x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT

Add the option to flush IBPB only on VMEXIT in order to protect from
malicious guests but one otherwise trusts the software that runs on the
hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO		(11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS		(11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT	(11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -2198,6 +2198,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation {
 	SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
 	SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
 	SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
 };
 
 enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
@@ -2205,6 +2206,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
 	SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE,
 	SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
 	SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
+	SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
 };
 
 static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
@@ -2212,6 +2214,7 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
 	[SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE]      = "Mitigation: microcode",
 	[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET]	 = "Mitigation: safe RET",
 	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB]		 = "Mitigation: IBPB",
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
 };
 
 static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
@@ -2230,6 +2233,8 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
 	else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb"))
 		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
+		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
 	else
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
 
@@ -2313,6 +2318,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
 			goto pred_cmd;
 		}
+		break;
+
+	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+			}
+		} else {
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			goto pred_cmd;
+                }
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c

@@ -1498,7 +1498,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 
 	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
 		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
-		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
+		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
 	}
 	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
 		avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);

arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S

@@ -224,6 +224,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 	 */
 	UNTRAIN_RET
 
+	/* SRSO */
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT
+
 	/*
 	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
 	 * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded