Commit 688078e7 authored by Randall Huang's avatar Randall Huang Committed by Jaegeuk Kim

f2fs: fix to avoid memory leakage in f2fs_listxattr

In f2fs_listxattr, there is no boundary check before
memcpy e_name to buffer.
If the e_name_len is corrupted,
unexpected memory contents may be returned to the buffer.
Signed-off-by: default avatarRandall Huang <huangrandall@google.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarChao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
parent 9f701f6c
......@@ -539,8 +539,9 @@ int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name,
ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
void *base_addr;
void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
int error = 0;
size_t rest = buffer_size;
......@@ -550,6 +551,8 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
if (error)
return error;
last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
const struct xattr_handler *handler =
f2fs_xattr_handler(entry->e_name_index);
......@@ -557,6 +560,15 @@ ssize_t f2fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
size_t prefix_len;
size_t size;
if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
(void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr) {
f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has corrupted xattr",
inode->i_ino);
set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK);
error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!handler || (handler->list && !handler->list(dentry)))
continue;
......
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