net: cxgb3_main: fix potential Spectre v1

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1790884

commit 676bcfec upstream.

t.qset_idx can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c:2286 cxgb_extension_ioctl()
warn: potential spectre issue 'adapter->msix_info'

Fix this by sanitizing t.qset_idx before using it to index
adapter->msix_info

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>

drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/cxgb3_main.c

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <linux/stringify.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
@@ -2256,6 +2257,7 @@ static int cxgb_extension_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 
 		if (t.qset_idx >= nqsets)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		t.qset_idx = array_index_nospec(t.qset_idx, nqsets);
 
 		q = &adapter->params.sge.qset[q1 + t.qset_idx];
 		t.rspq_size = q->rspq_size;