Merge tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux

Pull fsverity updates from Eric Biggers:
 "Fix the longstanding implementation limitation that fsverity was only
  supported when the Merkle tree block size, filesystem block size, and
  PAGE_SIZE were all equal.

  Specifically, add support for Merkle tree block sizes less than
  PAGE_SIZE, and make ext4 support fsverity on filesystems where the
  filesystem block size is less than PAGE_SIZE.

  Effectively, this means that fsverity can now be used on systems with
  non-4K pages, at least on ext4. These changes have been tested using
  the verity group of xfstests, newly updated to cover the new code
  paths.

  Also update fs/verity/ to support verifying data from large folios.

  There's also a similar patch for fs/crypto/, to support decrypting
  data from large folios, which I'm including in here to avoid a merge
  conflict between the fscrypt and fsverity branches"

* tag 'fsverity-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/linux:
  fscrypt: support decrypting data from large folios
  fsverity: support verifying data from large folios
  fsverity.rst: update git repo URL for fsverity-utils
  ext4: allow verity with fs block size < PAGE_SIZE
  fs/buffer.c: support fsverity in block_read_full_folio()
  f2fs: simplify f2fs_readpage_limit()
  ext4: simplify ext4_readpage_limit()
  fsverity: support enabling with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE
  fsverity: support verification with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE
  fsverity: replace fsverity_hash_page() with fsverity_hash_block()
  fsverity: use EFBIG for file too large to enable verity
  fsverity: store log2(digest_size) precomputed
  fsverity: simplify Merkle tree readahead size calculation
  fsverity: use unsigned long for level_start
  fsverity: remove debug messages and CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
  fsverity: pass pos and size to ->write_merkle_tree_block
  fsverity: optimize fsverity_cleanup_inode() on non-verity files
  fsverity: optimize fsverity_prepare_setattr() on non-verity files
  fsverity: optimize fsverity_file_open() on non-verity files

Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst

@@ -1277,8 +1277,8 @@ the file contents themselves, as described below:
 
 For the read path (->read_folio()) of regular files, filesystems can
 read the ciphertext into the page cache and decrypt it in-place.  The
-page lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the
-page from becoming visible to userspace prematurely.
+folio lock must be held until decryption has finished, to prevent the
+folio from becoming visible to userspace prematurely.
 
 For the write path (->writepage()) of regular files, filesystems
 cannot encrypt data in-place in the page cache, since the cached

Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst

@@ -118,10 +118,11 @@ as follows:
 - ``hash_algorithm`` must be the identifier for the hash algorithm to
   use for the Merkle tree, such as FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_SHA256.  See
   ``include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h`` for the list of possible values.
-- ``block_size`` must be the Merkle tree block size.  Currently, this
-  must be equal to the system page size, which is usually 4096 bytes.
-  Other sizes may be supported in the future.  This value is not
-  necessarily the same as the filesystem block size.
+- ``block_size`` is the Merkle tree block size, in bytes.  In Linux
+  v6.3 and later, this can be any power of 2 between (inclusively)
+  1024 and the minimum of the system page size and the filesystem
+  block size.  In earlier versions, the page size was the only allowed
+  value.
 - ``salt_size`` is the size of the salt in bytes, or 0 if no salt is
   provided.  The salt is a value that is prepended to every hashed
   block; it can be used to personalize the hashing for a particular
@@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY can fail with the following errors:
 - ``EBUSY``: this ioctl is already running on the file
 - ``EEXIST``: the file already has verity enabled
 - ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory
+- ``EFBIG``: the file is too large to enable verity on
 - ``EINTR``: the operation was interrupted by a fatal signal
 - ``EINVAL``: unsupported version, hash algorithm, or block size; or
   reserved bits are set; or the file descriptor refers to neither a
@@ -495,9 +497,11 @@ To create verity files on an ext4 filesystem, the filesystem must have
 been formatted with ``-O verity`` or had ``tune2fs -O verity`` run on
 it.  "verity" is an RO_COMPAT filesystem feature, so once set, old
 kernels will only be able to mount the filesystem readonly, and old
-versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem.  Moreover,
-currently ext4 only supports mounting a filesystem with the "verity"
-feature when its block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
+versions of e2fsck will be unable to check the filesystem.
+
+Originally, an ext4 filesystem with the "verity" feature could only be
+mounted when its block size was equal to the system page size
+(typically 4096 bytes).  In Linux v6.3, this limitation was removed.
 
 ext4 sets the EXT4_VERITY_FL on-disk inode flag on verity files.  It
 can only be set by `FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY`_, and it cannot be cleared.
@@ -518,9 +522,7 @@ support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and to support
 encrypting xattrs.  Note that the verity metadata *must* be encrypted
 when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data.
 
-Currently, ext4 verity only supports the case where the Merkle tree
-block size, filesystem block size, and page size are all the same.  It
-also only supports extent-based files.
+ext4 only allows verity on extent-based files.
 
 f2fs
 ----
@@ -538,11 +540,10 @@ Like ext4, f2fs stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and
 fsverity_descriptor) past the end of the file, starting at the first
 64K boundary beyond i_size.  See explanation for ext4 above.
 Moreover, f2fs supports at most 4096 bytes of xattr entries per inode
-which wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block.
+which usually wouldn't be enough for even a single Merkle tree block.
 
-Currently, f2fs verity only supports a Merkle tree block size of 4096.
-Also, f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently
-have atomic or volatile writes pending.
+f2fs doesn't support enabling verity on files that currently have
+atomic or volatile writes pending.
 
 btrfs
 -----
@@ -567,51 +568,48 @@ Pagecache
 ~~~~~~~~~
 
 For filesystems using Linux's pagecache, the ``->read_folio()`` and
-``->readahead()`` methods must be modified to verify pages before they
-are marked Uptodate.  Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be
+``->readahead()`` methods must be modified to verify folios before
+they are marked Uptodate.  Merely hooking ``->read_iter()`` would be
 insufficient, since ``->read_iter()`` is not used for memory maps.
 
-Therefore, fs/verity/ provides a function fsverity_verify_page() which
-verifies a page that has been read into the pagecache of a verity
-inode, but is still locked and not Uptodate, so it's not yet readable
-by userspace.  As needed to do the verification,
-fsverity_verify_page() will call back into the filesystem to read
-Merkle tree pages via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page().
+Therefore, fs/verity/ provides the function fsverity_verify_blocks()
+which verifies data that has been read into the pagecache of a verity
+inode.  The containing folio must still be locked and not Uptodate, so
+it's not yet readable by userspace.  As needed to do the verification,
+fsverity_verify_blocks() will call back into the filesystem to read
+hash blocks via fsverity_operations::read_merkle_tree_page().
 
-fsverity_verify_page() returns false if verification failed; in this
-case, the filesystem must not set the page Uptodate.  Following this,
+fsverity_verify_blocks() returns false if verification failed; in this
+case, the filesystem must not set the folio Uptodate.  Following this,
 as per the usual Linux pagecache behavior, attempts by userspace to
-read() from the part of the file containing the page will fail with
-EIO, and accesses to the page within a memory map will raise SIGBUS.
-
-fsverity_verify_page() currently only supports the case where the
-Merkle tree block size is equal to PAGE_SIZE (often 4096 bytes).
+read() from the part of the file containing the folio will fail with
+EIO, and accesses to the folio within a memory map will raise SIGBUS.
 
-In principle, fsverity_verify_page() verifies the entire path in the
-Merkle tree from the data page to the root hash.  However, for
-efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash pages.  Therefore,
-fsverity_verify_page() only ascends the tree reading hash pages until
-an already-verified hash page is seen, as indicated by the PageChecked
-bit being set.  It then verifies the path to that page.
+In principle, verifying a data block requires verifying the entire
+path in the Merkle tree from the data block to the root hash.
+However, for efficiency the filesystem may cache the hash blocks.
+Therefore, fsverity_verify_blocks() only ascends the tree reading hash
+blocks until an already-verified hash block is seen.  It then verifies
+the path to that block.
 
 This optimization, which is also used by dm-verity, results in
 excellent sequential read performance.  This is because usually (e.g.
-127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash page from the
+127 in 128 times for 4K blocks and SHA-256) the hash block from the
 bottom level of the tree will already be cached and checked from
-reading a previous data page.  However, random reads perform worse.
+reading a previous data block.  However, random reads perform worse.
 
 Block device based filesystems
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 Block device based filesystems (e.g. ext4 and f2fs) in Linux also use
 the pagecache, so the above subsection applies too.  However, they
-also usually read many pages from a file at once, grouped into a
+also usually read many data blocks from a file at once, grouped into a
 structure called a "bio".  To make it easier for these types of
 filesystems to support fs-verity, fs/verity/ also provides a function
-fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all pages in a bio.
+fsverity_verify_bio() which verifies all data blocks in a bio.
 
 ext4 and f2fs also support encryption.  If a verity file is also
-encrypted, the pages must be decrypted before being verified.  To
+encrypted, the data must be decrypted before being verified.  To
 support this, these filesystems allocate a "post-read context" for
 each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``::
 
@@ -626,14 +624,14 @@ each bio and store it in ``->bi_private``::
 verity, or both is enabled.  After the bio completes, for each needed
 postprocessing step the filesystem enqueues the bio_post_read_ctx on a
 workqueue, and then the workqueue work does the decryption or
-verification.  Finally, pages where no decryption or verity error
-occurred are marked Uptodate, and the pages are unlocked.
+verification.  Finally, folios where no decryption or verity error
+occurred are marked Uptodate, and the folios are unlocked.
 
 On many filesystems, files can contain holes.  Normally,
-``->readahead()`` simply zeroes holes and sets the corresponding pages
-Uptodate; no bios are issued.  To prevent this case from bypassing
-fs-verity, these filesystems use fsverity_verify_page() to verify hole
-pages.
