Commit 8c27bd75 authored by Florian Westphal's avatar Florian Westphal Committed by David S. Miller

tcp: syncookies: reduce cookie lifetime to 128 seconds

We currently accept cookies that were created less than 4 minutes ago
(ie, cookies with counter delta 0-3).  Combined with the 8 mss table
values, this yields 32 possible values (out of 2**32) that will be valid.

Reducing the lifetime to < 2 minutes halves the guessing chance while
still providing a large enough period.

While at it, get rid of jiffies value -- they overflow too quickly on
32 bit platforms.

getnstimeofday is used to create a counter that increments every 64s.
perf shows getnstimeofday cost is negible compared to sha_transform;
normal tcp initial sequence number generation uses getnstimeofday, too.
Reported-by: default avatarJakob Lell <jakob@jakoblell.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 61f860c3
...@@ -481,6 +481,24 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, ...@@ -481,6 +481,24 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_options *opt); struct ip_options *opt);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
#include <linux/ktime.h>
/* Syncookies use a monotonic timer which increments every 64 seconds.
* This counter is used both as a hash input and partially encoded into
* the cookie value. A cookie is only validated further if the delta
* between the current counter value and the encoded one is less than this,
* i.e. a sent cookie is valid only at most for 128 seconds (or less if
* the counter advances immediately after a cookie is generated).
*/
#define MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE 2
static inline u32 tcp_cookie_time(void)
{
struct timespec now;
getnstimeofday(&now);
return now.tv_sec >> 6; /* 64 seconds granularity */
}
u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
u16 *mssp); u16 *mssp);
__u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mss); __u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mss);
......
...@@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ __u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req) ...@@ -89,8 +89,7 @@ __u32 cookie_init_timestamp(struct request_sock *req)
static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 data)
__u32 data)
{ {
/* /*
* Compute the secure sequence number. * Compute the secure sequence number.
...@@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, ...@@ -102,7 +101,7 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
* As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the * As an extra hack, we add a small "data" value that encodes the
* MSS into the second hash value. * MSS into the second hash value.
*/ */
u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
...@@ -114,22 +113,21 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, ...@@ -114,22 +113,21 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport,
* If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of * If the syncookie is bad, the data returned will be out of
* range. This must be checked by the caller. * range. This must be checked by the caller.
* *
* The count value used to generate the cookie must be within * The count value used to generate the cookie must be less than
* "maxdiff" if the current (passed-in) "count". The return value * MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE minutes in the past.
* is (__u32)-1 if this test fails. * The return value (__u32)-1 if this test fails.
*/ */
static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
__u32 count, __u32 maxdiff)
{ {
__u32 diff; u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
/* Strip away the layers from the cookie */ /* Strip away the layers from the cookie */
cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
/* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */ /* Cookie is now reduced to (count * 2^24) ^ (hash % 2^24) */
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS); diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) - 1 >> COOKIEBITS);
if (diff >= maxdiff) if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
return (__u32)-1; return (__u32)-1;
return (cookie - return (cookie -
...@@ -173,7 +171,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, ...@@ -173,7 +171,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v4_init_sequence(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), th->source, th->dest, ntohl(th->seq),
jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind); mssind);
} }
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v4_init_sequence);
...@@ -188,13 +186,6 @@ __u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp) ...@@ -188,13 +186,6 @@ __u32 cookie_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u16 *mssp)
return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp); return __cookie_v4_init_sequence(iph, th, mssp);
} }
/*
* This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
* Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
* sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
* backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
*/
#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
/* /*
* Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie. * Check if a ack sequence number is a valid syncookie.
* Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not. * Return the decoded mss if it is, or 0 if not.
...@@ -204,9 +195,7 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, ...@@ -204,9 +195,7 @@ int __cookie_v4_check(const struct iphdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
{ {
__u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
__u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr, __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, seq, th->source, th->dest, seq);
jiffies / (HZ * 60),
COUNTER_TRIES);
return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
} }
......
...@@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ static __u16 const msstab[] = { ...@@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ static __u16 const msstab[] = {
9000 - 60, 9000 - 60,
}; };
/*
* This (misnamed) value is the age of syncookie which is permitted.
* Its ideal value should be dependent on TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT and
* sysctl_tcp_retries1. It's a rather complicated formula (exponential
* backoff) to compute at runtime so it's currently hardcoded here.
*/
#define COUNTER_TRIES 4
static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static inline struct sock *get_cookie_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req, struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst) struct dst_entry *dst)
...@@ -86,8 +78,9 @@ static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *dadd ...@@ -86,8 +78,9 @@ static u32 cookie_hash(const struct in6_addr *saddr, const struct in6_addr *dadd
static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr, static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, const struct in6_addr *daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __be16 sport, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq,
__u32 count, __u32 data) __u32 data)
{ {
u32 count = tcp_cookie_time();
return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + return (cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) +
sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) + sseq + (count << COOKIEBITS) +
((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data) ((cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, count, 1) + data)
...@@ -96,15 +89,14 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr, ...@@ -96,15 +89,14 @@ static __u32 secure_tcp_syn_cookie(const struct in6_addr *saddr,
static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, const struct in6_addr *saddr, static __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport, const struct in6_addr *daddr, __be16 sport,
__be16 dport, __u32 sseq, __u32 count, __be16 dport, __u32 sseq)
__u32 maxdiff)
{ {
__u32 diff; __u32 diff, count = tcp_cookie_time();
cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq; cookie -= cookie_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, 0, 0) + sseq;
diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS); diff = (count - (cookie >> COOKIEBITS)) & ((__u32) -1 >> COOKIEBITS);
if (diff >= maxdiff) if (diff >= MAX_SYNCOOKIE_AGE)
return (__u32)-1; return (__u32)-1;
return (cookie - return (cookie -
...@@ -125,8 +117,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, ...@@ -125,8 +117,7 @@ u32 __cookie_v6_init_sequence(const struct ipv6hdr *iph,
*mssp = msstab[mssind]; *mssp = msstab[mssind];
return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source, return secure_tcp_syn_cookie(&iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, th->source,
th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), th->dest, ntohl(th->seq), mssind);
jiffies / (HZ * 60), mssind);
} }
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_init_sequence); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__cookie_v6_init_sequence);
...@@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ int __cookie_v6_check(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th, ...@@ -146,8 +137,7 @@ int __cookie_v6_check(const struct ipv6hdr *iph, const struct tcphdr *th,
{ {
__u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1; __u32 seq = ntohl(th->seq) - 1;
__u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr, __u32 mssind = check_tcp_syn_cookie(cookie, &iph->saddr, &iph->daddr,
th->source, th->dest, seq, th->source, th->dest, seq);
jiffies / (HZ * 60), COUNTER_TRIES);
return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0; return mssind < ARRAY_SIZE(msstab) ? msstab[mssind] : 0;
} }
......
Markdown is supported
0%
or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment