arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown

[ Upstream commit 1b3ccf4b ]

We implement page table isolation as a mitigation for meltdown.
Report this to userspace via sysfs.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ static bool has_cache_dic(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 	return ctr & BIT(CTR_DIC_SHIFT);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+static bool __meltdown_safe = true;
 static int __kpti_forced; /* 0: not forced, >0: forced on, <0: forced off */
 
 static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
@@ -908,6 +908,16 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		{ /* sentinel */ }
 	};
 	char const *str = "command line option";
+	bool meltdown_safe;
+
+	meltdown_safe = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list);
+
+	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
+	if (has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope))
+		meltdown_safe = true;
+
+	if (!meltdown_safe)
+		__meltdown_safe = false;
 
 	/*
 	 * For reasons that aren't entirely clear, enabling KPTI on Cavium
@@ -919,6 +929,19 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		__kpti_forced = -1;
 	}
 
+	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) && kaslr_offset() > 0) {
+		if (!__kpti_forced) {
+			str = "KASLR";
+			__kpti_forced = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0)) {
+		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* Forced? */
 	if (__kpti_forced) {
 		pr_info_once("kernel page table isolation forced %s by %s\n",
@@ -926,18 +949,10 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 		return __kpti_forced > 0;
 	}
 
-	/* Useful for KASLR robustness */
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE))
-		return true;
-
-	/* Don't force KPTI for CPUs that are not vulnerable */
-	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), kpti_safe_list))
-		return false;
-
-	/* Defer to CPU feature registers */
-	return !has_cpuid_feature(entry, scope);
+	return !meltdown_safe;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 static void
 kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
@@ -962,6 +977,12 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 
 	return;
 }
+#else
+static void
+kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
+{
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
 static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
 {
@@ -975,7 +996,6 @@ static int __init parse_kpti(char *str)
 	return 0;
 }
 early_param("kpti", parse_kpti);
-#endif	/* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_HW_AFDBM
 static inline void __cpu_enable_hw_dbm(void)
@@ -1196,7 +1216,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
 		.field_pos = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT,
 		.min_field_value = ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_32BIT_64BIT,
 	},
-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	{
 		.desc = "Kernel page table isolation (KPTI)",
 		.capability = ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0,
@@ -1212,7 +1231,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
 		.matches = unmap_kernel_at_el0,
 		.cpu_enable = kpti_install_ng_mappings,
 	},
-#endif
 	{
 		/* FP/SIMD is not implemented */
 		.capability = ARM64_HAS_NO_FPSIMD,
@@ -1853,3 +1871,15 @@ void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 	/* Firmware may have left a deferred SError in this register. */
 	write_sysreg_s(0, SYS_DISR_EL1);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+			  char *buf)
+{
+	if (__meltdown_safe)
+		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+	if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}