+``->readahead()`` simply zeroes hole blocks and considers the
+corresponding data to be up-to-date; no bios are issued.  To prevent
+this case from bypassing fs-verity, filesystems use
+fsverity_verify_blocks() to verify hole blocks.
 
 Filesystems also disable direct I/O on verity files, since otherwise
 direct I/O would bypass fs-verity.
@@ -644,7 +642,7 @@ Userspace utility
 This document focuses on the kernel, but a userspace utility for
 fs-verity can be found at:
 
-	https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/fsverity-utils.git
+	https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fsverity/fsverity-utils.git
 
 See the README.md file in the fsverity-utils source tree for details,
 including examples of setting up fs-verity protected files.
@@ -793,9 +791,9 @@ weren't already directly answered in other parts of this document.
 :A: There are many reasons why this is not possible or would be very
     difficult, including the following:
 
-    - To prevent bypassing verification, pages must not be marked
+    - To prevent bypassing verification, folios must not be marked
       Uptodate until they've been verified.  Currently, each
-      filesystem is responsible for marking pages Uptodate via
+      filesystem is responsible for marking folios Uptodate via
       ``->readahead()``.  Therefore, currently it's not possible for
       the VFS to do the verification on its own.  Changing this would
       require significant changes to the VFS and all filesystems.

fs/btrfs/verity.c

@@ -783,30 +783,25 @@ static struct page *btrfs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
 /*
  * fsverity op that writes a Merkle tree block into the btree.
  *
- * @inode:          inode to write a Merkle tree block for
- * @buf:            Merkle tree data block to write
- * @index:          index of the block in the Merkle tree
- * @log_blocksize:  log base 2 of the Merkle tree block size
- *
- * Note that the block size could be different from the page size, so it is not
- * safe to assume that index is a page index.
+ * @inode:	inode to write a Merkle tree block for
+ * @buf:	Merkle tree block to write
+ * @pos:	the position of the block in the Merkle tree (in bytes)
+ * @size:	the Merkle tree block size (in bytes)
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or negative error code on failure
  */
 static int btrfs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
-					u64 index, int log_blocksize)
+					 u64 pos, unsigned int size)
 {
-	u64 off = index << log_blocksize;
-	u64 len = 1ULL << log_blocksize;
 	loff_t merkle_pos = merkle_file_pos(inode);
 
 	if (merkle_pos < 0)
 		return merkle_pos;
-	if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - off - len)
+	if (merkle_pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes - pos - size)
 		return -EFBIG;
 
 	return write_key_bytes(BTRFS_I(inode), BTRFS_VERITY_MERKLE_ITEM_KEY,
-			       off, buf, len);
+			       pos, buf, size);
 }
 
 const struct fsverity_operations btrfs_verityops = {

fs/buffer.c

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <trace/events/block.h>
 #include <linux/fscrypt.h>
+#include <linux/fsverity.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
@@ -295,20 +296,53 @@ static void end_buffer_async_read(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate)
 	return;
 }
 
-struct decrypt_bh_ctx {
+struct postprocess_bh_ctx {
 	struct work_struct work;
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
 };
 
+static void verify_bh(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx =
+		container_of(work, struct postprocess_bh_ctx, work);
+	struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh;
+	bool valid;
+
+	valid = fsverity_verify_blocks(page_folio(bh->b_page), bh->b_size,
+				       bh_offset(bh));
+	end_buffer_async_read(bh, valid);
+	kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static bool need_fsverity(struct buffer_head *bh)
+{
+	struct page *page = bh->b_page;
+	struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
+
+	return fsverity_active(inode) &&
+		/* needed by ext4 */
+		page->index < DIV_ROUND_UP(inode->i_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
 static void decrypt_bh(struct work_struct *work)
 {
-	struct decrypt_bh_ctx *ctx =
-		container_of(work, struct decrypt_bh_ctx, work);
+	struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx =
+		container_of(work, struct postprocess_bh_ctx, work);
 	struct buffer_head *bh = ctx->bh;
 	int err;
 
-	err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(bh->b_page, bh->b_size,
-					       bh_offset(bh));
+	err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page_folio(bh->b_page),
+					       bh->b_size, bh_offset(bh));
+	if (err == 0 && need_fsverity(bh)) {
+		/*
+		 * We use different work queues for decryption and for verity
+		 * because verity may require reading metadata pages that need
+		 * decryption, and we shouldn't recurse to the same workqueue.
+		 */
+		INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verify_bh);
+		fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work);
+		return;
+	}
 	end_buffer_async_read(bh, err == 0);
 	kfree(ctx);
 }
@@ -319,15 +353,24 @@ static void decrypt_bh(struct work_struct *work)
  */
 static void end_buffer_async_read_io(struct buffer_head *bh, int uptodate)
 {
-	/* Decrypt if needed */
-	if (uptodate &&
-	    fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(bh->b_page->mapping->host)) {
-		struct decrypt_bh_ctx *ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	struct inode *inode = bh->b_page->mapping->host;
+	bool decrypt = fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(inode);
+	bool verify = need_fsverity(bh);
+
+	/* Decrypt (with fscrypt) and/or verify (with fsverity) if needed. */
+	if (uptodate && (decrypt || verify)) {
+		struct postprocess_bh_ctx *ctx =
+			kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_ATOMIC);
 
 		if (ctx) {
-			INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_bh);
 			ctx->bh = bh;
-			fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work);
+			if (decrypt) {
+				INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, decrypt_bh);
+				fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(&ctx->work);
+			} else {
+				INIT_WORK(&ctx->work, verify_bh);
+				fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(&ctx->work);
+			}
 			return;
 		}
 		uptodate = 0;
@@ -2245,6 +2288,11 @@ int block_read_full_folio(struct folio *folio, get_block_t *get_block)
 	int nr, i;
 	int fully_mapped = 1;
 	bool page_error = false;
+	loff_t limit = i_size_read(inode);
+
+	/* This is needed for ext4. */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
+		limit = inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
 
 	VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_large(folio), folio);
 
@@ -2253,7 +2301,7 @@ int block_read_full_folio(struct folio *folio, get_block_t *get_block)
 	bbits = block_size_bits(blocksize);
 
 	iblock = (sector_t)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - bbits);
-	lblock = (i_size_read(inode)+blocksize-1) >> bbits;
+	lblock = (limit+blocksize-1) >> bbits;
 	bh = head;
 	nr = 0;
 	i = 0;

fs/crypto/bio.c

@@ -30,13 +30,11 @@
  */
 bool fscrypt_decrypt_bio(struct bio *bio)
 {
-	struct bio_vec *bv;
-	struct bvec_iter_all iter_all;
+	struct folio_iter fi;
 
-	bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, iter_all) {
-		struct page *page = bv->bv_page;
-		int err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, bv->bv_len,
-							   bv->bv_offset);
+	bio_for_each_folio_all(fi, bio) {
+		int err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(fi.folio, fi.length,
+							   fi.offset);
 
 		if (err) {
 			bio->bi_status = errno_to_blk_status(err);

fs/crypto/crypto.c

@@ -237,41 +237,43 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace);
 
 /**
  * fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks() - Decrypt filesystem blocks in a
- *					pagecache page
- * @page:      The locked pagecache page containing the block(s) to decrypt
+ *					pagecache folio
+ * @folio:     The locked pagecache folio containing the block(s) to decrypt
  * @len:       Total size of the block(s) to decrypt.  Must be a nonzero
  *		multiple of the filesystem's block size.
- * @offs:      Byte offset within @page of the first block to decrypt.  Must be
+ * @offs:      Byte offset within @folio of the first block to decrypt.  Must be
  *		a multiple of the filesystem's block size.
  *
- * The specified block(s) are decrypted in-place within the pagecache page,
- * which must still be locked and not uptodate.  Normally, blocksize ==
- * PAGE_SIZE and the whole page is decrypted at once.
+ * The specified block(s) are decrypted in-place within the pagecache folio,
+ * which must still be locked and not uptodate.
  *
  * This is for use by the filesystem's ->readahead() method.
  *
  * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure
  */
-int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len,
-				     unsigned int offs)
+int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len,
+				     size_t offs)
 {
-	const struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
+	const struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
 	const unsigned int blockbits = inode->i_blkbits;
 	const unsigned int blocksize = 1 << blockbits;
-	u64 lblk_num = ((u64)page->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blockbits)) +
+	u64 lblk_num = ((u64)folio->index << (PAGE_SHIFT - blockbits)) +
 		       (offs >> blockbits);
-	unsigned int i;
+	size_t i;
 	int err;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(page)))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!folio_test_locked(folio)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0 || !IS_ALIGNED(len | offs, blocksize)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	for (i = offs; i < offs + len; i += blocksize, lblk_num++) {
+		struct page *page = folio_page(folio, i >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+
 		err = fscrypt_crypt_block(inode, FS_DECRYPT, lblk_num, page,
-					  page, blocksize, i, GFP_NOFS);
+					  page, blocksize, i & ~PAGE_MASK,
+					  GFP_NOFS);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 	}

fs/ext4/inode.c

@@ -1136,7 +1136,8 @@ static int ext4_block_write_begin(struct page *page, loff_t pos, unsigned len,
 		for (i = 0; i < nr_wait; i++) {
 			int err2;
 
-			err2 = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, blocksize,
+			err2 = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page_folio(page),
+								blocksize,
 								bh_offset(wait[i]));
 			if (err2) {
 				clear_buffer_uptodate(wait[i]);
@@ -3858,7 +3859,8 @@ static int __ext4_block_zero_page_range(handle_t *handle,
 		if (fscrypt_inode_uses_fs_layer_crypto(inode)) {
 			/* We expect the key to be set. */
 			BUG_ON(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode));
-			err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page, blocksize,
+			err = fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(page_folio(page),
+							       blocksize,
 							       bh_offset(bh));
 			if (err) {
 				clear_buffer_uptodate(bh);

fs/ext4/readpage.c

@@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ static void ext4_set_bio_post_read_ctx(struct bio *bio,
 
 static inline loff_t ext4_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
-	    (IS_VERITY(inode) || ext4_verity_in_progress(inode)))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
 		return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
 
 	return i_size_read(inode);

fs/ext4/super.c

@@ -5325,11 +5325,6 @@ static int __ext4_fill_super(struct fs_context *fc, struct super_block *sb)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (ext4_has_feature_verity(sb) && sb->s_blocksize != PAGE_SIZE) {
-		ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Unsupported blocksize for fs-verity");
-		goto failed_mount_wq;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * Get the # of file system overhead blocks from the
 	 * superblock if present.

fs/ext4/verity.c

@@ -381,11 +381,11 @@ static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
