tracing: Correct the length check which causes memory corruption

We've suffered from severe kernel crashes due to memory corruption on
our production environment, like,

Call Trace:
[1640542.554277] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[1640542.554856] CPU: 17 PID: 26996 Comm: python Kdump: loaded Tainted:G
[1640542.556629] RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x90/0x190
[1640542.559074] RSP: 0018:ffffb16faa597df8 EFLAGS: 00010286
[1640542.559587] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000400200 RCX:
0000000006e931bf
[1640542.560323] RDX: 0000000006e931be RSI: 0000000000400200 RDI:
ffff9a45ff004300
[1640542.560996] RBP: 0000000000400200 R08: 0000000000023420 R09:
0000000000000000
[1640542.561670] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffffffff9a20608d
[1640542.562366] R13: ffff9a45ff004300 R14: ffff9a45ff004300 R15:
696c662f65636976
[1640542.563128] FS:  00007f45d7c6f740(0000) GS:ffff9a45ff840000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[1640542.563937] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1640542.564557] CR2: 00007f45d71311a0 CR3: 000000189d63e004 CR4:
00000000003606e0
[1640542.565279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[1640542.566069] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[1640542.566742] Call Trace:
[1640542.567009]  anon_vma_clone+0x5d/0x170
[1640542.567417]  __split_vma+0x91/0x1a0
[1640542.567777]  do_munmap+0x2c6/0x320
[1640542.568128]  vm_munmap+0x54/0x70
[1640542.569990]  __x64_sys_munmap+0x22/0x30
[1640542.572005]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[1640542.573724]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[1640542.575642] RIP: 0033:0x7f45d6e61e27

James Wang has reproduced it stably on the latest 4.19 LTS.
After some debugging, we finally proved that it's due to ftrace
buffer out-of-bound access using a debug tool as follows:
[   86.775200] BUG: Out-of-bounds write at addr 0xffff88aefe8b7000
[   86.780806]  no_context+0xdf/0x3c0
[   86.784327]  __do_page_fault+0x252/0x470
[   86.788367]  do_page_fault+0x32/0x140
[   86.792145]  page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[   86.795576]  strncpy_from_unsafe+0x66/0xb0
[   86.799789]  fetch_memory_string+0x25/0x40
[   86.804002]  fetch_deref_string+0x51/0x60
[   86.808134]  kprobe_trace_func+0x32d/0x3a0
[   86.812347]  kprobe_dispatcher+0x45/0x50
[   86.816385]  kprobe_ftrace_handler+0x90/0xf0
[   86.820779]  ftrace_ops_assist_func+0xa1/0x140
[   86.825340]  0xffffffffc00750bf
[   86.828603]  do_sys_open+0x5/0x1f0
[   86.832124]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0
[   86.835900]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

commit b220c049 ("tracing: Check length before giving out
the filter buffer") adds length check to protect trace data
overflow introduced in 0fc1b09f, seems that this fix can't prevent
overflow entirely, the length check should also take the sizeof
entry->array[0] into account, since this array[0] is filled the
length of trace data and occupy addtional space and risk overflow.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210607125734.1770447-1-liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: b220c049 ("tracing: Check length before giving out the filter buffer")
Reviewed-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: yinbinbin <yinbinbin@alibabacloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Wetp Zhang <wetp.zy@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: James Wang <jnwang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Liangyan <liangyan.peng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

kernel/trace/trace.c

@@ -2736,7 +2736,7 @@ trace_event_buffer_lock_reserve(struct trace_buffer **current_rb,
 	    (entry = this_cpu_read(trace_buffered_event))) {
 		/* Try to use the per cpu buffer first */
 		val = this_cpu_inc_return(trace_buffered_event_cnt);
-		if ((len < (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*entry))) && val == 1) {
+		if ((len < (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*entry) - sizeof(entry->array[0]))) && val == 1) {
 			trace_event_setup(entry, type, trace_ctx);
 			entry->array[0] = len;
 			return entry;