Commit 82a11e9c authored by Bandan Das's avatar Bandan Das Committed by Paolo Bonzini

KVM: SVM: Add emulation support for #GP triggered by SVM instructions

While running SVM related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD), some AMD
CPUs check EAX against reserved memory regions (e.g. SMM memory on host)
before checking VMCB's instruction intercept. If EAX falls into such
memory areas, #GP is triggered before VMEXIT. This causes problem under
nested virtualization. To solve this problem, KVM needs to trap #GP and
check the instructions triggering #GP. For VM execution instructions,
KVM emulates these instructions.
Co-developed-by: default avatarWei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarWei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210126081831.570253-3-wei.huang2@amd.com>
[Conditionally enable #GP intercept. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: default avatarPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
parent 4aa2691d
......@@ -200,6 +200,8 @@ module_param(sev_es, int, 0444);
bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
bool svm_gp_erratum_intercept = true;
static u8 rsm_ins_bytes[] = "\x0f\xaa";
static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
......@@ -288,6 +290,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
if (!(efer & EFER_SVME)) {
svm_leave_nested(svm);
svm_set_gif(svm, true);
/* #GP intercept is still needed for vmware backdoor */
if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
/*
* Free the nested guest state, unless we are in SMM.
......@@ -304,6 +309,9 @@ int svm_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
vcpu->arch.efer = old_efer;
return ret;
}
if (svm_gp_erratum_intercept)
set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
}
}
......@@ -1962,24 +1970,6 @@ static int ac_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return 1;
}
static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
/*
* VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles IN{S},
* OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero error code.
*/
if (error_code) {
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
}
return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
}
static bool is_erratum_383(void)
{
int err, i;
......@@ -2178,6 +2168,89 @@ static int vmrun_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return nested_svm_vmrun(svm);
}
enum {
NONE_SVM_INSTR,
SVM_INSTR_VMRUN,
SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD,
SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE,
};
/* Return NONE_SVM_INSTR if not SVM instrs, otherwise return decode result */
static int svm_instr_opcode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
if (ctxt->b != 0x1 || ctxt->opcode_len != 2)
return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
switch (ctxt->modrm) {
case 0xd8: /* VMRUN */
return SVM_INSTR_VMRUN;
case 0xda: /* VMLOAD */
return SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD;
case 0xdb: /* VMSAVE */
return SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE;
default:
break;
}
return NONE_SVM_INSTR;
}
static int emulate_svm_instr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int opcode)
{
int (*const svm_instr_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
[SVM_INSTR_VMRUN] = vmrun_interception,
[SVM_INSTR_VMLOAD] = vmload_interception,
[SVM_INSTR_VMSAVE] = vmsave_interception,
};
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
return svm_instr_handlers[opcode](svm);
}
/*
* #GP handling code. Note that #GP can be triggered under the following two
* cases:
* 1) SVM VM-related instructions (VMRUN/VMSAVE/VMLOAD) that trigger #GP on
* some AMD CPUs when EAX of these instructions are in the reserved memory
* regions (e.g. SMM memory on host).
* 2) VMware backdoor
*/
static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
int opcode;
/* Both #GP cases have zero error_code */
if (error_code)
goto reinject;
/* Decode the instruction for usage later */
if (x86_decode_emulated_instruction(vcpu, 0, NULL, 0) != EMULATION_OK)
goto reinject;
opcode = svm_instr_opcode(vcpu);
if (opcode == NONE_SVM_INSTR) {
if (!enable_vmware_backdoor)
goto reinject;
/*
* VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
* IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC.
*/
return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu,
EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP | EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE);
} else
return emulate_svm_instr(vcpu, opcode);
reinject:
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
}
void svm_set_gif(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool value)
{
if (value) {
......
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