 }
 
 static int ext4_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
-					u64 index, int log_blocksize)
+					u64 pos, unsigned int size)
 {
-	loff_t pos = ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
+	pos += ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode);
 
-	return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
+	return pagecache_write(inode, buf, size, pos);
 }
 
 const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops = {

fs/f2fs/data.c

@@ -2053,8 +2053,7 @@ int f2fs_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
 
 static inline loff_t f2fs_readpage_limit(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) &&
-	    (IS_VERITY(inode) || f2fs_verity_in_progress(inode)))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
 		return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
 
 	return i_size_read(inode);

fs/f2fs/verity.c

@@ -276,11 +276,11 @@ static struct page *f2fs_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode,
 }
 
 static int f2fs_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
-					u64 index, int log_blocksize)
+					u64 pos, unsigned int size)
 {
-	loff_t pos = f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) + (index << log_blocksize);
+	pos += f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode);
 
-	return pagecache_write(inode, buf, 1 << log_blocksize, pos);
+	return pagecache_write(inode, buf, size, pos);
 }
 
 const struct fsverity_operations f2fs_verityops = {

fs/verity/Kconfig

@@ -34,14 +34,6 @@ config FS_VERITY
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
-config FS_VERITY_DEBUG
-	bool "FS Verity debugging"
-	depends on FS_VERITY
-	help
-	  Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default.
-
-	  Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer.
-
 config FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
 	bool "FS Verity builtin signature support"
 	depends on FS_VERITY

fs/verity/fsverity_private.h

@@ -8,10 +8,6 @@
 #ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
 #define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_DEBUG
-#define DEBUG
-#endif
-
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
 
 #include <linux/fsverity.h>
@@ -46,17 +42,20 @@ struct merkle_tree_params {
 	unsigned int digest_size;	/* same as hash_alg->digest_size */
 	unsigned int block_size;	/* size of data and tree blocks */
 	unsigned int hashes_per_block;	/* number of hashes per tree block */
-	unsigned int log_blocksize;	/* log2(block_size) */
-	unsigned int log_arity;		/* log2(hashes_per_block) */
+	unsigned int blocks_per_page;	/* PAGE_SIZE / block_size */
+	u8 log_digestsize;		/* log2(digest_size) */
+	u8 log_blocksize;		/* log2(block_size) */
+	u8 log_arity;			/* log2(hashes_per_block) */
+	u8 log_blocks_per_page;		/* log2(blocks_per_page) */
 	unsigned int num_levels;	/* number of levels in Merkle tree */
 	u64 tree_size;			/* Merkle tree size in bytes */
-	unsigned long level0_blocks;	/* number of blocks in tree level 0 */
+	unsigned long tree_pages;	/* Merkle tree size in pages */
 
 	/*
 	 * Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0)
 	 * to root level ('num_levels - 1')
 	 */
-	u64 level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
+	unsigned long level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
 };
 
 /*
@@ -73,9 +72,10 @@ struct fsverity_info {
 	u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	u8 file_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
 	const struct inode *inode;
+	unsigned long *hash_block_verified;
+	spinlock_t hash_page_init_lock;
 };
 
-
 #define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE	(FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \
 					 sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor))
 
@@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ void fsverity_free_hash_request(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
 				struct ahash_request *req);
 const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
 				      const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
-int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
-		       const struct inode *inode,
-		       struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out);
+int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
+			const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req,
+			struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out);
 int fsverity_hash_buffer(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
 			 const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out);
 void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void);

fs/verity/hash_algs.c

@@ -220,35 +220,33 @@ const u8 *fsverity_prepare_hash_state(struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
 }
 
 /**
- * fsverity_hash_page() - hash a single data or hash page
+ * fsverity_hash_block() - hash a single data or hash block
  * @params: the Merkle tree's parameters
  * @inode: inode for which the hashing is being done
  * @req: preallocated hash request
- * @page: the page to hash
+ * @page: the page containing the block to hash
+ * @offset: the offset of the block within @page
  * @out: output digest, size 'params->digest_size' bytes
  *
- * Hash a single data or hash block, assuming block_size == PAGE_SIZE.
- * The hash is salted if a salt is specified in the Merkle tree parameters.
+ * Hash a single data or hash block.  The hash is salted if a salt is specified
+ * in the Merkle tree parameters.
  *
  * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
  */
-int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
-		       const struct inode *inode,
-		       struct ahash_request *req, struct page *page, u8 *out)
+int fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
+			const struct inode *inode, struct ahash_request *req,
+			struct page *page, unsigned int offset, u8 *out)
 {
 	struct scatterlist sg;
 	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
 	int err;
 
-	if (WARN_ON(params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	sg_init_table(&sg, 1);
-	sg_set_page(&sg, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
+	sg_set_page(&sg, page, params->block_size, offset);
 	ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
 					CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
 				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
-	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, PAGE_SIZE);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, out, params->block_size);
 
 	if (params->hashstate) {
 		err = crypto_ahash_import(req, params->hashstate);
@@ -264,7 +262,7 @@ int fsverity_hash_page(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
 
 	err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
 	if (err)
-		fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing page hash", err);
+		fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing block hash", err);
 	return err;
 }
 

fs/verity/init.c

@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void)
 	if (err)
 		goto err_exit_workqueue;
 
-	pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n");
 	return 0;
 
 err_exit_workqueue:

fs/verity/open.c

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 #include "fsverity_private.h"
 
+#include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *fsverity_info_cachep;
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
 	struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg;
 	int err;
 	u64 blocks;
+	u64 blocks_in_level[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
 	u64 offset;
 	int level;
 
@@ -54,7 +56,23 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
 		goto out_err;
 	}
 
-	if (log_blocksize != PAGE_SHIFT) {
+	/*
+	 * fs/verity/ directly assumes that the Merkle tree block size is a
+	 * power of 2 less than or equal to PAGE_SIZE.  Another restriction
+	 * arises from the interaction between fs/verity/ and the filesystems
+	 * themselves: filesystems expect to be able to verify a single
+	 * filesystem block of data at a time.  Therefore, the Merkle tree block
+	 * size must also be less than or equal to the filesystem block size.
+	 *
+	 * The above are the only hard limitations, so in theory the Merkle tree
+	 * block size could be as small as twice the digest size.  However,
+	 * that's not useful, and it would result in some unusually deep and
+	 * large Merkle trees.  So we currently require that the Merkle tree
+	 * block size be at least 1024 bytes.  That's small enough to test the
+	 * sub-page block case on systems with 4K pages, but not too small.
+	 */
+	if (log_blocksize < 10 || log_blocksize > PAGE_SHIFT ||
+	    log_blocksize > inode->i_blkbits) {
 		fsverity_warn(inode, "Unsupported log_blocksize: %u",
 			      log_blocksize);
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -62,6 +80,8 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
 	}
 	params->log_blocksize = log_blocksize;
 	params->block_size = 1 << log_blocksize;
+	params->log_blocks_per_page = PAGE_SHIFT - log_blocksize;
+	params->blocks_per_page = 1 << params->log_blocks_per_page;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!is_power_of_2(params->digest_size))) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -74,13 +94,10 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_err;
 	}
-	params->log_arity = params->log_blocksize - ilog2(params->digest_size);
+	params->log_digestsize = ilog2(params->digest_size);
+	params->log_arity = log_blocksize - params->log_digestsize;
 	params->hashes_per_block = 1 << params->log_arity;
 
-	pr_debug("Merkle tree uses %s with %u-byte blocks (%u hashes/block), salt=%*phN\n",
-		 hash_alg->name, params->block_size, params->hashes_per_block,
-		 (int)salt_size, salt);
-
 	/*
 	 * Compute the number of levels in the Merkle tree and create a map from
 	 * level to the starting block of that level.  Level 'num_levels - 1' is
@@ -90,31 +107,45 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
 
 	/* Compute number of levels and the number of blocks in each level */
 	blocks = ((u64)inode->i_size + params->block_size - 1) >> log_blocksize;
-	pr_debug("Data is %lld bytes (%llu blocks)\n", inode->i_size, blocks);
 	while (blocks > 1) {
 		if (params->num_levels >= FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS) {
 			fsverity_err(inode, "Too many levels in Merkle tree");
-			err = -EINVAL;
+			err = -EFBIG;
 			goto out_err;
 		}
 		blocks = (blocks + params->hashes_per_block - 1) >>
 			 params->log_arity;
-		/* temporarily using level_start[] to store blocks in level */
-		params->level_start[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
+		blocks_in_level[params->num_levels++] = blocks;
 	}
-	params->level0_blocks = params->level_start[0];
 
 	/* Compute the starting block of each level */
 	offset = 0;
 	for (level = (int)params->num_levels - 1; level >= 0; level--) {
-		blocks = params->level_start[level];
 		params->level_start[level] = offset;
-		pr_debug("Level %d is %llu blocks starting at index %llu\n",
-			 level, blocks, offset);
-		offset += blocks;
+		offset += blocks_in_level[level];
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * With block_size != PAGE_SIZE, an in-memory bitmap will need to be
+	 * allocated to track the "verified" status of hash blocks.  Don't allow
+	 * this bitmap to get too large.  For now, limit it to 1 MiB, which
+	 * limits the file size to about 4.4 TB with SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
+	 *
+	 * Together with the fact that the data, and thus also the Merkle tree,
+	 * cannot have more than ULONG_MAX pages, this implies that hash block
+	 * indices can always fit in an 'unsigned long'.  But to be safe, we
+	 * explicitly check for that too.  Note, this is only for hash block
+	 * indices; data block indices might not fit in an 'unsigned long'.
+	 */
+	if ((params->block_size != PAGE_SIZE && offset > 1 << 23) ||
+	    offset > ULONG_MAX) {
+		fsverity_err(inode, "Too many blocks in Merkle tree");
+		err = -EFBIG;
+		goto out_err;
 	}
 
 	params->tree_size = offset << log_blocksize;
+	params->tree_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(params->tree_size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	return 0;
 
 out_err:
@@ -165,7 +196,7 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
 		fsverity_err(inode,
 			     "Error %d initializing Merkle tree parameters",
 			     err);
-		goto out;
+		goto fail;
 	}
 
 	memcpy(vi->root_hash, desc->root_hash, vi->tree_params.digest_size);
@@ -174,20 +205,48 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode,
 				  vi->file_digest);
 	if (err) {
 		fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d computing file digest", err);
-		goto out;
+		goto fail;
 	}
-	pr_debug("Computed file digest: %s:%*phN\n",
-		 vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name,
-		 vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->file_digest);
 
 	err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc->signature,
 					le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size));
-out:
-	if (err) {
-		fsverity_free_info(vi);
-		vi = ERR_PTR(err);
+	if (err)
+		goto fail;
+
+	if (vi->tree_params.block_size != PAGE_SIZE) {
+		/*
+		 * When the Merkle tree block size and page size differ, we use
+		 * a bitmap to keep track of which hash blocks have been
+		 * verified.  This bitmap must contain one bit per hash block,
+		 * including alignment to a page boundary at the end.
+		 *
+		 * Eventually, to support extremely large files in an efficient
+		 * way, it might be necessary to make pages of this bitmap
+		 * reclaimable.  But for now, simply allocating the whole bitmap
+		 * is a simple solution that works well on the files on which
+		 * fsverity is realistically used.  E.g., with SHA-256 and 4K
+		 * blocks, a 100MB file only needs a 24-byte bitmap, and the
+		 * bitmap for any file under 17GB fits in a 4K page.
+		 */
+		unsigned long num_bits =
+			vi->tree_params.tree_pages <<
+			vi->tree_params.log_blocks_per_page;
+
+		vi->hash_block_verified = kvcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(num_bits),
+						   sizeof(unsigned long),
+						   GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!vi->hash_block_verified) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		spin_lock_init(&vi->hash_page_init_lock);
 	}
+
 	return vi;
+
+fail:
+	fsverity_free_info(vi);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
 void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi)
@@ -214,6 +273,7 @@ void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)
 	if (!vi)
 		return;
 	kfree(vi->tree_params.hashstate);
+	kvfree(vi->hash_block_verified);
 	kmem_cache_free(fsverity_info_cachep, vi);
 }
 
@@ -325,67 +385,28 @@ static int ensure_verity_info(struct inode *inode)
 	return err;
 }
 
-/**
- * fsverity_file_open() - prepare to open a verity file
- * @inode: the inode being opened
- * @filp: the struct file being set up
- *
- * When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing.  Otherwise,
- * set up the inode's ->i_verity_info if not already done.
- *
- * When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open().
- * Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
- */
-int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	if (!IS_VERITY(inode))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
-		pr_debug("Denying opening verity file (ino %lu) for write\n",
-			 inode->i_ino);
+	if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 		return -EPERM;
-	}
-
 	return ensure_verity_info(inode);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_file_open);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_file_open);
 
-/**
- * fsverity_prepare_setattr() - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes
- * @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed
- * @attr: attributes to change
- *
- * Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates.  This isn't covered by the
- * open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor.
- *
- * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
- */
-int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 {
-	if (IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
-		pr_debug("Denying truncate of verity file (ino %lu)\n",
-			 d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
+	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
 		return -EPERM;
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_prepare_setattr);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_prepare_setattr);
 
-/**
- * fsverity_cleanup_inode() - free the inode's verity info, if present
- * @inode: an inode being evicted
- *
- * Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info.
- */
-void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
+void __fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	fsverity_free_info(inode->i_verity_info);
 	inode->i_verity_info = NULL;
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_cleanup_inode);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fsverity_cleanup_inode);
 
 int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void)
 {

fs/verity/signature.c

@@ -82,8 +82,6 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
 		return err;
 	}
 
-	pr_debug("Valid signature for file digest %s:%*phN\n",
-		 hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->file_digest);
 	return 0;
 }
 

include/linux/fscrypt.h

@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
 				  unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
 				  u64 lblk_num, gfp_t gfp_flags);
 
-int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned int len,
-				     unsigned int offs);
+int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len,
+				     size_t offs);
 int fscrypt_decrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
 				  unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
 				  u64 lblk_num);
@@ -420,9 +420,8 @@ static inline int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static inline int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct page *page,
-						   unsigned int len,
-						   unsigned int offs)
