Commit 960828aa authored by Gustavo A. R. Silva's avatar Gustavo A. R. Silva Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman

kernel/sys.c: fix potential Spectre v1 issue

commit 23d6aef7 upstream.

`resource' can be controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential
exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

  kernel/sys.c:1474 __do_compat_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)
  kernel/sys.c:1455 __do_sys_old_getrlimit() warn: potential spectre issue 'get_current()->signal->rlim' (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing *resource* before using it to index
current->signal->rlim

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to
kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515030038.GA11822@embeddedor.comSigned-off-by: default avatarGustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent b1fc8ecb
...@@ -1313,6 +1313,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, ...@@ -1313,6 +1313,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
task_lock(current->group_leader); task_lock(current->group_leader);
x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
task_unlock(current->group_leader); task_unlock(current->group_leader);
......
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