Merge branch 'for-linus' of...

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (38 commits)
  SELinux: Make selinux_kernel_create_files_as() shouldn't just always return 0
  TOMOYO: Protect find_task_by_vpid() with RCU.
  Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variable
  selinux: libsepol: remove dead code in check_avtab_hierarchy_callback()
  TOMOYO: Remove __func__ from tomoyo_is_correct_path/domain
  security: fix a couple of sparse warnings
  TOMOYO: Remove unneeded parameter.
  TOMOYO: Use shorter names.
  TOMOYO: Use enum for index numbers.
  TOMOYO: Add garbage collector.
  TOMOYO: Add refcounter on domain structure.
  TOMOYO: Merge headers.
  TOMOYO: Add refcounter on string data.
  TOMOYO: Reduce lines by using common path for addition and deletion.
  selinux: fix memory leak in sel_make_bools
  TOMOYO: Extract bitfield
  syslog: clean up needless comment
  syslog: use defined constants instead of raw numbers
  syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscalls
  selinux: allow MLS->non-MLS and vice versa upon policy reload
  ...

fs/proc/kmsg.c

@@ -12,37 +12,37 @@
 #include <linux/poll.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
 extern wait_queue_head_t log_wait;
 
-extern int do_syslog(int type, char __user *bug, int count);
-
 static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
 {
-	return do_syslog(1,NULL,0);
+	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
 }
 
 static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
 {
-	(void) do_syslog(0,NULL,0);
+	(void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && !do_syslog(9, NULL, 0))
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) &&
+	    !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
 		return -EAGAIN;
-	return do_syslog(2, buf, count);
+	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE);
 }
 
 static unsigned int kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait);
-	if (do_syslog(9, NULL, 0))
+	if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_FILE))
 		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
 	return 0;
 }

include/linux/security.h

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
-extern int cap_syslog(int type);
+extern int cap_syslog(int type, bool from_file);
 extern int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
 
 struct msghdr;
@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ struct seq_file;
 extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 extern int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 
+void reset_security_ops(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
 extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr;
@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	Check permissions on incoming network packets.  This hook is distinct
  *	from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
  *	incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
+ *	Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
  *	@sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
  *	@skb contains the incoming network data.
  * @socket_getpeersec_stream:
@@ -1348,6 +1351,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	logging to the console.
  *	See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values.
  *	@type contains the type of action.
+ *	@from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc).
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @settime:
  *	Check permission to change the system time.
@@ -1462,7 +1466,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 	int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 	int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*syslog) (int type);
+	int (*syslog) (int type, bool from_file);
 	int (*settime) (struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
 	int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
 
@@ -1761,7 +1765,7 @@ int security_acct(struct file *file);
 int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_syslog(int type);
+int security_syslog(int type, bool from_file);
 int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
 int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages);
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
@@ -2007,9 +2011,9 @@ static inline int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_syslog(int type)
+static inline int security_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
 {
-	return cap_syslog(type);
+	return cap_syslog(type, from_file);
 }
 
 static inline int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)

include/linux/syslog.h

+/*  Syslog internals
+ *
+ *  Copyright 2010 Canonical, Ltd.
+ *  Author: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
+ *
+ *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+ *  any later version.
+ *
+ *  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with this program; see the file COPYING.  If not, write to
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_SYSLOG_H
+#define _LINUX_SYSLOG_H
+
+/* Close the log.  Currently a NOP. */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE          0
+/* Open the log. Currently a NOP. */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN           1
+/* Read from the log. */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_READ           2
+/* Read all messages remaining in the ring buffer. */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL       3
+/* Read and clear all messages remaining in the ring buffer */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR     4
+/* Clear ring buffer. */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR          5
+/* Disable printk's to console */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF    6
+/* Enable printk's to console */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON     7
+/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL  8
+/* Return number of unread characters in the log buffer */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD    9
+/* Return size of the log buffer */
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER   10
+
+#define SYSLOG_FROM_CALL 0
+#define SYSLOG_FROM_FILE 1
+
+int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int count, bool from_file);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SYSLOG_H */

kernel/capability.c

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
 	if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
 		struct task_struct *target;
 
-		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_lock();
 
 		target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
 		if (!target)
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
 		else
 			ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
 
-		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 	} else
 		ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
 

kernel/printk.c

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -258,38 +259,23 @@ static inline void boot_delay_msec(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-/*
- * Commands to do_syslog:
- *
- * 	0 -- Close the log.  Currently a NOP.
- * 	1 -- Open the log. Currently a NOP.
- * 	2 -- Read from the log.
- * 	3 -- Read all messages remaining in the ring buffer.
- * 	4 -- Read and clear all messages remaining in the ring buffer
- * 	5 -- Clear ring buffer.
- * 	6 -- Disable printk's to console
- * 	7 -- Enable printk's to console
- *	8 -- Set level of messages printed to console
- *	9 -- Return number of unread characters in the log buffer
- *     10 -- Return size of the log buffer
- */
-int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len)
+int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file)
 {
 	unsigned i, j, limit, count;
 	int do_clear = 0;
 	char c;
 	int error = 0;
 
-	error = security_syslog(type);
+	error = security_syslog(type, from_file);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
 	switch (type) {
-	case 0:		/* Close log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE:	/* Close log */
 		break;
-	case 1:		/* Open log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN:	/* Open log */
 		break;
-	case 2:		/* Read from log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ:	/* Read from log */
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (!buf || len < 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -320,10 +306,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len)
 		if (!error)
 			error = i;
 		break;
-	case 4:		/* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+	/* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR:
 		do_clear = 1;
 		/* FALL THRU */
-	case 3:		/* Read last kernel messages */
+	/* Read last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (!buf || len < 0)
 			goto out;
@@ -376,21 +364,25 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len)
 			}
 		}
 		break;
-	case 5:		/* Clear ring buffer */
+	/* Clear ring buffer */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR:
 		logged_chars = 0;
 		break;
-	case 6:		/* Disable logging to console */
+	/* Disable logging to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:
 		if (saved_console_loglevel == -1)
 			saved_console_loglevel = console_loglevel;
 		console_loglevel = minimum_console_loglevel;
 		break;
-	case 7:		/* Enable logging to console */
+	/* Enable logging to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:
 		if (saved_console_loglevel != -1) {
 			console_loglevel = saved_console_loglevel;
 			saved_console_loglevel = -1;
 		}
 		break;
-	case 8:		/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (len < 1 || len > 8)
 			goto out;
@@ -401,10 +393,12 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len)
 		saved_console_loglevel = -1;
 		error = 0;
 		break;
-	case 9:		/* Number of chars in the log buffer */
+	/* Number of chars in the log buffer */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD:
 		error = log_end - log_start;
 		break;
-	case 10:	/* Size of the log buffer */
+	/* Size of the log buffer */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:
 		error = log_buf_len;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -417,7 +411,7 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len)
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len)
 {
-	return do_syslog(type, buf, len);
+	return do_syslog(type, buf, len, SYSLOG_FROM_CALL);
 }
 
 /*

security/capability.c

@@ -906,10 +906,6 @@ static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
-struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
-	.name	= "default",
-};
-
 #define set_to_cap_if_null(ops, function)				\
 	do {								\
 		if (!ops->function) {					\

security/commoncap.c

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -888,13 +889,17 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 /**
  * cap_syslog - Determine whether syslog function is permitted
  * @type: Function requested
+ * @from_file: Whether this request came from an open file (i.e. /proc)
  *
  * Determine whether the current process is permitted to use a particular
  * syslog function, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
  */
-int cap_syslog(int type)
+int cap_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
 {
-	if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN && from_file)
+		return 0;
+	if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL &&
+	     type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
 }

security/security.c

@@ -23,10 +23,12 @@ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
 	CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
 
 /* things that live in capability.c */
-extern struct security_operations default_security_ops;
 extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
 
-struct security_operations *security_ops;	/* Initialized to NULL */
+static struct security_operations *security_ops;
+static struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
+	.name	= "default",
+};
 
 static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
@@ -63,6 +65,11 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void reset_security_ops(void)
+{
+	security_ops = &default_security_ops;
+}
+
 /* Save user chosen LSM */
 static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
 {
@@ -203,9 +210,9 @@ int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return security_ops->quota_on(dentry);
 }
 
-int security_syslog(int type)
+int security_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
 {
-	return security_ops->syslog(type);
+	return security_ops->syslog(type, from_file);
 }
 
 int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
@@ -389,42 +396,42 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
-int security_path_mknod(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 			unsigned int dev)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_mknod(path, dentry, mode, dev);
+	return security_ops->path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
 
-int security_path_mkdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_mkdir(path, dentry, mode);
+	return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
 }
 
-int security_path_rmdir(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_rmdir(path, dentry);
+	return security_ops->path_rmdir(dir, dentry);
 }
 
-int security_path_unlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry)
+int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_unlink(path, dentry);
+	return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
 }
 
-int security_path_symlink(struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry,
+int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			  const char *old_name)
 {
-	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir->dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->path_symlink(path, dentry, old_name);
+	return security_ops->path_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
 }
 
 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -630,14 +637,14 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
-		return 0;
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return security_ops->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
 }
 
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
-		return 0;
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return security_ops->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags);
 }
 

security/selinux/avc.c

@@ -489,17 +489,14 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	u32 denied, audited;
 	denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
-	if (denied) {
-		audited = denied;
-		if (!(audited & avd->auditdeny))
-			return;
-	} else if (result) {
+	if (denied)
+		audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+	else if (result)
 		audited = denied = requested;
-	} else {
-		audited = requested;
-		if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
-			return;
-	}
+	else
+		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+	if (!audited)
+		return;
 	if (!a) {
 		a = &stack_data;
 		memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
@@ -746,9 +743,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		else
 			avd = &avd_entry;
 
-		rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
-		if (rc)
-			goto out;
+		security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
 	} else {
@@ -770,7 +765,6 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-out:
 	return rc;
 }
 

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -125,13 +126,6 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
-
-/*
- * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
- * just to allow the use of the capability module.
- */
-static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
-
 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
    before the policy was loaded. */
 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
@@ -2049,29 +2043,30 @@ static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
 }
 
-static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = cap_syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	switch (type) {
-	case 3:		/* Read last kernel messages */
-	case 10:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:	/* Read last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
 		rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
 		break;
-	case 6:		/* Disable logging to console */
-	case 7:		/* Enable logging to console */
-	case 8:		/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:	/* Disable logging to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:	/* Enable logging to console */
+	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
 		rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
 		break;
-	case 0:		/* Close log */
-	case 1:		/* Open log */
-	case 2:		/* Read from log */
-	case 4:		/* Read/clear last kernel messages */
-	case 5:		/* Clear ring buffer */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE:	/* Close log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN:	/* Open log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ:	/* Read from log */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR:	/* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR:	/* Clear ring buffer */
 	default:
 		rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
 		break;
@@ -3334,7 +3329,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 
 	if (ret == 0)
 		tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
@@ -5672,9 +5667,6 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
-	secondary_ops = security_ops;
-	if (!secondary_ops)
-		panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
 	if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
 		panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
 
@@ -5835,8 +5827,7 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
 	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
-	/* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
-	security_ops = secondary_ops;
+	reset_security_ops();
 
 	/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
 	avc_disable();

security/selinux/include/security.h

@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
 
 extern int selinux_enabled;
-extern int selinux_mls_enabled;
 
 /* Policy capabilities */
 enum {
@@ -80,6 +79,8 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 /* limitation of boundary depth  */
 #define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH	4
 
+int security_mls_enabled(void);
+
 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
 
 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
@@ -96,13 +97,11 @@ struct av_decision {
 /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
-int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			struct av_decision *avd);
+void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			     u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			     struct av_decision *avd);
+void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			    u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);

security/selinux/selinuxfs.c

@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_mls_enabled);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   security_mls_enabled());
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -494,7 +495,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *scon, *tcon;
 	u32 ssid, tsid;
 	u16 tclass;
-	u32 req;
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	ssize_t length;
 
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		goto out;
 
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon, &tclass, &req) != 4)
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out2;
 
 	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
@@ -522,9 +522,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length < 0)
 		goto out2;
 
-	length = security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd);
-	if (length < 0)
-		goto out2;
+	security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
 			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
@@ -979,6 +977,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	u32 sid;
 
 	/* remove any existing files */
+	for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
+		kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
 	kfree(bool_pending_names);
 	kfree(bool_pending_values);
 	bool_pending_names = NULL;

security/selinux/ss/context.h

@@ -41,9 +41,6 @@ static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
-		return 0;
-
 	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
 	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
 	if (rc)
@@ -64,9 +61,6 @@ static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
-		return 0;
-
 	dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
 	rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
 	if (rc)
@@ -82,9 +76,6 @@ static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
 
 static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 {
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
-		return 1;
-
 	return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
 		ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
 		(c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
@@ -93,9 +84,6 @@ static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 
 static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
 {
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
-		return;
-
 	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
 	mls_context_init(c);

security/selinux/ss/mls.c

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	scontextp = *scontext;
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
 {
 	struct user_datum *usrdatum;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 1;
 
 	if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
 	struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
 	int l, rc = -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled) {
+	if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
 		if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
 			*scontext += strlen(*scontext)+1;
 		return 0;
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	char *tmpstr, *freestr;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 /*
  * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
  */
-static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
 				struct mls_range *range)
 {
 	int l, rc = 0;
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
 int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon)
 {
-	if (selinux_mls_enabled) {
+	if (policydb.mls_enabled) {
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
 		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 	int l, i;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
@@ -513,23 +513,21 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		    u32 specified,
 		    struct context *newcontext)
 {
-	struct range_trans *rtr;
+	struct range_trans rtr;
+	struct mls_range *r;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	switch (specified) {
 	case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
 		/* Look for a range transition rule. */
-		for (rtr = policydb.range_tr; rtr; rtr = rtr->next) {
-			if (rtr->source_type == scontext->type &&
-			    rtr->target_type == tcontext->type &&
-			    rtr->target_class == tclass) {
-				/* Set the range from the rule */
-				return mls_range_set(newcontext,
-						     &rtr->target_range);
-			}
-		}
+		rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
+		rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
+		rtr.target_class = tclass;
+		r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr);
+		if (r)
+			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
 		if (tclass == policydb.process_class)
@@ -541,8 +539,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 	case AVTAB_MEMBER:
 		/* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
 		return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
-	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* fall through */
 	}
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
@@ -561,7 +559,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
@@ -581,7 +579,7 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
 void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
@@ -603,7 +601,7 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
@@ -631,7 +629,7 @@ int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,

security/selinux/ss/mls.h

@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
 
 int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask);
 
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
+
 int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 			struct policydb *newp,
 			struct context *context);

security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
 
 #include "security.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
 
 struct mls_level {
 	u32 sens;		/* sensitivity */
@@ -27,18 +28,12 @@ struct mls_range {
 
 static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
 {
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
-		return 1;
-
 	return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
 		ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
 }
 
 static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
 {
-	if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
-		return 1;
-
 	return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
 		ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
 }

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ static char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
 };
 #endif
 
-int selinux_mls_enabled;
-
 static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
 	2,
 	32,
@@ -177,6 +175,21 @@ static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
 	goto out;
 }
 
+static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
+{
+	const struct range_trans *key = k;
+	return (key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
+		(key->target_class << 5)) & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+	return (key1->source_type != key2->source_type ||
+		key1->target_type != key2->target_type ||
+		key1->target_class != key2->target_class);
+}
+
 /*
  * Initialize a policy database structure.
  */
@@ -204,6 +217,10 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_free_symtab;
 
+	p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
+	if (!p->range_tr)
+		goto out_free_symtab;
+
 	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -408,6 +425,20 @@ static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
 		       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
 	}
 }
+
+static void rangetr_hash_eval(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+	struct hashtab_info info;
+
+	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: rangetr:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+	       "longest chain length %d\n", h->nel,
+	       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+}
+#else
+static inline void rangetr_hash_eval(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+}
 #endif
 
 /*
@@ -422,7 +453,7 @@ static int policydb_index_others(struct policydb *p)
 
 	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
 	       p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
-	if (selinux_mls_enabled)
+	if (p->mls_enabled)
 		printk(", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
 		       p->p_cats.nprim);
 	printk("\n");
@@ -612,6 +643,17 @@ static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
 	cat_destroy,
 };
 
+static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct mls_range *rt = datum;
+	kfree(key);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
+	ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
+	kfree(datum);
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
 {
 	context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
@@ -632,7 +674,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	int i;
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
 	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
-	struct range_trans *rt, *lrt = NULL;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
 		cond_resched();
@@ -693,20 +734,8 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	}
 	kfree(lra);
 
-	for (rt = p->range_tr; rt; rt = rt->next) {
-		cond_resched();
-		if (lrt) {
-			ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
-			ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat);
-			kfree(lrt);
-		}
-		lrt = rt;
-	}
-	if (lrt) {
-		ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[0].cat);
-		ebitmap_destroy(&lrt->target_range.level[1].cat);
-		kfree(lrt);
-	}
+	hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
 
 	if (p->type_attr_map) {
 		for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
@@ -1686,12 +1715,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	int i, j, rc;
 	__le32 buf[4];
 	u32 nodebuf[8];
-	u32 len, len2, config, nprim, nel, nel2;
+	u32 len, len2, nprim, nel, nel2;
 	char *policydb_str;
 	struct policydb_compat_info *info;
-	struct range_trans *rt, *lrt;
-
-	config = 0;
+	struct range_trans *rt;
+	struct mls_range *r;
 
 	rc = policydb_init(p);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1740,7 +1768,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	kfree(policydb_str);
 	policydb_str = NULL;
 
-	/* Read the version, config, and table sizes. */
+	/* Read the version and table sizes. */
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto bad;
@@ -1755,13 +1783,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	}
 
 	if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
-		if (ss_initialized && !selinux_mls_enabled) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Cannot switch between non-MLS"
-				" and MLS policies\n");
-			goto bad;
-		}
-		selinux_mls_enabled = 1;
-		config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+		p->mls_enabled = 1;
 
 		if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
 			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: security policydb version %d "
@@ -1769,12 +1791,6 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 				p->policyvers);
 			goto bad;
 		}
-	} else {
-		if (ss_initialized && selinux_mls_enabled) {
-			printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Cannot switch between MLS and"
-				" non-MLS policies\n");
-			goto bad;
-		}
 	}
 	p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
 	p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
@@ -2122,44 +2138,61 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		if (rc < 0)
 			goto bad;
 		nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
-		lrt = NULL;
 		for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
 			rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!rt) {
 				rc = -ENOMEM;
 				goto bad;
 			}
-			if (lrt)
-				lrt->next = rt;
-			else
-				p->range_tr = rt;
 			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
-			if (rc < 0)
+			if (rc < 0) {
+				kfree(rt);
 				goto bad;
+			}
 			rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 			rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 			if (new_rangetr) {
 				rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
-				if (rc < 0)
+				if (rc < 0) {
+					kfree(rt);
 					goto bad;
+				}
 				rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 			} else
 				rt->target_class = p->process_class;
 			if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
 			    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
 			    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) {
+				kfree(rt);
 				rc = -EINVAL;
 				goto bad;
 			}
-			rc = mls_read_range_helper(&rt->target_range, fp);
-			if (rc)
+			r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!r) {
+				kfree(rt);
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
 				goto bad;
-			if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &rt->target_range)) {
+			}
+			rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+			if (rc) {
+				kfree(rt);
+				kfree(r);
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
 				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  rangetrans:  invalid range\n");
+				kfree(rt);
+				kfree(r);
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r);
+			if (rc) {
+				kfree(rt);
+				kfree(r);
 				goto bad;
 			}
-			lrt = rt;
 		}
+		rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
 	}
 
 	p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim*sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);

security/selinux/ss/policydb.h

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
 #include "symtab.h"
 #include "avtab.h"
 #include "sidtab.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
 #include "context.h"
 #include "constraint.h"
 
@@ -113,8 +115,6 @@ struct range_trans {
 	u32 source_type;
 	u32 target_type;
 	u32 target_class;
-	struct mls_range target_range;
-	struct range_trans *next;
 };
 
 /* Boolean data type */
@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ struct genfs {
 
 /* The policy database */
 struct policydb {
+	int mls_enabled;
+
 	/* symbol tables */
 	struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
 #define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
@@ -240,8 +242,8 @@ struct policydb {
 	   fixed labeling behavior. */
 	struct genfs *genfs;
 
-	/* range transitions */
-	struct range_trans *range_tr;
+	/* range transitions table (range_trans_key -> mls_range) */
+	struct hashtab *range_tr;
 