+static inline int fscrypt_decrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio,
+						   size_t len, size_t offs)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }

include/linux/fsverity.h

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_FSVERITY_H
 
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 #include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/fsverity.h>
@@ -93,8 +94,7 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
 	 *		  isn't already cached.  Implementations may ignore this
 	 *		  argument; it's only a performance optimization.
 	 *
-	 * This can be called at any time on an open verity file, as well as
-	 * between ->begin_enable_verity() and ->end_enable_verity().  It may be
+	 * This can be called at any time on an open verity file.  It may be
 	 * called by multiple processes concurrently, even with the same page.
 	 *
 	 * Note that this must retrieve a *page*, not necessarily a *block*.
@@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
 	 * Write a Merkle tree block to the given inode.
 	 *
 	 * @inode: the inode for which the Merkle tree is being built
-	 * @buf: block to write
-	 * @index: 0-based index of the block within the Merkle tree
-	 * @log_blocksize: log base 2 of the Merkle tree block size
+	 * @buf: the Merkle tree block to write
+	 * @pos: the position of the block in the Merkle tree (in bytes)
+	 * @size: the Merkle tree block size (in bytes)
 	 *
 	 * This is only called between ->begin_enable_verity() and
 	 * ->end_enable_verity().
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ struct fsverity_operations {
 	 * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
 	 */
 	int (*write_merkle_tree_block)(struct inode *inode, const void *buf,
-				       u64 index, int log_blocksize);
+				       u64 pos, unsigned int size);
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY
@@ -148,9 +148,21 @@ int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
 
 /* open.c */
 
-int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
-int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
-void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
+int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);
+int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
+void __fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_cleanup_inode() - free the inode's verity info, if present
+ * @inode: an inode being evicted
+ *
+ * Filesystems must call this on inode eviction to free ->i_verity_info.
+ */
+static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (inode->i_verity_info)
+		__fsverity_cleanup_inode(inode);
+}
 
 /* read_metadata.c */
 
@@ -158,7 +170,7 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg);
 
 /* verify.c */
 
-bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page);
+bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len, size_t offset);
 void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio);
 void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work);
 
@@ -193,15 +205,15 @@ static inline int fsverity_get_digest(struct inode *inode,
 
 /* open.c */
 
-static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+static inline int __fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	return IS_VERITY(inode) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
-static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-					   struct iattr *attr)
+static inline int __fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					     struct iattr *attr)
 {
-	return IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0;
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
 static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode)
@@ -218,7 +230,8 @@ static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp,
 
 /* verify.c */
 
-static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
+static inline bool fsverity_verify_blocks(struct folio *folio, size_t len,
+					  size_t offset)
 {
 	WARN_ON(1);
 	return false;
@@ -236,6 +249,16 @@ static inline void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 #endif	/* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY */
 
+static inline bool fsverity_verify_folio(struct folio *folio)
+{
+	return fsverity_verify_blocks(folio, folio_size(folio), 0);
+}
+
+static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
+{
+	return fsverity_verify_blocks(page_folio(page), PAGE_SIZE, 0);
+}
+
 /**
  * fsverity_active() - do reads from the inode need to go through fs-verity?
  * @inode: inode to check
@@ -254,4 +277,42 @@ static inline bool fsverity_active(const struct inode *inode)
 	return fsverity_get_info(inode) != NULL;
 }
 
+/**
+ * fsverity_file_open() - prepare to open a verity file
+ * @inode: the inode being opened
+ * @filp: the struct file being set up
+ *
+ * When opening a verity file, deny the open if it is for writing.  Otherwise,
+ * set up the inode's ->i_verity_info if not already done.
+ *
+ * When combined with fscrypt, this must be called after fscrypt_file_open().
+ * Otherwise, we won't have the key set up to decrypt the verity metadata.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+static inline int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	if (IS_VERITY(inode))
+		return __fsverity_file_open(inode, filp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fsverity_prepare_setattr() - prepare to change a verity inode's attributes
+ * @dentry: dentry through which the inode is being changed
+ * @attr: attributes to change
+ *
+ * Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates.  This isn't covered by the
+ * open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a path, not a file descriptor.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
+ */
+static inline int fsverity_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+					   struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	if (IS_VERITY(d_inode(dentry)))
+		return __fsverity_prepare_setattr(dentry, attr);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif	/* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */