vsprintf: don't obfuscate NULL and error pointers
I don't see what security concern is addressed by obfuscating NULL and IS_ERR() error pointers, printed with %p/%pK. Given the number of sites where %p is used (over 10000) and the fact that NULL pointers aren't uncommon, it probably wouldn't take long for an attacker to find the hash that corresponds to 0. Although harder, the same goes for most common error values, such as -1, -2, -11, -14, etc. The NULL part actually fixes a regression: NULL pointers weren't obfuscated until commit 3e5903eb ("vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers") which went into 5.2. I'm tacking the IS_ERR() part on here because error pointers won't leak kernel addresses and printing them as pointers shouldn't be any different from e.g. %d with PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(). Obfuscating them just makes debugging based on existing pr_debug and friends excruciating. Note that the "always print 0's for %pK when kptr_restrict == 2" behaviour which goes way back is left as is. Example output with the patch applied: ptr error-ptr NULL %p: 0000000001f8cc5b fffffffffffffff2 0000000000000000 %pK, kptr = 0: 0000000001f8cc5b fffffffffffffff2 0000000000000000 %px: ffff888048c04020 fffffffffffffff2 0000000000000000 %pK, kptr = 1: ffff888048c04020 fffffffffffffff2 0000000000000000 %pK, kptr = 2: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Fixes: 3e5903eb ("vsprintf: Prevent crash when dereferencing invalid pointers") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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