Commit 5e9629d0 authored by James Clark's avatar James Clark Committed by Will Deacon

drivers/perf: arm_spe: Use perf_allow_kernel() for permissions

Use perf_allow_kernel() for 'pa_enable' (physical addresses),
'pct_enable' (physical timestamps) and context IDs. This means that
perf_event_paranoid is now taken into account and LSM hooks can be used,
which is more consistent with other perf_event_open calls. For example
PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR uses perf_allow_kernel() rather than just
perfmon_capable().

This also indirectly fixes the following error message which is
misleading because perf_event_paranoid is not taken into account by
perfmon_capable():

  $ perf record -e arm_spe/pa_enable/

  Error:
  Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is
  limited. Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid
  setting ...
Suggested-by: default avatarAl Grant <al.grant@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240827145113.1224604-1-james.clark@linaro.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240807120039.GD37996@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net/Signed-off-by: default avatarWill Deacon <will@kernel.org>
parent db9e7a83
......@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
/*
* Cache if the event is allowed to trace Context information.
* This allows us to perform the check, i.e, perfmon_capable(),
* This allows us to perform the check, i.e, perf_allow_kernel(),
* in the context of the event owner, once, during the event_init().
*/
#define SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX 0x00001
......@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static_assert((PERF_EVENT_FLAG_ARCH & SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX) == SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_C
static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && perfmon_capable())
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr))
event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX;
}
......@@ -745,9 +745,8 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
set_spe_event_has_cx(event);
reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
if (!perfmon_capable() &&
(reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT)))
return -EACCES;
if (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))
return perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
return 0;
}
......
......@@ -1602,13 +1602,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
}
static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr);
static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
......
......@@ -13351,6 +13351,15 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event)
return &event->attr;
}
int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel);
/*
* Inherit an event from parent task to child task.
*
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment