Commit a919a18c authored by Pawan Gupta's avatar Pawan Gupta Committed by Stefan Bader

x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR

commit c2955f27 upstream

Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain
processors as part of a speculative side channel attack.  A microcode
update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will
add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the
option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations.

The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones
which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those
CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all
CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well.

  [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also
    support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ]

Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits.

TSX has two sub-features:

1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature
   where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions.
2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of
   "old" style locks are used by software.

Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the
IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR.

There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:

  Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
         sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
	 XBEGIN instruction).

  Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
         (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
	  CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is
unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated
as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by
IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR.
Signed-off-by: default avatarPawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: default avatarNeelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarMark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarTony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

CVE-2019-11135
Signed-off-by: default avatarTyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarStefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
parent 036ff4e2
......@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
* Microarchitectural Data
* Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
*/
#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR BIT(7) /* MSR for TSX control is available. */
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
......@@ -83,6 +84,10 @@
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL 0x00000122
#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */
#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
......
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