 	/* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
 	struct ebitmap *type_attr_map;

security/smack/smack_lsm.c

@@ -157,12 +157,12 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-static int smack_syslog(int type)
+static int smack_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
 {
 	int rc;
 	char *sp = current_security();
 
-	rc = cap_syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 

security/tomoyo/Makefile

-obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o
+obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o

security/tomoyo/gc.c

+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/gc.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2010  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+
+enum tomoyo_gc_id {
+	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER,
+	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER,
+	TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS,
+	TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE,
+	TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN,
+	TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE,
+	TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER,
+	TOMOYO_ID_NAME,
+	TOMOYO_ID_ACL,
+	TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN
+};
+
+struct tomoyo_gc_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	int type;
+	void *element;
+};
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_gc_queue);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_gc_mutex);
+
+/* Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex. */
+static bool tomoyo_add_to_gc(const int type, void *element)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_gc_entry *entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!entry)
+		return false;
+	entry->type = type;
+	entry->element = element;
+	list_add(&entry->list, &tomoyo_gc_queue);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_allow_read
+(struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->pattern);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->pattern);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_domain_initializer
+(struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_domain_keeper(struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_alias(struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->original_name);
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->aliased_name);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_manager(struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr)
+{
+	tomoyo_put_name(ptr->manager);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl)
+{
+	switch (acl->type) {
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename);
+		}
+		break;
+	case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
+		{
+			struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry
+				= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
+			tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename1);
+			tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename2);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n");
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
+	struct tomoyo_acl_info *tmp;
+	/*
+	 * Since we don't protect whole execve() operation using SRCU,
+	 * we need to recheck domain->users at this point.
+	 *
+	 * (1) Reader starts SRCU section upon execve().
+	 * (2) Reader traverses tomoyo_domain_list and finds this domain.
+	 * (3) Writer marks this domain as deleted.
+	 * (4) Garbage collector removes this domain from tomoyo_domain_list
+	 *     because this domain is marked as deleted and used by nobody.
+	 * (5) Reader saves reference to this domain into
+	 *     "struct linux_binprm"->cred->security .
+	 * (6) Reader finishes SRCU section, although execve() operation has
+	 *     not finished yet.
+	 * (7) Garbage collector waits for SRCU synchronization.
+	 * (8) Garbage collector kfree() this domain because this domain is
+	 *     used by nobody.
+	 * (9) Reader finishes execve() operation and restores this domain from
+	 *     "struct linux_binprm"->cred->security.
+	 *
+	 * By updating domain->users at (5), we can solve this race problem
+	 * by rechecking domain->users at (8).
+	 */
+	if (atomic_read(&domain->users))
+		return false;
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(acl, tmp, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+		tomoyo_del_acl(acl);
+		tomoyo_memory_free(acl);
+	}
+	tomoyo_put_name(domain->domainname);
+	return true;
+}
+
+
+static void tomoyo_del_name(const struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr)
+{
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list,
+					list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list,
+					list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list,
+					list) {
+			if (!ptr->is_deleted)
+				continue;
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER, ptr))
+				list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	{
+		struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+			struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl;
+			list_for_each_entry_rcu(acl, &domain->acl_info_list,
+						list) {
+				switch (acl->type) {
+				case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL:
+					if (container_of(acl,
+					 struct tomoyo_path_acl,
+							 head)->perm ||
+					    container_of(acl,
+					 struct tomoyo_path_acl,
+							 head)->perm_high)
+						continue;
+					break;
+				case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
+					if (container_of(acl,
+					 struct tomoyo_path2_acl,
+							 head)->perm)
+						continue;
+					break;
+				default:
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ACL, acl))
+					list_del_rcu(&acl->list);
+				else
+					break;
+			}
+			if (!domain->is_deleted || atomic_read(&domain->users))
+				continue;
+			/*
+			 * Nobody is referring this domain. But somebody may
+			 * refer this domain after successful execve().
+			 * We recheck domain->users after SRCU synchronization.
+			 */
+			if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, domain))
+				list_del_rcu(&domain->list);
+			else
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+	mutex_lock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+	{
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) {
+			struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr;
+			list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[i],
+						list) {
+				if (atomic_read(&ptr->users))
+					continue;
+				if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NAME, ptr))
+					list_del_rcu(&ptr->list);
+				else {
+					i = TOMOYO_MAX_HASH;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_kfree_entry(void)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_gc_entry *p;
+	struct tomoyo_gc_entry *tmp;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &tomoyo_gc_queue, list) {
+		switch (p->type) {
+		case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER:
+			tomoyo_del_domain_initializer(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER:
+			tomoyo_del_domain_keeper(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS:
+			tomoyo_del_alias(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE:
+			tomoyo_del_allow_read(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN:
+			tomoyo_del_file_pattern(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE:
+			tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER:
+			tomoyo_del_manager(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_NAME:
+			tomoyo_del_name(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_ACL:
+			tomoyo_del_acl(p->element);
+			break;
+		case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN:
+			if (!tomoyo_del_domain(p->element))
+				continue;
+			break;
+		default:
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n");
+			break;
+		}
+		tomoyo_memory_free(p->element);
+		list_del(&p->list);
+		kfree(p);
+	}
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_gc_thread(void *unused)
+{
+	daemonize("GC for TOMOYO");
+	if (mutex_trylock(&tomoyo_gc_mutex)) {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+			tomoyo_collect_entry();
+			if (list_empty(&tomoyo_gc_queue))
+				break;
+			synchronize_srcu(&tomoyo_ss);
+			tomoyo_kfree_entry();
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_gc_mutex);
+	}
+	do_exit(0);
+}
+
+void tomoyo_run_gc(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task = kthread_create(tomoyo_gc_thread, NULL,
+						  "GC for TOMOYO");
+	if (!IS_ERR(task))
+		wake_up_process(task);
+}

security/tomoyo/realpath.h

-/*
- * security/tomoyo/realpath.h
- *
- * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
- *
- * Version: 2.2.0   2009/04/01
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
-#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
-
-struct path;
-struct tomoyo_path_info;
-struct tomoyo_io_buffer;
-
-/* Convert binary string to ascii string. */
-int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str);
-
-/* Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. */
-int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
-			       int newname_len);
-
-/*
- * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
- * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
- * if these functions didn't return NULL.
- */
-char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname);
-/*
- * Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that it doesn't follow the final symlink.
- */
-char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname);
-/* Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that the pathname is already solved. */
-char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path);
-
-/*
- * Allocate memory for ACL entry.
- * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
- */
-void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size);
-
-/*
- * Keep the given name on the RAM.
- * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
- */
-const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name);
-
-/* Allocate memory for temporary use (e.g. permission checks). */
-void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size);
-
-/* Free memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc(). */
-void tomoyo_free(const void *p);
-
-/* Check for memory usage. */
-int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
-
-/* Set memory quota. */
-int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
-
-/* Initialize realpath related code. */
-void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void);
-
-#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H) */

security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c

@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include "common.h"
-#include "tomoyo.h"
-#include "realpath.h"
 
 static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -23,21 +21,23 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
 static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			       gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	/*
-	 * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
-	 * we don't need to duplicate.
-	 */
-	new->security = old->security;
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = old->security;
+	new->security = domain;
+	if (domain)
+		atomic_inc(&domain->users);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	/*
-	 * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
-	 * we don't need to duplicate.
-	 */
-	new->security = old->security;
+	tomoyo_cred_prepare(new, old, 0);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+	if (domain)
+		atomic_dec(&domain->users);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -60,6 +60,14 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 */
 	if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
 		tomoyo_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+	/*
+	 * Release reference to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" stored inside
+	 * "bprm->cred->security". New reference to "struct tomoyo_domain_info"
+	 * stored inside "bprm->cred->security" will be acquired later inside
+	 * tomoyo_find_next_domain().
+	 */
+	atomic_dec(&((struct tomoyo_domain_info *)
+		     bprm->cred->security)->users);
 	/*
 	 * Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
 	 * execve operation.
@@ -76,8 +84,12 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
 	 * using current domain.
 	 */
-	if (!domain)
-		return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
+	if (!domain) {
+		const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock();
+		const int err = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
+		tomoyo_read_unlock(idx);
+		return err;
+	}
 	/*
 	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
 	 */
@@ -87,67 +99,56 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
 				unsigned int time_attrs)
 {
-	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
-				       path);
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, path);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
-	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL,
-				       &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK, &path);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 			     int mode)
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
-	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL,
-				       &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
-	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL,
-				       &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR, &path);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 			       const char *old_name)
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
-	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL,
-				       &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK, &path);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 			     int mode, unsigned int dev)
 {
 	struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
-	int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL;
+	int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE;
 
 	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 	case S_IFCHR:
-		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL;
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR;
 		break;
 	case S_IFBLK:
-		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL;
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK;
 		break;
 	case S_IFIFO:
-		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL;
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO;
 		break;
 	case S_IFSOCK:
-		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL;
+		type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK;
 		break;
 	}
-	return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       type, &path);
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(type, &path);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
@@ -155,9 +156,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
 {
 	struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
 	struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
-	return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL,
-				       &path1, &path2);
+	return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK, &path1, &path2);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
@@ -167,16 +166,14 @@ static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
 {
 	struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
 	struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
-	return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
-				       TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL,
-				       &path1, &path2);
+	return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME, &path1, &path2);
 }
 
 static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			     unsigned long arg)
 {
 	if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
-		return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(tomoyo_domain(), file);
+		return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(file);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -189,6 +186,51 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
 	return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
 }
 
+static int tomoyo_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			     mode_t mode)
+{
+	struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+	if (uid != (uid_t) -1)
+		error = tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path);
+	if (!error && gid != (gid_t) -1)
+		error = tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+			   char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT, path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
+	return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT, &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
+{
+	return tomoyo_path2_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT, new_path, old_path);
+}
+
 /*
  * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
  * registering TOMOYO.
@@ -198,6 +240,7 @@ static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
 	.cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
 	.cred_transfer	     = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
+	.cred_free           = tomoyo_cred_free,
 	.bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
 	.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
 	.file_fcntl          = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
@@ -210,8 +253,18 @@ static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
 	.path_mknod          = tomoyo_path_mknod,
 	.path_link           = tomoyo_path_link,
 	.path_rename         = tomoyo_path_rename,
+	.file_ioctl          = tomoyo_file_ioctl,
+	.path_chmod          = tomoyo_path_chmod,
+	.path_chown          = tomoyo_path_chown,
+	.path_chroot         = tomoyo_path_chroot,
+	.sb_mount            = tomoyo_sb_mount,
+	.sb_umount           = tomoyo_sb_umount,
+	.sb_pivotroot        = tomoyo_sb_pivotroot,
 };
 
+/* Lock for GC. */
+struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss;
+
 static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
 {
 	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
@@ -219,7 +272,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
 	if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
 		return 0;
 	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
-	if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+	if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops) ||
+	    init_srcu_struct(&tomoyo_ss))
 		panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
 	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
 	cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;

security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h

-/*
- * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
- *
- * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2005-2009  NTT DATA CORPORATION
- *
- * Version: 2.2.0   2009/04/01
- *
- */
-
-#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
-#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
-
-struct tomoyo_path_info;
-struct path;
-struct inode;
-struct linux_binprm;
-struct pt_regs;
-
-int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-			   const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename);
-int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-				 struct path *path, const int flag);
-int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-			    const u8 operation, struct path *path);
-int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-			    const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
-			    struct path *path2);
-int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
-				    struct file *filp);
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-
-/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
-
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL                 0
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL                 1
-
-/* Index numbers for File Controls. */
-
-/*
- * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set
- * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and
- * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set.
- * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or
- * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are
- * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared.
- */
-
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL    0
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL       1
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL          2
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL         3
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL        4
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL        5
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL         6
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL         7
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL        8
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL        9
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL      10
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL       11
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL     12
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL      13
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL      14
-#define TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15
-
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL         0
-#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL       1
-#define TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2
-
-#define TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY          0
-#define TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY       1
-#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS         2
-#define TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS        3
-#define TOMOYO_MEMINFO               4
-#define TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN            5
-#define TOMOYO_VERSION               6
-#define TOMOYO_PROFILE               7
-#define TOMOYO_MANAGER               8
-
-extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
-
-static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
-{
-	return current_cred()->security;
-}
-
-static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
-							    *task)
-{
-	return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
-}
-
-#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */