Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf

Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2023-06-21

We've added 7 non-merge commits during the last 14 day(s) which contain
a total of 7 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix a verifier id tracking issue with scalars upon spill,
   from Maxim Mikityanskiy.

2) Fix NULL dereference if an exception is generated while a BPF
   subprogram is running, from Krister Johansen.

3) Fix a BTF verification failure when compiling kernel with LLVM_IAS=0,
   from Florent Revest.

4) Fix expected_attach_type enforcement for kprobe_multi link,
   from Jiri Olsa.

5) Fix a bpf_jit_dump issue for x86_64 to pick the correct JITed image,
   from Yonghong Song.

* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
  bpf: Force kprobe multi expected_attach_type for kprobe_multi link
  bpf/btf: Accept function names that contain dots
  selftests/bpf: add a test for subprogram extables
  bpf: ensure main program has an extable
  bpf: Fix a bpf_jit_dump issue for x86_64 with sysctl bpf_jit_enable.
  selftests/bpf: Add test cases to assert proper ID tracking on spill
  bpf: Fix verifier id tracking of scalars on spill
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621101116.16122-1-daniel@iogearbox.netSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c

@@ -2570,7 +2570,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	}
 
 	if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
-		bpf_jit_dump(prog->len, proglen, pass + 1, image);
+		bpf_jit_dump(prog->len, proglen, pass + 1, rw_image);
 
 	if (image) {
 		if (!prog->is_func || extra_pass) {

kernel/bpf/btf.c

@@ -744,13 +744,12 @@ static bool btf_name_offset_valid(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
 	return offset < btf->hdr.str_len;
 }
 
-static bool __btf_name_char_ok(char c, bool first, bool dot_ok)
+static bool __btf_name_char_ok(char c, bool first)
 {
 	if ((first ? !isalpha(c) :
 		     !isalnum(c)) &&
 	    c != '_' &&
-	    ((c == '.' && !dot_ok) ||
-	      c != '.'))
+	    c != '.')
 		return false;
 	return true;
 }
@@ -767,20 +766,20 @@ static const char *btf_str_by_offset(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static bool __btf_name_valid(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset, bool dot_ok)
+static bool __btf_name_valid(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
 {
 	/* offset must be valid */
 	const char *src = btf_str_by_offset(btf, offset);
 	const char *src_limit;
 
-	if (!__btf_name_char_ok(*src, true, dot_ok))
+	if (!__btf_name_char_ok(*src, true))
 		return false;
 
 	/* set a limit on identifier length */
 	src_limit = src + KSYM_NAME_LEN;
 	src++;
 	while (*src && src < src_limit) {
-		if (!__btf_name_char_ok(*src, false, dot_ok))
+		if (!__btf_name_char_ok(*src, false))
 			return false;
 		src++;
 	}
@@ -788,17 +787,14 @@ static bool __btf_name_valid(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset, bool dot_ok)
 	return !*src;
 }
 
-/* Only C-style identifier is permitted. This can be relaxed if
- * necessary.
- */
 static bool btf_name_valid_identifier(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
 {
-	return __btf_name_valid(btf, offset, false);
+	return __btf_name_valid(btf, offset);
 }
 
 static bool btf_name_valid_section(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
 {
-	return __btf_name_valid(btf, offset, true);
+	return __btf_name_valid(btf, offset);
 }
 
 static const char *__btf_name_by_offset(const struct btf *btf, u32 offset)
@@ -4422,7 +4418,7 @@ static s32 btf_var_check_meta(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
 	}
 
 	if (!t->name_off ||
-	    !__btf_name_valid(env->btf, t->name_off, true)) {
+	    !__btf_name_valid(env->btf, t->name_off)) {
 		btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid name");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}

kernel/bpf/syscall.c

@@ -3440,6 +3440,11 @@ static int bpf_prog_attach_check_attach_type(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
 		return prog->enforce_expected_attach_type &&
 			prog->expected_attach_type != attach_type ?
 			-EINVAL : 0;
+	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
+		if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI &&
+		    attach_type != BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return 0;
 	default:
 		return 0;
 	}

kernel/bpf/verifier.c

@@ -3868,6 +3868,9 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				return err;
 		}
 		save_register_state(state, spi, reg, size);
+		/* Break the relation on a narrowing spill. */
+		if (fls64(reg->umax_value) > BITS_PER_BYTE * size)
+			state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
 	} else if (!reg && !(off % BPF_REG_SIZE) && is_bpf_st_mem(insn) &&
 		   insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) {
 		struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
@@ -17214,9 +17217,10 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	}
 
 	/* finally lock prog and jit images for all functions and
-	 * populate kallsysm
+	 * populate kallsysm. Begin at the first subprogram, since
+	 * bpf_prog_load will add the kallsyms for the main program.
 	 */
-	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
+	for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
 		bpf_prog_lock_ro(func[i]);
 		bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(func[i]);
 	}
@@ -17242,6 +17246,8 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	prog->jited = 1;
 	prog->bpf_func = func[0]->bpf_func;
 	prog->jited_len = func[0]->jited_len;
+	prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable;
+	prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries;
 	prog->aux->func = func;
 	prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
 	bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/subprogs_extable.c

+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "test_subprogs_extable.skel.h"
+
+void test_subprogs_extable(void)
+{
+	const int read_sz = 456;
+	struct test_subprogs_extable *skel;
+	int err;
+
+	skel = test_subprogs_extable__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	err = test_subprogs_extable__attach(skel);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "skel_attach"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	/* trigger tracepoint */
+	ASSERT_OK(trigger_module_test_read(read_sz), "trigger_read");
+
+	ASSERT_NEQ(skel->bss->triggered, 0, "verify at least one program ran");
+
+	test_subprogs_extable__detach(skel);
+
+cleanup:
+	test_subprogs_extable__destroy(skel);
+}

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_subprogs_extable.c

+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+
+struct {
+	__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+	__uint(max_entries, 8);
+	__type(key, __u32);
+	__type(value, __u64);
+} test_array SEC(".maps");
+
+unsigned int triggered;
+
+static __u64 test_cb(struct bpf_map *map, __u32 *key, __u64 *val, void *data)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+SEC("fexit/bpf_testmod_return_ptr")
+int BPF_PROG(handle_fexit_ret_subprogs, int arg, struct file *ret)
+{
+	*(volatile long *)ret;
+	*(volatile int *)&ret->f_mode;
+	bpf_for_each_map_elem(&test_array, test_cb, NULL, 0);
+	triggered++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("fexit/bpf_testmod_return_ptr")
+int BPF_PROG(handle_fexit_ret_subprogs2, int arg, struct file *ret)
+{
+	*(volatile long *)ret;
+	*(volatile int *)&ret->f_mode;
+	bpf_for_each_map_elem(&test_array, test_cb, NULL, 0);
+	triggered++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("fexit/bpf_testmod_return_ptr")
+int BPF_PROG(handle_fexit_ret_subprogs3, int arg, struct file *ret)
+{
+	*(volatile long *)ret;
+	*(volatile int *)&ret->f_mode;
+	bpf_for_each_map_elem(&test_array, test_cb, NULL, 0);
+	triggered++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_spill_fill.c

@@ -371,4 +371,83 @@ __naked void and_then_at_fp_8(void)
 "	::: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+SEC("xdp")
+__description("32-bit spill of 64-bit reg should clear ID")
+__failure __msg("math between ctx pointer and 4294967295 is not allowed")
+__naked void spill_32bit_of_64bit_fail(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r6 = r1;					\
+	/* Roll one bit to force the verifier to track both branches. */\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
+	r0 &= 0x8;					\
+	/* Put a large number into r1. */		\
+	r1 = 0xffffffff;				\
+	r1 <<= 32;					\
+	r1 += r0;					\
+	/* Assign an ID to r1. */			\
+	r2 = r1;					\
+	/* 32-bit spill r1 to stack - should clear the ID! */\
+	*(u32*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
+	/* 32-bit fill r2 from stack. */		\
+	r2 = *(u32*)(r10 - 8);				\
+	/* Compare r2 with another register to trigger find_equal_scalars.\
+	 * Having one random bit is important here, otherwise the verifier cuts\
+	 * the corners. If the ID was mistakenly preserved on spill, this would\
+	 * cause the verifier to think that r1 is also equal to zero in one of\
+	 * the branches, and equal to eight on the other branch.\
+	 */						\
+	r3 = 0;						\
+	if r2 != r3 goto l0_%=;				\
+l0_%=:	r1 >>= 32;					\
+	/* At this point, if the verifier thinks that r1 is 0, an out-of-bounds\
+	 * read will happen, because it actually contains 0xffffffff.\
+	 */						\
+	r6 += r1;					\
+	r0 = *(u32*)(r6 + 0);				\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+SEC("xdp")
+__description("16-bit spill of 32-bit reg should clear ID")
+__failure __msg("dereference of modified ctx ptr R6 off=65535 disallowed")
+__naked void spill_16bit_of_32bit_fail(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("					\
+	r6 = r1;					\
+	/* Roll one bit to force the verifier to track both branches. */\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];			\
+	r0 &= 0x8;					\
+	/* Put a large number into r1. */		\
+	w1 = 0xffff0000;				\
+	r1 += r0;					\
+	/* Assign an ID to r1. */			\
+	r2 = r1;					\
+	/* 16-bit spill r1 to stack - should clear the ID! */\
+	*(u16*)(r10 - 8) = r1;				\
+	/* 16-bit fill r2 from stack. */		\
+	r2 = *(u16*)(r10 - 8);				\
+	/* Compare r2 with another register to trigger find_equal_scalars.\
+	 * Having one random bit is important here, otherwise the verifier cuts\
+	 * the corners. If the ID was mistakenly preserved on spill, this would\
+	 * cause the verifier to think that r1 is also equal to zero in one of\
+	 * the branches, and equal to eight on the other branch.\
+	 */						\
+	r3 = 0;						\
+	if r2 != r3 goto l0_%=;				\
+l0_%=:	r1 >>= 16;					\
+	/* At this point, if the verifier thinks that r1 is 0, an out-of-bounds\
+	 * read will happen, because it actually contains 0xffff.\
+	 */						\
+	r6 += r1;					\
+	r0 = *(u32*)(r6 + 0);				\
+	exit;						\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";