open = tid_maps_open,
.read = seq_read, .read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek, .llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private, .release = proc_map_release,
}; };
/* /*
...@@ -680,14 +699,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations = { ...@@ -680,14 +699,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations = {
.open = pid_smaps_open, .open = pid_smaps_open,
.read = seq_read, .read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek, .llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private, .release = proc_map_release,
}; };
const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = { const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = {
.open = tid_smaps_open, .open = tid_smaps_open,
.read = seq_read, .read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek, .llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private, .release = proc_map_release,
}; };
/* /*
...@@ -1544,13 +1563,13 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_operations = { ...@@ -1544,13 +1563,13 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_operations = {
.open = pid_numa_maps_open, .open = pid_numa_maps_open,
.read = seq_read, .read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek, .llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private, .release = proc_map_release,
}; };
const struct file_operations proc_tid_numa_maps_operations = { const struct file_operations proc_tid_numa_maps_operations = {
.open = tid_numa_maps_open, .open = tid_numa_maps_open,
.read = seq_read, .read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek, .llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = seq_release_private, .release = proc_map_release,
}; };
#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */ #endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
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